Despite the prominence of thresholds and limits in theories of distributive justice, there is no general account of their role within such theories. This has allowed an ongoing lack of clarity and misunderstanding around threshold views in distributive justice. In this thesis, I develop an account of the conceptual structure of such views. Such an account helps understand and characterize threshold views, can subsume what may seem to be different debates about such views under one conceptual header, and can be (...) used to further examine and develop patterns of justice that draw on thresholds. In light of this account, I propose a novel characterization of sufficientarianism which sheds new light on the distinctiveness of sufficientarianism as a distributive principle and on the common objections to sufficientarianism. Moreover, I examine and defend limitarianism, which is the view that people should not have more than a certain amount of wealth. In particular, I argue in favour of limitarianism as a midlevel principle for guiding institutional design and individual actions and, furthermore, as a specification of what a just allocation of wealth requires under epistemic constraints. (shrink)

In this article, I propose a novel characterization of sufficientarianism. I argue that sufficientarianism combines three claims: a priority claim that we have non-instrumental reasons to prioritize benefits in certain ranges over benefits in other ranges; a continuum claim that at least two of those ranges are on one continuum; and a deficiency claim that the lower a range on a continuum, the more priority benefits in that range have. This characterization of sufficientarianism sheds new light on two long-standing philosophical (...) debates, namely about the distinctiveness of sufficientarianism as a distributive principle and about the common objections to sufficientarianism. (shrink)

Přes rozšířené používání pojmu společné dobro byla mezi antickými a středověkými mysliteli pozoruhodná nejednota o jeho konkrétním obsahu. Někdy bylo společné dobro chápáno jako dobro zúčastněných jednotlivců, jindy jako dobro společenství jako celku. Jakmile politická filozofie začala být stavěna na individualističtějších základech, společné dobro jako pojem ustoupilo do pozadí. Společné dobro by mělo mít dvě vlastnosti: jde o dobro a navíc společné. Dobro však není vnitřní kvalita o sobě, nýbrž subjektivní hodnocení člověka. Zda považujeme určité jednání či situaci za dobré (...) či špatné, záleží na našem hodnocení. Základní vlastností každého hodnocení je jeho subjektivita. Subjektivita v pojetí dobra je hlavním problémem společného dobra. Společné dobro může být společné pouze, když jde o cíl, který je sdílený všemi rozumnými aktéry uvnitř politického společenství. Má-li společné dobro být cílem regulujícím politické úvahy a zdrojem loajality ke společenství, muselo by být všemi sdíleno. To však v praxi je nesmírně obtížné zaručit. Neutrální hlasovací mechanismus, který by rozhodl, co je společné dobro, neexistuje. Společné dobro je příliš vágní pojetí, aby bylo užitečné v politické teorii a praktické politice. Veřejný zájem musí být posuzován partikulárně a lokálně, vždy s ohledem na zvláštní doby a místa. Co vytváří obecný zájem či "společné dobro", nevyplývá z filozofické teorie, ale praxe. Ačkoli společné dobro může být užitečné v politické i církevní rétorice, jeho vědecký smysl je omezený, nebo dokonce nulový. (shrink)

This article puts critical realism in conversation with the classical Aristotelian concept of the common good. This concept plays an essential explanatory role in Aristotelian thought, not only a normative one, and so it has something to offer critical realism, which in turn can provide a sound metatheory for common good reflection. It is argued that accounts of emergence based on causal powers and common purpose are compatible and mutually enlightening. Critical realism can develop a distinctive conception of common good (...) based around ontological stratification and social teleology. In this conception, empirical social enquiry is essential for understanding what common goods are available in given social settings, since common goods flow from the intransitive real features of social entities, especially their causal powers. (shrink)

Contrary to the recent argument developed by Matthew Kramer, edificatory perfectionism is an integral part of the purpose of the state and as such is required by justice. This claim can be supported by an appropriate understanding of the common good and the principle of subsidiarity. The purpose of the state rests in its duty to secure for its citizens the common good, which is a set of conditions under which all individuals and associations can attain for themselves various reasonable (...) goods or cooperate together to attain them. This includes perfectionist goods, such as living in a favourable moral environment. The relationship between the common good and justice is clarified by the application of the principle of subsidiarity. Its negative formulation is well known as a principle limiting the government’s competence. I draw attention to the positive formulation, which mandates that the state is obliged to assist when individuals and communities cannot achieve their reasonable goals, including perfectionist ones, by themselves. This obligation, though enabling perfectionist actions, is still limited by prudential considerations and plurality of intrinsic goods which requires respect for personal freedom. (shrink)