- Submit
-
Browse
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- More
Switch to: References
Citations of:
Deductive Heuristics
In Kostas Gavroglu, Yorgos Goudaroulis & P. Nicolacopoulos (eds.), Imre Lakatos and Theories of Scientific Change. Springer. pp. 15-32 (1989)
Add citations
You must login to add citations.
|
|
|
Many parts of the contemporary philosophical debate have been built on the radicalization of conclusions derived from the acceptance of a certain set of classical dichotomies. It also discusses how pragmatism and abduction are currently presented to solve the problems arising from these dichotomies. For this reason, the efforts of this article have been directed to analyze the impact of this fact on the philosophy of science and logic. The starting point is that accepting abduction implies, in many ways, accepting (...) |
|
|
|
|
|
Η ιστορία και η φιλοσοφία της επιστήμης χαρακτηρίζονται τόσο από λόγο όσο και από αντίλογο: στη θέση ότι υπάρχουν διαχρονικά κριτήρια/αξίες που διέπουν την επιστημονική δραστηριότητα, αντιπαρατίθεται η αντίθετη θέση, η οποία υποστηρίζει τη συγχρονική, τοπική και υποκειμενική έκφανση αυτών των κριτηρίων. Στην ορθολογικότητα της επιστημονικής σκέψης που δικαιώνει τη συνεχή διεύρυνση της εξηγηματικής ισχύος της επιστήμης, την επιστημονική εξέλιξη δηλαδή, αντιπαρατίθεται το μη ορθολογικό και ενδεχομενικό στοιχείο που υποστηρίζει την ασυνέχεια της επιστημονικής εξέλιξης. |
|
|
The way scientific discovery has been conceptualized has changed drastically in the last few decades: its relation to logic, inference, methods, and evolution has been deeply reloaded. The ‘philosophical matrix’ moulded by logical empiricism and analytical tradition has been challenged by the ‘friends of discovery’, who opened up the way to a rational investigation of discovery. This has produced not only new theories of discovery, but also new ways of practicing it in a rational and more systematic way. Ampliative rules, (...) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
There seem to be some very good reasons for a philosopher of science to be a deductivist about scientific reasoning. Deductivism is apparently connected with a demand for clarity and definiteness in the reconstruction of scientists' reasonings. And some philosophers even think that deductivism is the way around the problem of induction. But the deductivist image is challenged by cases of actual scientific reasoning, in which hard-to-state and thus discursively ill-defined elements of thought nonetheless significantly condition what practitioners accept as (...) |
|
|
How do scientific models represent in a way that enables us to discover new truths about reality and draw inferences about it? Contemporary accounts of scientific discovery answer this question by focusing on the cognitive mechanisms involved in the generation of new ideas and concepts in terms of a special sort of reasoning—or model-based reasoning—involving imagery. Alternatively, I argue that answering this question requires that we recognise the crucial role of the propositional imagination in the construction and development of models (...) |
|
|
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1991. |
|
|
|
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-6f9648bdd6-69tc5 uwo