We review articles about corporate political activity published in Business & Society since its beginnings 60 years ago and in a set of other leading management journals over the past decade. We present evidence that most studies of CPA use the political markets’ perspective. Under the premise that the contemporary political environment has changed significantly since the inception of the political markets’ perspective, our review asks two interconnected questions. First, to what degree have changes in the political environment challenged the (...) ability of the political markets’ perspective to understand the pillars of politics: issues, institutions, interests, and information? Second, to what degree have CPA scholars augmented or diversified their theoretical arguments to accommodate these changes in the political environment? We document the CPA literature across these dimensions and questions and note that many scholars are already adopting other theories side by side with the political markets’ perspective. (shrink)

This article develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of corporate political involvement, as mediated not only by environmental factors but also by characteristics of the firm itself. Consistent with previous research, the authors examine how policy salience and the political, macroeconomic, and industry environments influence the level of a firm's involvement in politics. In addition, the authors' model takes into account such influences as corporate structure, resources, political experience, and stakeholder dependence.

This study tests an integrative model of corporate political action, the filter model, based on the behavioral theory of the firm. The filter model posits that external political, economic, and industry environments are mediated by organizational structures and resources to affect a firm’s political actions. The authors rate the filter model’s predictive power against that of an economic-based direct-effects model by examining the efforts of about 1,100 U.S.-domiciled manufacturing firms to influence trade policy. LISREL analysis demonstrates that the integrative filter (...) model provides a superior explanation of corporate political action. (shrink)

Corporate political action committees (PACs) play a prominent role in the political strategies of U.S. organizations, and the ability of firms to influence political outcomes is highly controversial. To the extent that PACs enable groups of firms to pursue corporate agendas at the expense of the social good, they promote socially suboptimal outcomes. This study examines the impact of corporate PACs on entry restriction in manufacturing industries and finds a negative relationship between corporate PAC spending and the entry of new (...) firms. Results suggest that PACs are used to shape industry structure to the economic benefit of incumbents. (shrink)

Abstract:The new push to move political issue activity from the federal to the state and local levels—a new New Federalism—has implications for the ethical and political legitimacy of business political activity. While business political activity at the federal level may be both less costly and less risky than when action shifts to states or localities, at the state or local level it is likely to be more visible, and individual firms may be perceived to have more power. Increased corporate power (...) raises questions about the legitimacy of firm involvement in the political process at the state and local levels. The issue of legitimacy is viewed in the context of the literature on political subcultures being used to study state economic development. (shrink)

Corrupt regulatory environment encourages firms to deploy middlemen for speedy and assured acquisition of different services from regulatory agencies. Using a World Bank dataset of 2210 Indian manufacturing firms, this article examines how firms with middlemen deal with corrupt governmental agencies for its operational efficiency. Our results demonstrate that deployment of middlemen by the firms is often accompanied by a substantial increase in operational delay, relatively trigger more consumption of senior management’s time on regulatory disentanglement, enhance the likelihood/tendency to pay (...) bribe, and likely to face more court cases as a means of restitution of legal rights. As firm-specific attributes may contaminate our preliminary results, we utilized the propensity score framework to examine relationships among variables of interests. Our study contributes to the inconspicuous part of the corruption literature by attempting to present a comprehensive but indirect assessment of the functions of middlemen that predominantly remained unattended except some scattered descriptive, case-based anecdotal presentations. (shrink)