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  1. Political polarization: Radicalism and immune beliefs.Manuel Almagro - 2023 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 49 (3):309-331.
    When public opinion gets polarized, the population’s beliefs can experience two different changes: they can become more extreme in their contents or they can be held with greater confidence. These two possibilities point to two different understandings of the rupture that characterizes political polarization: extremism and radicalism. In this article, I show that from the close examination of the best available evidence regarding how we get polarized, it follows that the pernicious type of political polarization has more to do with (...)
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  • (1 other version)Mandevillian Intelligence.Paul R. Smart - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):4169-4200.
    Mandevillian intelligence is a specific form of collective intelligence in which individual cognitive vices are seen to play a positive functional role in yielding collective forms of cognitive success. The present paper introduces the concept of mandevillian intelligence and reviews a number of strands of empirical research that help to shed light on the phenomenon. The paper also attempts to highlight the value of the concept of mandevillian intelligence from a philosophical, scientific and engineering perspective. Inasmuch as we accept the (...)
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  • What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias?Uwe Peters - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1351-1376.
    Confirmation bias is one of the most widely discussed epistemically problematic cognitions, challenging reliable belief formation and the correction of inaccurate views. Given its problematic nature, it remains unclear why the bias evolved and is still with us today. To offer an explanation, several philosophers and scientists have argued that the bias is in fact adaptive. I critically discuss three recent proposals of this kind before developing a novel alternative, what I call the ‘reality-matching account’. According to the account, confirmation (...)
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  • Implicit bias, ideological bias, and epistemic risks in philosophy.Uwe Peters - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (3):393-419.
    It has been argued that implicit biases are operative in philosophy and lead to significant epistemic costs in the field. Philosophers working on this issue have focussed mainly on implicit gender and race biases. They have overlooked ideological bias, which targets political orientations. Psychologists have found ideological bias in their field and have argued that it has negative epistemic effects on scientific research. I relate this debate to the field of philosophy and argue that if, as some studies suggest, the (...)
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  • Echo chambers, polarization, and “Post-truth”: In search of a connection.Wade Munroe - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    The US populace appears to be increasingly polarized on partisan lines. Political fissures bifurcate the country even on empirical matters like vaccine safety and anthropogenic climate change. There now exists an ever-expanding interdisciplinary research program in which theorists attempt to explain increases in political polarization and myriad other phenomena collected under the “post-truth” heading by appeal to social-epistemic structures, like echo chambers and epistemic bubbles, that affect the flow and uptake of information in various communities. In this paper, I critically (...)
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  • Forecasting tournaments, epistemic humility and attitude depolarization.Barbara Mellers, Philip Tetlock & Hal R. Arkes - 2019 - Cognition 188 (C):19-26.
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  • The contribution of activity theory to modeling multi-actor decision-making: A focus on human capital investments.Silvia Marocco & Alessandra Talamo - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    Making investment decisions is usually considered a challenging task for investors because it is a process based on risky, complex, and consequential choices. When it comes to Investments in human capital, such as startups fundings, the aspect of decision-making becomes even more critical since the outcome of the DM process is not completely predictable. Indeed, it has to take into consideration the will, goals, and motivations of each human actor involved: those who invest as well as those who seek investments. (...)
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  • Many heads are more utilitarian than one.Anita Keshmirian, Ophelia Deroy & Bahador Bahrami - 2022 - Cognition 220 (C):104965.
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  • A defense of mill’s argument for the “practical inseparability” of the liberties of conscience.Daniel Jacobson - 2020 - Social Philosophy and Policy 37 (2):9-30.
    Mill advocated an unqualified defense of the liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense, which he understood to include not just the freedom to hold but also to express any opinion or sentiment. Yet considerable dispute persists about the nature of Mill’s argument for freedom of expression and whether his premises can support so strong a conclusion. Two prominent interpretations of Mill that threaten to undermine his uncompromising defense of free speech are considered and refuted. A better interpretation can (...)
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  • Value from hedonic experience and engagement.E. Tory Higgins - 2006 - Psychological Review 113 (3):439-460.
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  • Extremists are more confident.Nora Heinzelmann & Viet Tran - 2022 - Erkenntnis (5).
