David Miller argues that national identity is indispensable for the successful functioning of a liberal democracy. National identity makes important contributions to liberal democratic institutions, including creating incentives for the fulfilment of civic duties, facilitating deliberative democracy, and consolidating representative democracy. Thus, a shared identity is indispensable for liberal democracy and grounds a good claim for self-determination. Because Miller’s arguments appeal to the instrumental values of a national culture, I call his argument ‘instrumental value’ arguments. In this paper, I examine (...) the instrumental value arguments and show that they fail to justify a group’s right to self-determination. (shrink)

Many of the most popular liberal arguments for cultural rights all note that the world is formed into groups. But in the attempt to universalise these arguments, it is too often assumed that the nation is the most important of these groups. This focus upon the nation ignores the many and varying bases of self?respect. It overlooks the fact that self?respect may be tied to many different kinds of groups. Further, most discussions of cultural rights are fuelled by the experience (...) of particular groups. Which groups depends on the theorist and issue at hand. The discussion may be sound for the particular group being discussed. But then many cultural rights theorists, in generalising from one case to others, may not have good reason to do so, leading into a mistaken universalism. The study of cultural rights arguments, with closer reference to the case studies that underpin them, should serve to limit illicit generalisation and to illuminate the true value of cultural rights arguments. (shrink)

According to cultural nationalism, members of groups sharing a common history and societal culture have a fundamental, morally significant interest in adhering to their culture and in sustaining it for generations. Moreover, this interest should be protected by states. I shall examine three theses included in this statement. The first, theadherence thesis,relates to the basic interest people have in adhering to their national culture. The second thesis ishistorical.It concerns the basic interest people have in recognizing and protecting the multigenerational dimension (...) of their culture. The third thesis, apoliticalone, holds that the interests people have in living their lives within their culture and in sustaining this culture for generations should be protected politically. Some contemporary writers who support a liberal version of cultural nationalism do so by arguing that people have an interest in culture mainly because it is a prerequisite for their freedom and also because it is a component of their identity. (shrink)

There are nationalisms and nationalisms, and as nationalisms vary from barbarous and murderous to benign and, all things considered, perhaps desirable, so theories of nationalism vary from irrational or turgid metaphysical accounts to reasonable and carefully articulated and argued theories of nationalism. André Van de Putte has well described some of the former while David Miller, Yael Tamir, Geneviève Nootens, Ross Poole, and Robert X. Ware have carefully argued for some modest forms of nationalism, sometimes explicitly and sometimes only by (...) implication. But there are also, as the reader will have seen, forcefully argued and systematic theories setting themselves against even the most sophisticated and plausible defences of nationalism. The articles of Harry Brighouse, Omar Dahbour, and Andrew Levine fall explicitly into that category and, we would argue, so does Allen Buchanan's carefully wrought article, though implicitly and by implication but not by programmatic intent. (shrink)

The recent surge in academic theorizing of the nation and nationalism has made it difficult to isolate the actual phenomena from their constructions as objects of theory. This is all the more difficult because most contemporary theories are grounded in unacknowledged political agendas that to a significant extent generate the theories independently of the phenomena. Chapter 1 focuses on “antinational-ist” theories of the nation—theories that deny the reality of nations or fundamentally delegitimate them as retrogressive or inherently oppressive political forms. (...) Such a theory rejects the nation primarily because it is inconsistent with the theorist's uncritically assumed political ideology. In Chapter 2, I examine theories that do not reject the nation, but rather control its form—again in line with a particular political agenda or ideology. Such a theory allows the reality and/or legitimacy of nations, but only after theoretically misconstruing them as consistent with the theorist's specific ideology or by limiting approval to only those nations that are in line with this ideology. I stress the important practical consequences of this: when backed by powerful institutions and forces, such a theory of the nation supports the coerced transformation of minor or post-colonial nations to fit it. These critiques expose the complexities of nations and nationalisms that most theories fail to register, due to their limiting assumptions. In Chapter 3, I develop an account of the nation sufficiently comprehensive to capture this complexity. Perhaps most importantly, my account does not reduce the nation to just one type of social force, political relation, identity characteristic, narrative structure, or “false consciousness”—which virtually all other theories do. All “unity” associated with the nation is partial: any presumed universal unity is always cut by gaps or discontinuities. A nation exists where the discontinuities are bridged by some alternate connector, by another type of relation. I then consider the relationship of nation to race, gender, and sexuality, as well as to state and ethnicity. Finally, I develop a novel concept of national “self-determination” as conceptual self- definition, not territorial control. (shrink)