That there is some connection between politics and human nature is a commonplace, but why and in what way they are conjoined is disputed. Aristotle's practice of comparing humans with other animals, and not conceptually divorcing them, is fruitful. By adopting a similar practice an indirect linkage (rather than Aristotle's direct one) between human nature and politics is identified. The strategy is to locate at least one universal aspect of human nature which is non‐political that, nonetheless, carries with it a (...) requirement that universally calls forth a political response. The aspect is reproductive sex and the need to ensure that offspring survive. In humans, the natural fact of paternal uncertainty is dealt with by conventions, but, because of this, these vary (for example, as between matrilineal and patrilineal kinship systems). But what is necessitated amid this variety is a need to establish an authoritative allocation of responsibility for nurture. Politics is the exercise of that authority. However, because of its roots in conventions called forth by human nature, the link is indirect. The conclusion is that contemporary attempts to re‐establish a direct link are bound to be inconclusive. (shrink)

This paper argues the case for coming to see ‘medical politics’ as a topic or subject within medical education. First, its absence is noted from the wide array of paramedical subjects (medical ethics, history of medicine, the medical humanities, etc) currently given attention in both the medical education literature and in specific curricula. Second the author suggests that ‘the political’ is implicitly recognisable in the historical roots of medical ethics education, specifically in certain of the London Medical Group's activities, and (...) also that the medical profession, or indeed any profession, cannot be understood as an apolitical form of social organisation either in its institutional or scientific (epistemic) forms. Some brief suggestions for introductory and advanced topics in medical politics are discussed and the degree to which medical politics ought to be taken seriously and delivered as part of medical education is considered. Ultimately the author concludes that medical politics might be considered a useful subject within medical education, but it is perhaps best understood as a perspective or approach that can contribute to the development of a more expansive perspective within the extant paramedical subjects. (shrink)

Aristotle's treatment of the choice between the political and contemplative lives (in EN I 5 and X 7-8) can seem awkward. To offer one explanation of this, I argue that when he invokes self-sufficience (autarkeia) as a criterion for this choice, he appeals to two different and incompatible specifications of "lacking nothing." On one specification, suitable to a human being living as a political animal and thus seeking to realize his end as an engaged citizen of a polis, a person (...) lacks nothing by possessing a wide range of goods that directly require other people. On the other, more suitable to a god or a beast, a person lacks nothing by having no need of goods that directly require other people. The ambiguity of this criterion renders the choice between the political and contemplative lives difficult. (shrink)

This essay contributes to contemporary discussions concerning so‐called animal politics by drawing from the history of the notion of political animal. Two different historical meanings of the notion are identified: (1) normative political animality that is intrinsically linked with rationality, language, and justice; (2) biological political animality that focuses on collaboration for the sake of a common aim. The former is applicable only to human beings, while the latter can also be used in relation to other animals. After briefly discussing (...) the Aristotelian background of the notion, the essay argues that in medieval Aristotelian tradition, the normative meaning prevailed and the biological one was set aside. However, it is precisely the biological notion that appears useful today. The essay suggests several ways in which it might benefit contemporary theoretical discussions concerning animals, thus laying ground for further developments in animal politics. (shrink)

Aristotle’s Politicsis not only famous for its theory of constitutions, but for its statements about human nature. According to the central claim of Aristotle’s political anthropology, man is by nature a political animal (phusei politikon zôon). This famous statement is presented as the conclusion of the first set of arguments that Aristotle develops in the second chapter of book I of the Politics(Pol.,I, 2, 1252a24–1253a3). Aristotle’s statement is inextricably linked with the claim that the polisexists by nature (phusei), which he (...) mentions in the same phrase, as part of his conclusion: “From these considerations it is evident that the polisis one of the things that exist by nature, and that man is by nature a political animal”(Pol.,I, 2, 1253a1–3). Evidently, the claims that the polisexists by nature and that man is by nature a political animal are complementary. This article presents an interpretation of the two complementary claims or theses arguing that in Pol.,I, 2 Aristotle conceives exclusively of human beings as political animals because the whole chapter focuses on theanalysisof the polis,a community peculiar to humans. Italso examines Aristotle’sclaim that the polis“is by nature prior (proteron) to the household and to the individual”(Pol.,I, 2, 1253a18–19). The paperdisagrees withscholars whounderstand this claim as an independent third thesis and theoremand argues that Aristotle’s claim functions as a strong argument for the thesis that man is by nature a political animal. Furthermore, it contends thatAristotle neither defends an organic theory of the polisnor has a “tendency towards totalitarianism”(J. Barnes). -/- . (shrink)

While Aristotle’s proposition that "Man is by nature a political animal" is often assumed to entail that, according to Aristotle, nonhuman animals are not political, some Aristotelian scholars suggest that Aristotle is only committed to the claim that man is more of a political animal than any other nonhuman animal. I argue that even this thesis is problematic, as contemporary research in cognitive ethology reveals that many social nonhuman mammals have demonstrated that they are, in fact, political in the Aristotelian (...) sense, as they possess a sense of both general and special justice. Keeping this in mind, I conclude that some nonhuman animal communities very well might be identified as highly political communities, leading us to question whether it is really the case that humans are more political than socially complex, group-living nonhuman animals. (shrink)

The most recent restatements of stakeholder theory formulate that approach in terms of the distribution of value: “A stakeholder approach to business is about creating as much value as possible for stakeholders, without resorting to tradeoffs” (Freeman et al. 2010: 28). This formulation marks a shift from earlier work, which included a procedural dimension—a requirement that stakeholders participate in organization decision making. The present paper pushes back against this shift: it argues that orienting the stakeholder approach around the participation requirement (...) provides for a different moral logic, one not available to (now) conventional stakeholder theorizing (without that requirement), and one that may be more compelling to many. This argument requires critical re-examination of the moral arguments offered in the most recent restatements of the stakeholder approach. (shrink)

At the beginning of Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that “the good is the same for an individual as for a city”. The good in question is εὐδαιμονία – the highest good achievable for human beings. In Book X, we learn that contemplative activity meets best the requirements set for eudaimonia. Even if we agree that contemplative activity is the good for an individual, how should we understand the claim that contemplation is also the good for a (...) city? I start by reminding readers that for Aristotle the Nicomachean Ethics is essentially a political enquiry and should be read together with his Politics. I focus on the teleological character of his political philosophy and the interlinking of the concepts of the good, nature, form, end and function. Then, I look at Aristotle’s two closely-connected statements that polis exists by nature and that men are political animals. Having taken into account Aristotle’s opinion regarding the imperfection of this world, which is exemplified by the vulnerability of human lives to fortune, luck and accidents, I conclude that Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of the political community as a common project explains well how contemplation could be the end of polis. Only very few individuals can achieve the highest good and they can do it only if they have the support of the political community. But all the inhabitants of a polis structured towards achieving the highest good benefit from living in a well-ordered community whose constitution reflects the objective hierarchy of goods. (shrink)