Clark and Chalmer’s conception of spatially extended memory is underpinned by an objectified conception of biological memory. To the extent that this can be identified with a ‘storage’ approach to memory, criticisms of it are well known and an alternative approach, perhaps more suited to an enactive account of cognition, might be one which focuses on remembering as a type of action. In the Otto story the objectification of memory is apparent not only in C&C’s characterization of the notebook but (...) also in the notion that Inga’s memory is notebook-like. Insofar as Inga’s practices, or conceptions, of remembering might be notebook-like this should not be taken as evidence of the existence of an internal store, but could instead be the result of prior interaction with notebook-like artifacts. (shrink)

The current view of theoretical statements in science is that they should be literal and precise; ambiguous and metaphorical statements are useful only as pre-theoretical, exegetical, and heuristic devices and as pedagogical tools. In this paper we argue that this view is mistaken. Literal, precise statements apply to those experiential phenomena which can be defined either conventionally by criterial attribution or by internal atomic constitution. Experiential phenomena which are defined relationally and/or functionally, like nursing, in virtue of their nature, require (...) metaphorical description and explanation. In such cases, metaphor is theory-constitutive. Using insights from the philosophies of language and mind, and examples from nursing practice, education, and our own empirical research, we explore the nature of metaphor and its role in theory constitution. We argue that the apparent resistance of certain experiential phenomena to literal description and explanation is not necessarily indicative of pre-theoretic linguistic imprecision. We suggest, rather, that such resistance provides useful insights into the nature of such experiential phenomena. We also suggest that the aim of scientific theory should be methodological or epistemological precision and not merely linguistic precision. (shrink)