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  1. Physicalism and ontological holism.Michael Esfeld - 1999 - Metaphilosophy 30 (4):319-337.
    The claim of this paper is that we should envisage physicalism as an ontological holism. Our current basic physics, quantum theory, suggests that, ontologically speaking, we have to assume one global quantum state of the world; many of the properties that are often taken to be intrinsic properties of physical systems are in fact relations, which are determined by that global quantum state. The paper elaborates on this conception of physicalism as an ontological holism and considers issues such as supervenience, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Metaphysics, Function and the Engineering of Life: the Problem of Vitalism.Charles T. Wolfe, Bohang Chen & Cécilia Bognon-Küss - 2018 - Kairos 20 (1):113-140.
    Vitalism was long viewed as the most grotesque view in biological theory: appeals to a mysterious life-force, Romantic insistence on the autonomy of life, or worse, a metaphysics of an entirely living universe. In the early twentieth century, attempts were made to present a revised, lighter version that was not weighted down by revisionary metaphysics: “organicism”. And mainstream philosophers of science criticized Driesch and Bergson’s “neovitalism” as a too-strong ontological commitment to the existence of certain entities or “forces”, over and (...)
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  • A Novel Approach to Emergence in Chemistry.Alexandru Manafu - 2015 - In Eric Scerri & L. McIntyre (eds.), Philosophy of Chemistry. Growth of a New Discipline. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. Volume 306. Berlin: Springer. pp. 39-55.
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  • Concepts of Emergence in Chemistry.Alexandru Manafu - 2013 - In Jean-Pierre Llored (ed.), The Philosophy of Chemistry: Practices, Methodologies, and Concepts. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 659-674.
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  • Whence Philosophy of Biology?Jason M. Byron - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3):409-422.
    A consensus exists among contemporary philosophers of biology about the history of their field. According to the received view, mainstream philosophy of science in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s focused on physics and general epistemology, neglecting analyses of the 'special sciences', including biology. The subdiscipline of philosophy of biology emerged (and could only have emerged) after the decline of logical positivism in the 1960s and 70s. In this article, I present bibliometric data from four major philosophy of science journals (Erkenntnis, (...)
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  • Attention to Kinds of Claims in Argument Evaluation.Paul Los - unknown
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  • Gallagher on Non-Reductive Naturalism: Complementarity, Integration or Multiscale Science?Patrick McGivern - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):159-170.
    Gallagher [2019] defends a form of naturalised phenomenology based on a non-classical view of science. A central component of this argument involves an analogy between phenomenology and quantum-mechanics: Gallagher suggests that both require us to give up key components of a classical view of the natural world. Here, I try to clarify this analogy and consider two associated problems. The first problem concerns the concept of subjectivity and its different roles in physics and phenomenology, and the second concerns the concept (...)
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  • Rethinking Nature: Phenomenology and a Non-reductionist Cognitive Science.Shaun Gallagher - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):125-137.
    Resistance to the idea that phenomenology can be relevant to cognitive scientific explanation has faced two objections advanced, respectively, from both sides of the issue: from the scientific perspective it has been suggested that phenomenology, understood as an account of first-person experience, is ultimately reducible to cognitive neuroscientific explanation; and from a phenomenological perspective it has been argued that phenomenology cannot be naturalized. In this context it makes sense to consider that the notion of scientific reduction is linked to a (...)
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  • Marx, Popper, and 'historicism'.W. A. Suchting - 1972 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 15 (1-4):235 – 266.
    According to Sir Karl Popper, there is a harmful approach to the social sciences called 'historicism'. This takes their principal aim to be historical prediction of an unconditional sort and the chief means to this the discovery of laws of historical development. The chief exemplar is held to be Marx. This paper distinguishes two possible sorts of laws of historical development. Popper's arguments against each are rejected. Which sort it is most plausible to ascribe to Marx is considered. Four models (...)
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  • Is our Universe Deterministic? Some Philosophical and Theological Reflections on an Elusive Topic.Taede A. Smedes - 2003 - Zygon 38 (4):955-979.
    . The question of whether or not our universe is deterministic remains of interest to both scientists and theologians. In this essay I argue that this question can be solved only by metaphysical decision and that no scientific evidence for either determinism or indeterminism will ever be conclusive. No finite being, no matter how powerful its cognitive abilities, will ever be able to establish the deterministic nature of the universe. The only being that would be capable of doing so would (...)
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  • Explanatory loops and the limits of genetic reductionism.Martin Carrier & Patrick Finzer - 2006 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (3):267 – 283.
    We reconstruct genetic determinism as a reductionist thesis to the effect that the molecular properties of cells can be accounted for to a great extent by their genetic outfit. The non-reductionist arguments offered at this molecular level often use the relationship between structure and function as their point of departure. By contrast, we develop a non-reductionist argument that is confined to the structural characteristics of biomolecules; no appeal to functions is made. We raise two kinds of objections against the reducibility (...)
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  • Decompositional Equivalence: A Fundamental Symmetry Underlying Quantum Theory.Chris Fields - 2016 - Axiomathes 26 (3):279-311.
    Decompositional equivalence is the principle that there is no preferred decomposition of the universe into subsystems. It is shown here, by using a simple thought experiment, that quantum theory follows from decompositional equivalence together with Landauer’s principle. This demonstration raises within physics a question previously left to psychology: how do human—or any—observers identify or agree about what constitutes a “system of interest”?
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  • Ideational Reflexivity in Economic Systems.Lauchlan Mackinnon - 2006 - Dissertation, The University of Queensland
    The present work is a chapter from my Ph.D thesis to be submitted in January 2006. Economists generate economic ideas, which are then spread to and impact on the very economic systems that they are ostensibly 'objectively' modelling. I term this dynamical relationship between economic theory and economic reality "ideational reflexivity," and show that various important contributions in economic theory such as the Lucas Critique and Merton's option-pricing theory may be identified as special cases of ideational reflexivity. I then argue (...)
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  • Associative Obligation and the Social Contract.Albert Weale - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):463-476.
    John Horton has argued for an associative theory of political obligation in which such obligation is seen as a concomitant of membership of a particular polity, where a polity provides the generic goods of order and security. Accompanying these substantive claims is a methodological thesis about the centrality of the phenomenology of ordinary moral consciousness to our understanding of the problem of political obligation. The phenomenological strategy seems modest but in some way it is far-reaching promising to dissolve some long-standing (...)
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  • Sociology as a science.David V. McQueen - 1981 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 12 (2):263-284.
    Presented here is an overview from the standpoints of sociology, history of science, philosophy of science and “pure science” of the lingering question of whether sociology is a form of scientific pursuit. The conclusion is drawn that sociology barely meets any of the rigid criteria traditionally associated with the natural sciences. Sociology is viewed as having a position of theory and argument which is labeled “inconoclastic scepticism.”.
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  • Chronic Pain as a Hypothetical Construct: A Practical and Philosophical Consideration.Daniel M. Doleys - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • Why metaphysical abstinence should prevail in the debate on reductionism.Stéphanie Ruphy - 2005 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):105 – 121.
    My main aim in this paper is to show that influential antireductionist arguments such as Fodor's, Kitcher's, and Dupré's state stronger conclusions than they actually succeed in establishing. By putting to the fore the role of metaphysical presuppositions in these arguments, I argue that they are convincing only as 'temporally qualified argument', and not as 'generally valid ones'. I also challenge the validity of the strategy consisting in drawing metaphysical lessons from the failure of reductionist programmes. What most of these (...)
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