We give arguments explaining why, when adopting a minimalist approach to constructive mathematics as that formalized in our two-level minimalist foundation, the choice for a pointfree approach to topology is not just a matter of convenience or mathematical elegance, but becomes compulsory. The main reason is that in our foundation real numbers, either as Dedekind cuts or as Cauchy sequences, do not form a set.

The Dedekind cuts in an ordered set form a set in the sense of constructive Zermelo—Fraenkel set theory. We deduce this statement from the principle of refinement, which we distill before from the axiom of fullness. Together with exponentiation, refinement is equivalent to fullness. None of the defining properties of an ordering is needed, and only refinement for two—element coverings is used. In particular, the Dedekind reals form a set; whence we have also refined an earlier result by Aczel and (...) Rathjen, who invoked the full form of fullness. To further generalise this, we look at Richman's method to complete an arbitrary metric space without sequences, which he designed to avoid countable choice. The completion of a separable metric space turns out to be a set even if the original space is a proper class; in particular, every complete separable metric space automatically is a set. (shrink)

We deal with a restricted form WC-N' of the weak continuity principle, a version BT' of Baire's theorem, and a boundedness principle BD-N. We show, in the spirit of constructive reverse mathematics, that WC-N'. BT' + ¬LPO and BD-N + ¬LPO are equivalent in a constructive system, where LPO is the limited principle of omniscience.

Even after yet another grand conjecture has been proved or refuted, any omniscience principle that had trivially settled this question is just as little acceptable as before. The significance of the constructive enterprise is therefore not affected by any gain of knowledge. In particular, there is no need to adapt weak counterexamples to mathematical progress.

This paper studies an economy whose agents perceive their consumption possibilities subjectively, and whose preferences are defined on what they subjectively experience, rather than on those alternatives that are objectively present. The model of agents' perceptions is based on intuitionistic logic. Roughly, this means that agents reason constructively: a solution to a problem exists only if there is a construction by which the problem can be solved. The theorems that can be proved determine how an agent perceives a set of (...) alternatives. A dual model relates perceived alternatives to a shared language, which the agents use in trading. So perceptions relate objective alternatives to an agent's subjective view of them, and reporting dually relates an agent's subjective world to a shared language. It turns out that an appropriately modified notion of competitive equilibrium always exists. However, in contrast with standard results in economic theory, competitive equilibrium need not be efficient. (shrink)