Although many of the pioneers of present-day bioethics came from religious and theological backgrounds, the recent controversy about the role of religion in bioethics has elicited much attention. Timothy Murphy would ban religion from bioethics altogether. Much of the ado hinges on conflicting understandings of just what bioethics is and just what religion is. This paper attempts to make more explicit how the fields of bioethics and religion have been understood in this context, and how they should not be understood. (...) We begin by looking at bioethics as a field: its origins, purpose, scope, and its methods. We then examine the notion of religion, looking especially at its importance for bioethics. Humanity is not just Homo sapiens but also Homo religiosus. Religion is more than a code of ethics; it gives insight into many of the foundational matters of bioethics. (shrink)

Debates about the ethics of health care and medical research in contemporary pluralistic democracies often arise partly from competing religious and secular values. Such disagreements raise challenges of balancing claims of religious liberty with claims to equal treatment in health care. This paper proposes several mid-level principles to help in framing sound policies for resolving such disputes. We develop and illustrate these principles, exploring their application to conscientious objection by religious providers and religious institutions, accommodation of religious priorities in biomedical (...) research, and treatment of patients’ religious views in doctor–patient encounters. Given that no sound set of guiding principles yields precise solutions for every policy dispute, we explore how morally sound democracies might deliberatively resolve such policy issues, following our proposed principles. Taken together and carefully interpreted, these principles may help in guiding difficult decision making in the indefinitely large realm where government, medical providers, and patients encounter problems concerning religion and medicine. (shrink)

Islamic religious norms are important for Islamic bioethical deliberations. In Muslim societies religious and cultural norms are sometimes confused but only the former are considered inviolable. I argue that respect for Islamic religious norms is essential for the legitimacy of bioethical standards in the Muslim context. I attribute the legitimating power of these norms, in addition to their purely religious and spiritual underpinnings, to their moral, legal, and communal dimensions. Although diversity within the Islamic ethical tradition defies any reductionist or (...) essentialist reconstruction, legitimacy is secured mainly by approximation of Islamic ethical ideals believed to be inherent in the scriptural texts, rather than by the adoption of particular dogmatic or creedal views. With these characteristics, Islamic (bio) ethics may provide useful insights for comparative ethics and global bioethics. (shrink)

Central to this essay is the understanding that varied communities may have an inherent and unrecognised culture of their own and this culture may be detrimental to their core. Bioethics constitutes one such community and is embedded in norms and values comprising its own culture. I use exclusion of religion or simply ‘irreligion’ as an example of a cultural element that may be established and so shape the culture of bioethics. Irreligious bioethics includes both overt religious preclusion and the more (...) pervasive form of religious marginalisation. This norm is narrated into the culture of bioethics with justifications sustaining it. Irreligious bioethics is inadmissible as it claims illegitimate neutrality, is a misuse of expertise and results in a variety of harms. As bioethics is influential in society, those engaged should be critically reflective and aware of harmful cultural elements whilst also possessing the honesty, courage and capacity to change them. (shrink)

In this issue, contributors engage Timothy Murphy’s proposal for irreligious bioethics over against religious bioethics. Two essays take opposing sides in the debate, while a third seeks middle ground. Another essay questions the meaning of the words “religion,” “irreligion,” and “secular.” The final essay examines the religious nature of human existence and its implications for the debate.

H. Tristram Engelhardt has said that “in the 1960s and 1970s... religious bioethics fell into the shadow of established secular bioethics. I don't think that religious bioethics has ever really...

Theological and secular voices in bioethics have drifted into separate silos. Such a separation results in part from theologians focusing less on conveying ideas in ways that contribute to a pluralistic and public bioethical discourse and the dwindling receptivity of religious arguments within secular bioethics. This essay works against these drifts by putting forward an argument that does not bounce around a religious echo-chamber, but instead demonstrates how insights of Christian anthropology can be meaningfully responsive to secular bioethics’ rightful concerns (...) with inequality and injustice. We offer core concepts from Christian bioethics that encourage dialogue with secular and theological bioethicists. The theologically-grounded concepts, human dignity, sin, and the common good, provide intellectual resources to address major areas of bioethical concern that remain unresolved. (shrink)

Brummett argues that P2+ is necessary because it acknowledges the metaphysical claims ignored in P2’s approach in addressing parental refusal for treatment in certain pediatric cases that cl...

