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  1. Inferentially Remembering that p.Andrew Naylor - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (2):225-230.
    Most of our memories are inferential, so says Sven Bernecker in Memory: A Philosophical Study. I show that his account of inferentially remembering that p is too strong. A revision of the account that avoids the difficulty is proposed. Since inferential memory that p is memory that q (a proposition distinct from p) with an admixture of inference from one’s memory that q and a true thought one has that r, its analysis presupposes an adequate account of the (presumably non-inferential) (...)
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  • Remembering-that: Episodic vs. semantic.Andrew Naylor - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):317 - 322.
    In a paper "The intentionality of memory," Jordi Fernández (2006) proposes a way of distinguishing between episodic and semantic memory. I identify three difficulties with his proposal and provide a way of drawing the distinction that avoids these shortcomings.
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  • Remembering without Knowing.Sven Bernecker - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):137 – 156.
    This paper challenges the standard conception of memory as a form of knowledge. Unlike knowledge, memory implies neither belief nor justification.
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  • Justification and Forgetting.Andrew Naylor - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):372-391.
    This article sets forth a view about how epistemic justification figures in the ongoing justification of memory belief, a view that I call moderate justificational preservationism . MJP presupposes a nontraditional notion of memorial justification according to which what makes one's present belief that p prima facie justified is that which provided one with prima facie justification to believe that p originally . The article offers support for MJP by examining a series of cases that involve forgetting, and in doing (...)
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  • Belief from the Past.Andrew Naylor - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):598-620.
    Abstract: A person who remembers having done something has a belief that she did it from having done it. To have a belief that one did something from having done it is to believe that one did the action on the (causal) basis of having done it, where this belief (in order for one to have it) need not be (causally) based even in part on any contributor to the belief other than doing the action. The notion of a contributor (...)
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