Nonhuman animals are unable to exert any direct control over the functioning of democratic institutions –the decisions of which, nevertheless, have a pervasive impact on their lives. Their interests are therefore likelier to be set back or unfairly discounted, and their choices are more vulnerable to arbitrary interference. Because of this, some authors have suggested that we ought to redesign our political institutions so that they are more responsive to the interests of animals. We argue that this strategy fails to (...) address the root of the problem, which is animals’ lack of robust political agency. We defend that, should it become technologically feasible, we have a pro tanto obligation, derived from the values that underpin democracy, to uplift, or radically enhance, the political agency of nonhuman animals, so that they can better participate in mass democratic politics, express their interests as they see them, self-organise to defend them, and hold their representatives accountable. Finally, we explain how our argument manages to resist the most important objections against animal enhancement and, in some cases, it does so better than alternative proposals based on the value of animal well-being. (shrink)

Rodger et al 1 present a thoughtful case for the ethical defensibility of genetic disenhancement targeting unnecessary harm and suffering of the pigs raised for xenotransplantation research. On the assumption that xenotransplantation research is unlikely to be halted (and by my lights, also that no other short-term palliative options can be identified or developed), their view appears to be largely reasonable and aligned with recent proposals by animal ethicists for targeting pain in factory-farmed animals. Yet, despite their thoughtful responses to (...) anticipated objections, the authors overlook an important class of recent harm-based objections grounded in the ethics of care. Drawing on recent work in animal ethics, I present a case for potential (a) care-based harms to pigs and (b) care-based harms to humans that are relevant to genetic disenhancement interventions of the sort these authors propose. I discuss each in turn below. The first concern over care-based harm draws on Mark Rowlands’2 notion that at least some non-human animals may be considered moral subjects, even if they are not considered moral agents. Rowlands’ view is based on the positive capacities that many animals possess for sympathy, compassion, kindness, patience and tolerance, as well as negative capacities including malice, anger and …. (shrink)

In recent years, some ethicists have defended that we should genetically engineer farmed animals to diminish or eliminate their capacity to experience negative affective states, a process known as disenhancement that would, according to these authors, result in a situation that is better than the status quo. While we agree with this overall assessment, we believe that it is a mistake to defend disenhancement as a good solution to farmed animals’ plight. This is because disenhancement entails some generally unseen harms (...) that arise from the fact that negative affective states, despite feeling bad, support the access to a number of intrinsic goods, such as individuality, social relationships, meaning, and political participation. Though farmed animals currently have few opportunities to enjoy these goods, we argue that this is a reason to change the environment in which they are kept, not the animals. If we truly care about improving farmed animals’ lives, we should aim to enrich their environment, rather than impoverish their mental lives. (shrink)