    Metacognitive mental states are mental states about mental states. For example, I may be uncertain whether my belief is correct. In social discourse, an interlocutor’s metacognitive certainty may constitute evidence about the reliability of their testimony. For example, if a speaker is certain that their belief is correct, then we may take this as evidence in favour of their belief, or its content. This paper argues that, if metacognitive certainty is genuine evidence, then it is disproportionate evidence for extreme beliefs. (...)
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  • Infostorms.Pelle G. Hansen, Vincent F. Hendricks & Rasmus K. Rendsvig - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (3):301-326.
    It has become a truism that we live in so-called information societies where new information technologies have made information abundant. At the same time, information science has made us aware of many phenomena tied to the way we process information. This article explores a series of socio-epistemic information phenomena resulting from processes that track truth imperfectly: pluralistic ignorance, informational cascades, and belief polarization. It then couples these phenomena with the hypothesis that modern information technologies may lead to their amplification so (...)
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  • Integration of Social Information by Human Groups.Boris Granovskiy, Jason M. Gold, David J. T. Sumpter & Robert L. Goldstone - 2015 - Topics in Cognitive Science 7 (3):469-493.
    We consider a situation in which individuals search for accurate decisions without direct feedback on their accuracy, but with information about the decisions made by peers in their group. The “wisdom of crowds” hypothesis states that the average judgment of many individuals can give a good estimate of, for example, the outcomes of sporting events and the answers to trivia questions. Two conditions for the application of wisdom of crowds are that estimates should be independent and unbiased. Here, we study (...)
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  • Endowment Effect in negotiations: group versus individual decision-making. [REVIEW]Amira Galin - 2013 - Theory and Decision 75 (3):389-401.
    The study’s two aims are: to investigate whether groups, as compared to individuals, show a different degree of Endowment Effect during the negotiating of intangible assets, such as leisure time and to gain some insight into the underlying mechanism behind groups’ decision-making processes. A total of 138 graduate students were randomly assigned to 35 groups of 3 members each; and 33 were randomly labeled as “individuals.” The study simulated two scenarios in which the students, both individuals and groups, had to (...)
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  • Social influence in committee deliberation.Chaim Fershtman & Uzi Segal - 2023 - Theory and Decision 96 (2):185-207.
    Committee protocols typically involve a deliberation stage in which members try to influence and convince other regarding the “right” decision. Beyond information exchange, such deliberations also aim to affect the preferences and the votes of other members. Using a model of social influence, we demonstrate how deliberation procedures affect the voting outcome and how different protocols of consultation by committees’ chairs may affect their decisions. We then analyze the ability of a “designer” to control the deliberation protocol and to manipulate (...)
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  • Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.
    Predictable polarization is everywhere: we can often predict how people’s opinions, including our own, will shift over time. Extant theories either neglect the fact that we can predict our own polarization, or explain it through irrational mechanisms. They needn’t. Empirical studies suggest that polarization is predictable when evidence is ambiguous, that is, when the rational response is not obvious. I show how Bayesians should model such ambiguity and then prove that—assuming rational updates are those which obey the value of evidence—ambiguity (...)
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  • Social epistemology and social cognition.J. Angelo Corlett - 1991 - Social Epistemology 5 (2):135 – 149.
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  • Goldman and the foundations of social epistemology.J. Angelo Corlett - 1994 - Argumentation 8 (2):145-156.
    This essay argues that Alvin I. Goldman's truth-linked theory of group knowledge (veritism) omits individual components of social cognition, that all group based theories of knowledge lead to scepticism, and that if any sense is to be made of social knowledge, it must be done on individualist lines. I argue that Goldman's veritism can be reconstructed by adopting a reliabilist theory,social reliabilism. And I argue that Goldman's objections to a particular sort of consensualism are not telling. So there are now (...)
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  • Group Epistemology and Structural Factors in Online Group Polarization.Kenneth Boyd - 2023 - Episteme 20 (1):57-72.
    There have been many discussions recently from philosophers, cognitive scientists, and psychologists about group polarization, with online and social media environments in particular receiving a lot of attention, both because of people's increasing reliance on such environments for receiving and exchanging information and because such environments often allow individuals to selectively interact with those who are like-minded. My goal here is to argue that the group epistemologist can facilitate understanding the kinds of factors that drive group polarization in a way (...)
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