Background Neuroimaging and lesion studies suggested that the dorsolateral prefrontal and posterior parietal cortices mediate visual metacognitive awareness. The causal evidence provided by non-invasive brain stimulation, however, is inconsistent. -/- Objective/hypothesis Here we revisit a major figure discrimination experiment adding a new Kanizsa figure task trying to resolve whether bilateral continuous theta-burst transcranial magnetic stimulation (cTBS) over these regions affects perceptual metacognition. Specifically, we tested whether subjective visibility ratings and/or metacognitive efficiency are lower when cTBS is applied to these two (...) regions in comparison to an active control region. -/- Methods A within-subjects design including three sessions spaced by one-week intervals was implemented. In each session, every participant was administered bilateral cTBS to either prefrontal, control or parietal cortices. Two concurrent tasks were performed, a real and an illusory figure task, stabilising objective performance with use of an adaptive staircase procedure. -/- Results When performing the replicated task, cTBS was found insufficient to disrupt neither visibility ratings nor metacognitive efficiency. However, with use of Kanizsa style illusory figures, cTBS over the dorsolateral prefrontal, but not over the posterior parietal cortex, was observed to significantly diminish metacognitive efficiency. -/- Conclusion(s) Real and illusory figure tasks demonstrated different cTBS effects. A possible explanation is the involvement of the prefrontal cortex in the creation of expectations, which is necessary for efficient metacognition. Failure to replicate previous findings for the real figure task, however, cannot be said to support, conclusively, the notion that these brain regions have a causal role in metacognitive awareness. This inconsistent finding may result from certain limitations of our study, thereby suggesting the need for yet further investigation. (shrink)

There is a continuing debate in the field of perceptual organization as to whether the locus of global processing is early or late perceptual, as previous studies have yielded contrary results. The conducted behavioural study explored this issue with the paradigm of collating global processing with other process of perceptual organization, namely illusory contours processing. Interaction between these two processes of perceptual organization would indicate that global processing has an early perceptual locus, whereas the lack of such interaction would suggest (...) the late perceptual locus of global processing. In experiment 1, the effect of global dominance was obtained with the use of a compound figure composed of geometrical shapes with real edges. Results showed that the processing of the figure at the global level was faster and that it disrupted the processing of the figures from the local level. In experiment 1b, the compound figure was composed of local geometrical shapes generated with the use of the line-end induced illusory contours. Local elements with illusory contours did not affect the processing of the hierarchical structure and the effect of global precedence occurred without any changes. In experiment 2a, a global advantaged effect within a compound figure with local elements with real edges was obtained in the paradigm of attention divided between levels of the hierarchical structure. When illusory contours of local elements of a compound figure were introduced to this paradigm, this again had no effect on the perceptual global advantage. The results demonstrate the lack of interaction between global processing and illusory contour processing, indicating that the locus of global processing is rather late perceptual. (shrink)

The question of whether cognition can influence perception has a long history in neuroscience and philosophy. Here, we outline a novel approach to this issue, arguing that it should be viewed within the framework of top-down information-processing. This approach leads to a reversal of the standard explanatory order of the cognitive penetration debate: we suggest studying top-down processing at various levels without preconceptions of perception or cognition. Once a clear picture has emerged about which processes have influences on those at (...) lower levels, we can re-address the extent to which they should be considered perceptual or cognitive. Using top-down processing within the visual system as a model for higher-level influences, we argue that the current evidence indicates clear constraints on top-down influences at all stages of information processing; it does, however, not support the notion of a boundary between specific types of information-processing as proposed by the cognitive impenetrability hypothesis. (shrink)