“The discipline of theological bioethics is in trouble.” So wrote Charles Camosy in November 2014, claiming that “Today’s centers of power in academic and clinical bioethics (at least in the develo...

Janet Malek has recently argued that the religious worldview of the clinical ethics consultant should play no normative role in clinical ethics consultation. What are the theological implications of a normatively secular clinical ethics? I argue that Malek’s proposal constitutes an irreligious clinical ethics, which commits multiple metaphysical harms. First, I summarize Malek’s key claims for a secular clinical ethics. Second, I explicate both John Milbank’s notion of ontological violence and Timothy Murphy’s irreligious bioethics to show how they apply to (...) Malek’s secular clinical ethics, resulting in an irreligious clinical ethics. Third, I then show how an irreligious clinical ethics commits metaphysical harms to patients, clinical ethics consultants, and the institution of clinical ethics consultation. I conclude that Malek’s proposal for an irreligious clinical ethics must be rejected to maintain the metaphysical integrity of clinical ethics consultants, patients, and the institution of clinical ethics consultation. (shrink)

McCarthy, Homan, and Rozier’s call for a renewal of open and honest dialogue between secular and theologically grounded bioethics is admirable. Yet, their essay argues for more than mere dia...

Full-Blooded religion is not acceptable in mainstream bioethics. This article excavates the cultural history that led to the suppression of religion in bioethics. Bioethicists typically fall into one of the following camps. 1) The irreligious, who advocate for suppressing religion, as do Timothy F. Murphy, Sam Harris, and Richard Dawkins. This irreligious camp assumes American Fundamentalist Protestantism is the real substance of all religions. 2) Religious bioethicists, who defend religion by emphasizing its functions and diminishing its metaphysical commitments. Religious defenders (...) empty religion of its theology to present its feel-good functions in a way that is acceptable to the irreligious. However, religion reduced to its functions dissolves into a counter-culture that may counteract materialism but lacks the power to motivate much more. This article criticizes both camps, as both presume Enlightenment myths and consequently neuter religion. Both irreligious and religious bioethicists commonly presume Enlightenment myths about secularity and religion. Secularity is presumed neutral and rational. Religion is presumed divisive and irrational. This myth provides built-in value-judgements; we have already judged secularity as good and religion as bad. Much of the debate over religion in bioethics is arguing over false stereotypes of religion. Consequently, mainstream bioethics neuters religion, while the irreligious are gifted political power to define the field. (shrink)

Most modern ethicists and ethics textbooks assert that religion holds little or no place in ethics, including fields of professional ethics like medical ethics. This assertion, of course, implicitly refers to ethical reasoning, but there is much more to the ethical life and the practice of ethics—especially professional ethics—than reasoning. It is no surprise that teachers of practical ethics, myself included, often focus on reasoning to the exclusion of other aspects of the ethical life. Especially for those with a philosophical (...) background, reasoning is the most patent and pedagogically controllable aspect of the ethical life—and the most easily testable. And whereas there may be powerful reasons for the limitation of religion in this aspect of ethics, there are other aspects of the ethical life in which recognition of religious belief may arguably be more relevant and possibly even necessary. I divide the ethical life into three areas—personal morality, interpersonal morality, and rational morality—each of which I explore in terms of its relationship to religion, normatively characterized by the qualities of devotion, diversity, and reasoning, respectively. (shrink)

In “There’s No Harm in Talking,” McCarthy, Homan, and Rozier note that in recent years theological bioethicists have not felt the need to translate their insights for a broader pluralistic a...

