Non-propositional intuition, intuitive belief and ‘intuition that p’


According to a popular view in philosophy, intuition is a singular propositional attitude. In this paper, I outline an opposite account on “garden-variety intuition”, i.e. intuition that people experience in their daily lives. The account is based on a distinction between intuition on the processing level, ‘intuitive belief’ and ‘intuition that p’. Immediacy and certainty prove to be the phenomenal features of intuitive beliefs and intuitions that p. Regarding the processing level, I suggest to combine dual-process theory and the theory of mental models, and I claim that this results in non-propositional intuitions. Finally, I argue that non-propositional intuitions are fundamental for garden-variety intuition: They constitute inclinations to believe, possibly resulting in intuitive beliefs or intuitions that p.

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Cyrill Mamin
Friedrich Schiller Universität, Jena


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