This paper presents a synoptic overview of two key philosophical concepts – self and identity - in Indian tradition. Drawing on both Indian and Western studies on the concept of self-hood and its implications for conceptualising identity, the paper reviews the contemporary scholarship on self-hood and outlines its relation to identity needs to be rethought if ethical possibilities of self-hood are to be given due consideration. This paper asks and addresses the nature and experience of the self in the Indian (...) intellectual tradition, how representative Indian thinkers conceptualised the self, how such a conception of self-hood engages with the overall conception of Western history of self-hood and so on. The paper offers a comparative study of self-hood that not only underscores the significant points of convergence and divergence as theorised in Indian and Western philosophical traditions but also highlights how certain conceptions of self-hood and identity enable the project of the self’s ethical transformation. (shrink)

My purpose in this paper is to challenge the continued exclusion of Indian philosophies from the Western philosophical canon on the supposed basis that such philosophies are really religion, mysticism, and mythology. I argue that many schools of Indian philosophy, such as Advaita Vedānta, resist and problematize historically particular Euro-Western conceptions of both philosophy and religion, and the conceptual borders between them, where philosophy is understood as grounded in various substantive notions of reason and rationality, defined as a purely theoretical (...) enterprise. In addition, I question the predominant tendency to see philosophy as opposed to “religion”, which is often presumed to rest on faith in a Judeo-Christian conception of God: The singular and wholly other, creator of all souls, ex nihilo, the ultimate judge of humankind, where salvation is granted in proportion to the intrinsic value of faith. I suggest that Advaita challenges these prevailing conceptions. A part of my larger purpose is to dislodge the view that the Euro-Western philosophical enterprise constitutes the universal, neutral, and objective standard from which all other approaches to philosophy are to be judged as legitimate. My hope is to lay some of the groundwork required to re-think dominant historical and conceptual categories from a broader global perspective, with the aim of developing a deeper and more plural understanding of the diverse nature of both philosophical and religious inquiry. (shrink)

Mode of philosophizing in post-colonial India is deeply influenced by two centuries of British rule, wherein a popular divide emerged between doing classical Indian philosophy and Western philosophy. However, a closer look reveals that the divide is not exclusive, since there are several criss-cross modes of philosophizing shaped by the forces of colonialism and nationalist consciousness. Contemporary challenges lie in raising new philosophical questions relevant to our time, keeping in view both what has been inherited and what has been imbibed (...) in these centuries-old civilizational journeys. One needs to recognize India’s rich intellectual traditions based on cultural diversity, and at the same time raise fundamental questions that are transcendental in nature, yet historically rooted in our temporal presence. The challenge to articulate the nature of Indian philosophy has remained one of the daunting tasks for scholars of philosophy. Contemporariness of Indian philosophy is another issue to be deliberated. Contemporariness lies not only in raising new questions to classical Indian philosophies, but also in finding newness in old questions. It should further include engaging the classical philosophies with new methodological questions, be it Western philosophical methods or ones internally generated. Contemporariness will include narrating new stories driven by the dynamics of the present, where drive for questioning comes from the authentic philosophical issues of our time. (shrink)

This article seeks to pluralize current scholarly perceptions of what constitutes Advaita Vedānta in colonial India. It suggests, in particular, that the tendency to concentrate on the so-called “neo-Vedānta” of a handful of cosmopolitan reformers has obscured other kinds of innovative Vedānta-inspired discourses that have significantly shaped the formation of modern Hindu consciousness. These discourses are indebted, in ways that are only beginning to be understood, to religious traditions rooted in particular regions and vernacular languages. The article illustrates this argument (...) with reference to the Kōvilūr Ātīṉam, a Vedānta-affiliated monastic institution in Tamil-speaking South India founded by Mutturāmaliṅka Ñāṉatēcika Cuvāmikaḷ. Examining the significance of this figure’s life story for the wealthy Nāṭṭukkōṭṭai Ceṭṭiyār merchant community that comprises the Ātīṉam’s social base, the article explores how social aspirations, traditions of monastic authority, and vernacular Vedāntic literature contribute toward a colonial project of caste self-fashioning that I refer to as “Ceṭṭiyār Vedānta”. (shrink)

Unknown to most Western psychologists, ancient Indian scriptures contain very rich, empirically derived psychological theories that are, however, intertwined with religious and philosophical content. This article represents our attempt to extract the psychological theory of cognition and consciousness from a prominent ancient Indian thought system: Samkhya-Yoga. We derive rather broad hypotheses from this approach that may complement and extend Western mainstream theorizing. These hypotheses address an ancient personality theory, the effects of practicing the applied part of Samkhya-Yoga on normal and (...) extraordinary cognition, as well as different ways of perceiving reality. We summarize empirical evidence collected in diverse fields of research that allows for making judgments about the hypotheses, and suggest more specific hypotheses to be examined in future research. We conclude that the existing evidence for the hypotheses is substantial but that there are still considerable gaps in theory and research to be filled. Theories of cognition contained in the ancient Indian systems have the potential to modify and complement existing Western mainstream accounts of cognition. In particular, they might serve as a basis for arriving at more comprehensive theories for several research areas that, so far, lack strong theoretical grounding, such as meditation research or research on aspects of consciousness. (shrink)

