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Saving the doxastic account of intuitions

Christian Nimtz

Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):357-375 (2010)

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Reflective Equilibrium Without Intuitions?Georg Brun - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):237-252.details In moral epistemology, the method of reflective equilibrium is often characterized in terms of intuitions or understood as a method for justifying intuitions. An analysis of reflective equilibrium and current theories of moral intuitions reveals that this picture is problematic. Reflective equilibrium cannot be adequately characterized in terms of intuitions. Although the method presupposes that we have initially credible commitments, it does not presuppose that they are intuitions. Nonetheless, intuitions can enter the process of developing a reflective equilibrium and, if (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 31 citations
Intuitionen, intuitiver Verstand und Intuition. Symposium zu: Eckart Förster: Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie.Markus Wild - 2012 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 60 (6):1011-1018.details Against Kant, Eckart Förster claims that Goethe’s methodology of intuitive understanding is a real possibility for us. Firstly, this essay shows that this methodology has to be strictly distinguished from the questionable use of intuitions in contemporary analytic philosophy; secondly, strong parallels between Goethe’s intuitive understanding and Bergson’s intuition are put forward. Both use intuitions as a tool to find essence concepts for natural kinds. Moreover, the parallels help naturalists to detach Förster’s important insight from the idealistic context. Download Export citation Bookmark
Affectivism about intuitions.Slawa Loev - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-24.details This article provides an account of intuitions: Affectivism. Affectivism states that intuitions are emotional experiences. The article proceeds as follows: first, the features that intuitions are typically taken to have are introduced. Then some issues with extant theories are outlined. After that, emotional experiences and their central features are brought into view. This is followed by a comparison of intuitions and emotional experiences, yielding the result that emotional experiences fit and elucidate the feature profile of intuitions. Finally, it is specified (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Non-propositional intuition, intuitive belief and ‘intuition that p’.Cyrill Mamin - manuscriptdetails According to a popular view in philosophy, intuition is a singular propositional attitude. In this paper, I outline an opposite account on “garden-variety intuition”, i.e. intuition that people experience in their daily lives. The account is based on a distinction between intuition on the processing level, ‘intuitive belief’ and ‘intuition that p’. Immediacy and certainty prove to be the phenomenal features of intuitive beliefs and intuitions that p. Regarding the processing level, I suggest to combine dual-process theory and the theory (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Models of Philosophical Thought Experimentation.Jonathan Andy Tapsell - 2014 - Dissertation, Australian National Universitydetails The practice of thought experimentation plays a central role in contemporary philosophical methodology. Many philosophers rely on thought experimentation as their primary and even sole procedure for testing theories about the natures of properties and relations. This test procedure involves entertaining hypothetical cases in imaginative thought and then undergoing intuitions about the distribution of properties and relations in them. A theory’s comporting with an intuition is treated as evidence in favour of it; but a clash is treated as evidence against (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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