Like it or not, a big picture of the history of science is something which we cannot avoid. Big pictures are, of course, thoroughly out of fashion at the moment; those committed to specialist research find them simplistic and insufficiently complex and nuanced, while postmodernists regard them as simply impossible. But however specialist we may be in our research, however scornful of the immaturity of grand narratives, it is not so easy to escape from dependence – acknowledged or not – (...) on a big picture. When we define our research as part of the history of science, we implicitly invoke a big picture of that history to give identity and meaning to our specialism. When we teach the history of science, even if we do not present a big picture explicitly, our students already have a big picture of that history which they bring to our classes and into which they fit whatever we say, no matter how many complications and refinements and contradictions we put before them – unless we offer them an alternative big picture. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article asks whether the philosophy of Paul K. Feyerabend can be reasonably classified as postmodernist, a label applied to him by friends and foes alike. After describing some superficial similarities between the style and content of both Feyerabend’s and postmodernist writings, I offer three more robust characterisations of postmodernism in terms of relativism, ‘incredulity to metanarratives’, and ‘depthlessness’. It emerges that none of these characterisations offers a strong justification for classifying Feyerabend as ‘postmodern’ in any significant sense. Indeed, what (...) does emerge is that Feyerabend’s work was fundamentally informed by a humanitarian vision of the value of science that is, in fact, strikingly modern. (shrink)

The debate on the origins of modern humans is one of the oldest and most controversial in the field of palaeoanthropology. In the 1860s the debate was established in the evolutionary context and, as a conflict between two major schools and various sub-schools, it has continued up until the present day. The opposing schools were and still are, at best, in only partial alignment on the major scientific issues. Each of them is founded in its own metaphysics and focuses on (...) an exclusive set of observations that it is capable of explaining. It would appear, therefore, that the history and present state of modern human origins research may be interpreted, in terms of Kuhn's philosophy of science, as an example of a pre-paradigm scientific dispute. This interpretation shows the immaturity of modern human origins research and calls for the re-examination of palaeoanthropology's basic theoretical propositions as well as of this sciencie's controversial relationship with the society. (shrink)