There is a growing consensus that Emilie Du Châtelet’s challenging essay “On Freedom” defends compatibilism. I offer an alternative, libertarian reading of the essay. I lay out the prima facie textual evidence for such a reading. I also explain how apparently compatibilist remarks in “On Freedom” can be read as aspects of a sophisticated type of libertarianism that rejects blind or arbitrary choice. To this end, I consider the historical context of Du Châtelet’s essay, and especially the dialectic between various (...) strands of eighteenth-century libertarianism and compatibilism. (shrink)

Leibniz is commonly labeled a foe of Molinism. His rejection of robust libertarian freedom coupled with some explicit passages in which he distances himself from the doctrine of middle knowledge seem to justify this classification. In this paper, I argue that this standard view is not quite correct. I identify the two substantive tenets of Molinism. First, the connection between the conditions for free actions and these free actions is a contingent one: free actions follow contingently from their sufficient conditions. (...) Second, God knows what creatures would freely do in different possible circumstances prevolitionally—that is, prior to God willing anything. I argue that Leibniz himself endorses a version of both tenets and utilizes them for theoretical purposes similar to those of Molinists. I conclude that Leibniz is much closer to Molinism than is typically acknowledged. Leibniz is best characterized as a friend—rather than a foe—of Molinism. (shrink)

Leibniz was introduced to the English-speaking world in the twentieth century by Bertrand Russell’s Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, a book that at once hailed the depth and elegance of Leibniz’s logico-metaphysical scheme and scorned his ethical theory. In the intervening years, Russell’s book has stimulated a large body of commentary, which has led to a sophisticated understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of Leibniz’s metaphysics. Predictably, Leibniz’s practical philosophy has received much less attention. With the exception of (...) John Hostler’s Leibniz’s Moral Philosophy, there has been no book-length treatment of Leibniz’s ethics in English and only a handful of articles. In this respect, English-language scholarship has lagged behind that of the Continent, where beginning with Gaston Grua’s landmark Jurisprudence universelle et Théodicée selon Leibniz there has grown a rich body of literature that has explored in detail the character of Leibniz’s practical philosophy and its relation to the history of moral and political thought. (shrink)

En sus últimos años, Leibniz emplea el concepto de necesidad moral para cualificar la elección divina de lo óptimo. Sin embargo, Leibniz no explica este concepto con precisión. El presente trabajo intenta mostrar que la necesidad moral leibniziana no puede entenderse como una modalidad puramente deóntica, porque ello contraría los fundamentos metafísicos que hacen al carácter teleológico de su ética. El artículo propone también una interpretación del contenido alético de tal noción, basada en la conexión necesaria que Leibniz parece atribuir (...) a la relación entre la voluntad y la tendencia al bien. Dicha necesidad afirmaría que, aun cuando toda elección es contingente, en tanto entraña una infinidad de consideraciones, el Dios leibniziano está metafísicamente necesitado a seguir el criterio de lo mejor. In his last years, Leibniz employs the concept of moral necessity to qualify God's choice of the best. However, he doesn't explain this concept accurately. This paper intends to show that leibnizian moral necessity cannot be conceived as a purely deontic modality, because it would be contrary to the metaphysical grounds which make Leibniz's ethics strictly teleological. This paper also proposes an interpretation of the alethic content of this concept, based on the necessary connection that Leibniz seems to assign to the relationship between free will and the tendency towards good. What this necessity entails is that, for Leibniz, even though the infinity of reasons involved makes every choice contingent, God is metaphysically necessitated to follow the rule of the best. (shrink)

En este artículo, presentamos primero un análisis de la proposición “Dios elige siempre lo mejor”, con el fin de indagar qué tipo de necesidad cabe atribuírsele. Puesto que Leibniz rechaza la necesidad geométrica en el ámbito de la libre elección divina, examinamos luego qué clase de relación hay entre el entendimiento y el bien, es decir, si corresponde prioritariamente a la razón juzgar sobre el bien o lo mejor. Del mismo modo, analizamos a continuación el vínculo que liga a la (...) voluntad con el bien, por cuanto este último parece ser, al mismo tiempo, el objeto natural de la voluntad. En ambos casos, el análisis se aplica tanto a Dios como a las criaturas racionales. Una aparente inconsistencia parece suscitarse entre un entendimiento y una voluntad que “se disputan” el mismo objeto. Nuestro objetivo es mostrar que, aunque la prioridad de examinar sobre el bien pueda recaer en una u otra facultad, según el contexto escritural, la cuestión carece de sentido al aplicársela a Dios. En suma, la ambivalencia se diluye cuando advertimos que ello resulta de una ficción humana, a saber que hay un hiato entre deber y querer. (shrink)

The proposition "God chooses the best" is for Leibniz an undeniable truth, as well as a fundamental premise in both his explanation of this world's existence and his theodicy. Leibniz thought it was necessary to clarify its modal status, in virtue of this matter's connection with God's freedom. Nevertheless, while dealing with this problem, he was led to violate his own modal theory's principles, in order to sustain the contingency of that proposition. This paper intends to show that Leibniz's main (...) view regarding the modality of this proposition represents a sort of exception in the framework of his modal conception, and that this uncertainty reveals the profound reasons of his numerous textual hesitations on the subject. (shrink)