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Knowledge and Reliability

In Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Alvin Goldman and his Critics. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 237-256 (2016)

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  1. The Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects.Sanford Goldberg & Jonathan Matheson - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):829-840.
    In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere animal knowledge. To do so we bring together literature on defeat and higher-order evidence with literature on the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We then defend our argument from a series of possible objections.
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  • Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon Problem.John Alton Christmann - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (1):55-61.
    Internalists who argue against reliabilism usually construct thought experiments designed to show how reliability is not necessary or sufficient for justification. Defenders of reliabilism have responded with debunking explanations of the intuitions that people are expected to have when considering anti-reliabilist thought experiments. One defender is Jennifer Nagel, who argues that internalist counterexamples to reliabilism play off of a shift between belief-formation processes that are unconscious and those that involve self-reflection on the contents of one’s conscious states. Nagel aims to (...)
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  • Epistemic Autonomy and Externalism.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Kirk Lougheed & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. London: Routledge.
    The philosophical significance of attitudinal autonomy—viz., the autonomy of attitudes such as beliefs—is widely discussed in the literature on moral responsibility and free will. Within this literature, a key debate centres around the following question: is the kind of attitudinal autonomy that’s relevant to moral responsibility at a given time determined entirely by a subject’s present mental structure at that time? Internalists say ‘yes’, externalists say ’no’. In this essay, I motivate a kind of distinctly epistemic attitudinal autonomy, attitudinal autonomy (...)
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