The historical pole of this research distinguishes differing historical and cultural contexts in which the scholar al-Bïrûnî evolved. Between the years 973 and 1017, he lived in Khwarezm (Kät and JürjänTya), Ray, and Jürjän. He also dwelt in Kabul and Ghazna, both situated on a passage between Persia and India, and travelled to some parts of early medieval India between the years 1017 and 1030. Evidence pointing to him having made actual direct observations beyond the abode of Islam remains scanty. (...) According to his writings, only five locales emerge as having been visited by him, all situated in today's Afghanistan and Pakistan. When al-BTrunl visited these places, he encountered the society of the Indian Shähis, who followed a form of Brahmanism. Al-Bïrûnï's knowledge of Sanskrit was the result of a long process that lasted at least 30 years (1000-1030). In order to reach the level of Sanskrit that enabled him to translate several works from Sanskrit into Arabic, he needed to work with literate people well-versed in Sanskrit, who may also have had some comprehension of Arabic, and/or Persian. The textual pole of this dissertation examines the question of the relationship between al- Bïrûnï's Arabic Kitab Sank and Kitäb Pätangal - two works related to Sämkhya-Yoga - and their possible Sanskrit sources. A philological survey based on these Arabic translations and on Sämkhya-Yoga Sanskrit literature highlights that al-Bïrûnï's translations, both, are related to the classical phase in the development of these two Indian philosophical systems. Despite the early spread of Yoga and Sämkhya ideas through Sanskrit literature, it seems that between the early 11th and 16th centuries they lost vitality amongst Indian scholars. Therefore, al-Bïrûnï's translation of works related to these specific Indian philosophies in the early 11th century CE deserves attention. The second pole of this study also demonstrates that al-BTrünl's hermeneutics played an important part in his transmission of these two Indian schools of thought, as he highly transformed his source in both form and substance. This dissertation considers the question of the relationship between al-Bïrûnï's Arabic translations and their possible Sanskrit sources from the viewpoint of Translation Studies; which makes it possible to point out potential candidates for being al-Bïrûnï's original Sanskrit sources with some confidence. Overall, the Kitäb Sank and the Kitäb Pätangal represent original works of Sämkhya and Yoga, as viewed and transmitted by a Perso-Muslim scholar, rather than pure translations of Sanskrit work. (shrink)

The article considers each case of using words with the stem ‘yoga’, as well as other yogic vocabulary found in the first part of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. In total, there are the following ten words: yoga, bhaktiyoga, yogin, yogeśvara, mahāyogin, kuyogin, yoganidrā, kriyāyogа, viyoga and yama. They are used 30 times altogether. This vocabulary forms not only the yoga glossary of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, but also the Vaiṣṇava understanding of yogic teaching. The analysis of these terms takes into account several (...) contexts, in particular: compositional, linguistic, religious and philosophical, and statistical. It has been found out that the whole vocabulary is somehow subordinated to the semantic vertical yogeśvara → mahāyogin → yogin and in various ways forms the Vaiṣṇava understanding of yoga, i.e. bhakti-yoga. The last is believed to be a human response to the challenges of the Highest reality (Heaven). This semantic vertical is conceived of as set by the Lord, who in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa appears under various names, including Viṣṇu, Kṛṣṇa, Adhokṣaja, as well as Yogeśvara, and Mahāyogin. Extraordinary people, who are called mahāyogins (Śukadeva Gosvāmī), and also yogins (Vyāsa, Śukadeva Gosvāmī, nameless yogins), are able to accept the challenge of Heaven. They are those who can achieve the highest goal of human life; they practice bhaktiyoga. The context of bhaktiyoga is present in most cases of the word yoga, and in all cases of the words yoganidra, kriyayoga, viyoga, as well as other friendly vocabulary (for example, seva), whereas the word yama does not apply to bhaktiyoga. The use of the rare word kuyogin reflects the fact that bad yogins are also mentioned in the text. The term yoga might be also considered to be a gender marker, as the yogins are exclusively men in the first part. The compositional peculiarities of the use of this yogic vocabulary include the fact that the first part begins and ends with chapters containing terms which are derived from the stem yoga (Is this some kind of semantic framing?). Moreover, the first chapter ends with the śloka, that contains the important word yogeśvara (Is it a kind of summarizing semantic marker?). (shrink)

Abstract I respond to three articles about my book, Hindu Theology and Biology, from David Gosling, Thomas Ellis, and Varadaraja Raman. I attempt to clarify misconceptions about Hindu intellectual history and the science and religion dialogue. I discuss the role of Hindu theologies in the contemporary world in response to the three articles, each of which highlights important areas of future research. I suggest that Hindu theology should be a critical discipline in which Hindu authors are interpreted in their own (...) terms and in conversation with contemporary authors. I argue that Hinduism and science can find an intellectual space between New Atheism (which denies the intellectual value of religion) and Neo-Hinduism (which neglects the critical discourse within the history of Hindu thought). (shrink)

This article examines the translator, Rongzom’s, scholastic philosophical defense of early Dzokchen or “Great Perfection.” As our earliest instance of religious apologia in Tibet, this examination contributes to a growing body of knowledge about the Tibetan assimilation of post-tenth century of Vajrayāna Buddhism and the indigenous response to the forces of cultural transformation shaping the late eleventh/early twelfth century Tibet. Traditional authorities and academics have identified Dzokchen as a Tibetan tradition of Buddhism that drew intense criticism at the time from (...) renaissance agents. This paper explores the primary Tibetan response by describing Rongzom’s philosophical defense of Great Perfection. As such, it illuminates the intellectual and ideological context of the milieu as it evinces Rongzom’s innovation and mastery of Indian systems of logic, language, and epistemology in the Dzokchen approach to the Buddhist path. (shrink)