Inferentially Remembering that p

Logos and Episteme 6 (2):225-230 (2015)
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Abstract
Most of our memories are inferential, so says Sven Bernecker in Memory: A Philosophical Study. I show that his account of inferentially remembering that p is too strong. A revision of the account that avoids the difficulty is proposed. Since inferential memory that p is memory that q (a proposition distinct from p) with an admixture of inference from one’s memory that q and a true thought one has that r, its analysis presupposes an adequate account of the (presumably non-inferential) memory that q. Bernecker’s account of non-inferentially remembering that is shown to be inadequate. A remedy lies in strengthening the account by requiring the rememberer to have had prima facie justification to believe that q, any defeaters of which were misleading.
Reprint years
2015
ISBN(s)
2069-0533
PhilPapers/Archive ID
NAYIRT
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Archival date: 2017-01-09
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2015-06-05

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