Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a relatively undeveloped concept despite its increasing importance to corporations. One difficulty is the possible inexactness of CSR. Another is the apparent reluctance by regulatory authorities and policy makers to intervene in the area. This is largely a result of inhibitions created by traditional approaches to company law with emphasis on shareholder protection and financial disclosure. The consequence is the stultification of independent development of CSR by tying social issues to financial performance. This attitude might (...) not be unconnected to the theoretical and practical challenges in justifying CSR and defining its scope. The underlying impediment is a factual and theoretical failure to distinguish ‘instrumental’ and ‘pure’ (ethical) CSR. This article demonstrates that ethical CSR highlights the role of regulation, and a principal stance is that regulation is neither incompatible nor irreconcilable with ethical CSR. The article argues that cognizance of the intrinsic moral justification of ‘pure’ CSR is required for delineating the scope of CSR as well as for clarifying the desirability and extent of its regulation. It argues that the dynamic history and visage of multinational corporate corruption illuminates the fluidity of the regulation–CSR relationship. The current and widening backlash against transnational corporate corruption is, arguably, a demonstration of the position that regulation and CSR are not mutually exclusive and absolute concepts. This article submits that recognition and application of this ‘ethical’ and ‘instrumental’ CSR distinction is fundamental to the development of CSR and resolution of connected questions of regulation. (shrink)

This article proposes a specific logic of dynamics for integrative social contracts theory that combines two empirically oriented process extensions strengthening concreteness of Donaldson and Dunfee’s conceptualization, namely international policy regime theory and Tiebout migration. While either would help “dynamize” and “concretize” ISCT, the two combined are even more insightful. Real-world policy regime processes can develop concrete action-guiding norms instantiating hypernorms to guide business decisions. Donaldson and Dunfee placed empirical reliance on expectation of converging parallel evolution of universal principles and (...) authentic local values. ISCT remains vague on how global or local norms can develop and change, for two reasons. First, ISCT does not explain mechanisms for how proposed hypernorms can become actual global norms and also become accepted across extant authentic communities. International policy regime theory explains how hypernorms can become instantiated as global norms expressed in policy regimes. Second, a basic element in ISCT is implied consent positing free exit from voluntary moral communities. Empirically, individuals or businesses may be unable to exit from undesired membership in authentic communities to which they do not consent. The Tiebout migration model provides valuable insights concerning how substantive mobility or its absence improves on the minimum ISCT assumption of implied consent. An integrated logic of ISCT dynamics generates a three-level framework in which instantiated hypernorms and authentic community norms can empirically change, and individuals or businesses can migrate more freely across extant communities. (shrink)

We examine the responses of South African multinational enterprises to corruption in African markets in the context of institutional voids. Corruption is a source of uncertainty and additional transactional costs for MNEs and it necessitates a strategic response. The research employs a qualitative study of a sample of MNEs with experience in internationalising into Africa. The results indicate that corruption in African markets is pervasive and closely associated with the institutional voids in these countries. MNEs see themselves as ‘institution takers’ (...) responding to countries’ institutional makeup at the organisational and individual level but fail to fully appreciate their impact on institutions both positively and negatively. Rather MNEs focus on strategic responses at the organisational level to address corruption operationally in the host country. We add to the existing literature by providing a dynamic framework of the complex webs of association between institutions, MNEs and corruption in conditions of economic underdevelopment. The research suggests that MNEs do not need to get caught in a vicious cycle whereby they perpetuate corruption in conditions of underdevelopment and institutional voids but instead can contribute towards a virtuous cycle through which they institutionalise ethical foundations. (shrink)