Timothy Murphy has done those of us in the field of bioethics a great service by being forthright about how irreligious centers of power work against theology and theologians. This has opened the door to direct and honest conversation about some facts that were previously known but rarely discussed publicly. Now, eight years after Murphy’s important article appeared in the American Journal of Bioethics, there is room to engage the facts and arguments surrounding the role for theology in the field. (...) It is important, first of all, to agree that if theology is to be excluded while other normative traditions included this must be defended on the basis of a coherent set of defensible claims, not merely raw assertions and power plays. Once the field comes to terms with the fact that no coherent set of defensible claims exist which can justify excluding theology from the field, this will create the conditions for the possibility of the kind of intellectual solidarity which can transform bioethics into a field that is at once much more diverse and inclusive while also of its very nature interested in robust debate which includes references first principles and metaphysical foundations. (shrink)

Douglas Diekema has argued that it is not the best interest standard, but the harm principle that serves as the moral basis for ethicists, clinicians, and the courts to trigger state intervention to limit parental authority in the clinic. Diekema claims the harm principle is especially effective in justifying state intervention in cases of religiously motivated medical neglect in pediatrics involving Jehovah’s Witnesses and Christian Scientists. I argue that Diekema has not articulated a harm principle that is capable of justifying (...) state intervention in these cases. Where disagreements over appropriate care are tethered to metaphysical disagreements, it is moral-metaphysical standards, rather than merely moral standards, that are needed to provide substantive guidance. I provide a discussion of Diekema’s harm principle to the broader end of highlighting an inconsistency between the theory and practice of secular bioethics when overriding religiously based medical decisions. In a secular state, ethicists, clinicians, and the courts are purportedly neutral with respect to moral-metaphysical positions, especially regarding those claims considered to be religious. However, the practice of overriding religiously based parental requests requires doffing the mantle of neutrality. In the search for a meaningful standard by which to override religiously based parental requests in pediatrics, bioethicists cannot avoid some minimal metaphysical commitments. To resolve this inconsistency, bioethicists must either begin permitting religiously based requests, even at the cost of children’s lives, or admit that at least some moral-metaphysical disputes can be rationally adjudicated. (shrink)

The national standards for clinical ethics consultation set forth by the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities endorse an “ethics facilitation” approach, which characterizes the role of the ethicist as one skilled at facilitating consensus within the range of ethically acceptable options. To determine the range of ethically acceptable options, ASBH recommends the standard model of decision-making, which is grounded in the values of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr. has sharply criticized the standard model for presuming (...) contentful moral claims in circumscribing the range of ethically acceptable options, which, he argues, cannot be rationally justified in a pluralistic context. Engelhardt’s solution is a secular clinical ethics based on a contentless principle of permission. The first part of this article lays out Engelhardt’s negative claim, that reason cannot establish contentful moral claims, and his positive claim, that secular clinical ethics ought to be based on a contentless principle of permission. The second part critiques these negative and positive claims. The purpose of this paper is to defend secular clinical ethics expertise—defined as the ability of ethicists to offer justified moral recommendations grounded in consensus positions endorsed by the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities—from the radical critiques of Engelhardt, who argues that no moral or metaphysical claims, and hence no bioethical consensus, can be rationally justified. Engelhardt’s critiques have caused some to worry that secular clinical ethics is in a state of theoretical crisis; this article concludes that Engelhardt’s view is an unstable basis for that worry. (shrink)

The proper role, if any, for religion-based arguments is a live and sometimes heated issue within the field of bioethics. The issue attracts heat primarily because bioethical analyses influence the outcomes of controversial court cases and help shape legislation in sensitive biopolicy areas. A problem for religious bioethicists who seek to influence biopolicy is that there is now widespread academic and public acceptance, at least within liberal democracies, that the state should not base its policies on any particular religion’s metaphysical (...) claims or esoteric moral system. In response, bioethicists motivated by religious concerns have adopted two identifiable strategies. Sometimes they rely on slippery-slope arguments that, sometimes at least, have empirically testable premises. A more questionable response is the manipulation and misuse of secular-sounding moral language, such as references to “human dignity,” and the plights of groups of people labeled “vulnerable.”. (shrink)