This article explores whether theory-ladenness makes empirical testing an inse cure foundation for objectivity. Specifically, this article uses path diagrams as visual heuristics to assist in (1) developing a parsimonious representation of the traditional empiricist view of empirical testing, (2) showing how the "New Image" view ostensibly threatens the objectivity of science, (3) proposing a unified, realist theory of empirical testing, (4) developing a representation of the unified theory, (5) exploring several potential threats to objectivity, (6) discussing the proposed theory's (...) implications for social science, and (7) adumbrating three foundational premises for scientific realism. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article asks whether the philosophy of Paul K. Feyerabend can be reasonably classified as postmodernist, a label applied to him by friends and foes alike. After describing some superficial similarities between the style and content of both Feyerabend’s and postmodernist writings, I offer three more robust characterisations of postmodernism in terms of relativism, ‘incredulity to metanarratives’, and ‘depthlessness’. It emerges that none of these characterisations offers a strong justification for classifying Feyerabend as ‘postmodern’ in any significant sense. Indeed, what (...) does emerge is that Feyerabend’s work was fundamentally informed by a humanitarian vision of the value of science that is, in fact, strikingly modern. (shrink)

. Neither the correspondence nor the coherence theory of truth does justice to the truth claims made in science and theology. I propose a new definition that relates truth to solving puzzles. I claim that this definition is more adequate than either of the traditional theories and that it offers two additional benefits: first, it provides grounds for a theory regarding the relations between theology and science that may stand up better to philosophical scrutiny than does critical realism; and second, (...) it blocks the move to relativism based on recognition of the plurality of perspectives and the historical and social conditioning of knowledge. (shrink)

Two main tendencies in postmodernism can be identified, neither providing much scope for developing a postmodern philosophy of science. According to the first, the world is fragmented into a plurality of autonomous local discourses, implying that any advice to scientists can be given only from within science and not from philosophers who stand outside ( above') science. According to the second, the meaning of signs is fundamentally elusive (poststructuralism and deconstruction). A deconstructive philosophy of science might be conceived of as (...) experimenting with scientific texts, but in that case the label philosophy' becomes a mere matter of convention. (shrink)

The article based on Kuhn’s paradigmatic approach and Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programmes, analyses certain aspects of selected cognitive functions of religous beliefs. Our approach is based on the search for angalogy between scientific theories on one hand and systems of religious beliefs on the other hand. Contemporary philosophy of science demonstrates that scientific models are the products of creative analogous immagination, data are theory-laden, theories as a whole are resistent to falsification and it is hard (if at all) (...) to find reliable criterions for the selection of a paradigm. These «subjective features» are more evident within religion, since a wider range of models, greater impact of interpretations on data, greater arduousness in regard to the commitment to a paradigm and more ambiguity in the process of the selection of a paradigm, exist in this area. However, with each of these features, I see the difference between science and religion in their degree and not in absolute contrast. (shrink)

This paper shows how critical realism can be used to integrate empirical data and philosophical analysis within ‘empirical bioethics’. The term empirical bioethics, whilst appearing oxymoronic, simply refers to an interdisciplinary approach to the resolution of practical ethical issues within the biological and life sciences, integrating social scientific, empirical data with philosophical analysis. It seeks to achieve a balanced form of ethical deliberation that is both logically rigorous and sensitive to context, to generate normative conclusions that are practically applicable to (...) the problem, challenge, or dilemma. Since it incorporates both philosophical and social scientific components, empirical bioethics is a field that is consistent with the use of critical realism as a research methodology. The integration of philosophical and social scientific approaches to ethics has been beset with difficulties, not least because of the irreducibly normative, rather than descriptive, nature of ethical analysis and the contested relation between fact and value. However, given that facts about states of affairs inform potential courses of action and their consequences, there is a need to overcome these difficulties and successfully integrate data with theory. Previous approaches have been formulated to overcome obstacles in combining philosophical and social scientific perspectives in bioethical analysis; however each has shortcomings. As a mature interdisciplinary approach critical realism is well suited to empirical bioethics, although it has hitherto not been widely used. Here I show how it can be applied to this kind of research and explain how it represents an improvement on previous approaches. (shrink)