In this article, we present the probability logic LFOCP which is suitable to formalize statements about conditional probabilities of first order formulas. The logical language contains formulas such as CP≥s and CP≤s with the intended meaning ‘the conditional probability of ϕ given θ is at least s’ and ‘at most s’, respectively, where ϕ and θ are first-order formulas. We introduce a class of first order Kripke-like models that combine properties of the usual Kripke models and finitely additive probabilities. We (...) propose an infinitary axiom system and prove that it is sound and strongly complete with respect to the considered class of models. In this article, the terms finitary and infinitary concern meta language only, i.e. the logical language is countable, formulas are finite, while only proofs are allowed to be infinite. We analyse decidability of LFOCP and provide a procedure which decides satisfiability of a given conditional probability formula, in the case when the underlying first-order theory is decidable. Relationships to other systems and possible extensions of the presented approach are discussed. (shrink)

Normic Laws and the Significance of Nonmonotonic Reasoning for Philosophy of Science. Normic laws have the form ‘if A then normally B’. They have been discovered in the explanation debate, but were considered as empirically vacuous (§1). I argue that the prototypical (or ideal) normality of normic laws implies statistical normality (§2), whence normic laws have empirical content. In §3–4 I explain why reasoning from normic laws is nonmonotonic, and why the understanding of the individual case is so important here. (...) After sketching some foundations of nonmonotonic reasoning as developed by AI-researchers (§5), Iargue that normic laws are also the best way to understand ceteris paribus laws (§6). §7 deals with the difference between physical and non-physical disciplines and §9 with the difference between normicity and approximation. In §8 it is shown how nonmonotonic reasoning provides a new understanding of the protection of theories against falsification by auxiliary hypotheses. §10, finally, gives a system- and evolution-theoretical explanation of the deeper reason for the omnipresence of normic laws in practice and science, and forthe connection between ideal and statistical normality. (shrink)

Gentzen’s approach to deductive systems, and Carnap’s and Popper’s treatment of probability in logic were two fruitful ideas that appeared in logic of the mid-twentieth century. By combining these two concepts, the notion of sentence probability, and the deduction relation formalized in the sequent calculus, we introduce the notion of ’probabilized sequent’ \ with the intended meaning that “the probability of truthfulness of \ belongs to the interval [a, b]”. This method makes it possible to define a system of derivations (...) based on ’axioms’ of the form \, obtained as a result of empirical research, and then infer conclusions of the form \. We discuss the consistency, define the models, and prove the soundness and completeness for the defined probabilized sequent calculus. (shrink)