The paper discusses the invariance view of reality: a view inspired by the relativity and quantum theory. It is an attempt to show that both versions of Structural Realism (epistemological and ontological) are already embedded in the invariance view but in each case the invariance view introduces important modifications. From the invariance view we naturally arrive at a consideration of symmetries and structures. It is often claimed that there is a strong connection between invariance and reality, established by symmetries. The (...) invariance view seems to render frame-invariant properties real, while frame-specific properties are illusory. But on a perspectival, yet observer-free view of frame-specific realities they too must be regarded as real although supervenient on frame-invariant realities. Invariance and perspectivalism are thus two faces of symmetries. Symmetries also elucidate structures. Because of this recognition, the invariance view is more comprehensive than Structural Realism. Referring to broken symmetries and coherence considerations, the paper concludes that at least some symmetries are ontological, not just epistemological constraints. (shrink)

Did the universe have a beginning or does it exist forever, i.e. is it eternal at least in relation to the past? This fundamental question was a main topic in ancient philosophy of nature and the Middle Ages. Philosophically it was more or less banished then by Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. But it used to have and still has its revival in modern physical cosmology both in the controversy between the big bang and steady state models some decades (...) ago and in the contemporary attempts to explain the big bang within a quantum cosmological framework. This paper has two main goals: First a conceptual clarification and distinction of different notions of "big bang" and "universe" is suggested, as well as a multiverse taxonomy and a classification of initial and eternal cosmologies. Second, and with the help of this analysis, it is shown how a conceptual and perhaps physical solution of the temporal aspect of Immanuel Kant's "first antinomy of pure reason" is possible, i.e. how our universe in some respect could have both a beginning and an eternal existence. Therefore, paradoxically, there might have been a time before time or a beginning of time in time. - Keywords: cosmology, big bang, big crunch, universe, multiverse, time, general relativity, quantum cosmology, loop quantum cosmology, string cosmology, world models, quantum vacuum, cosmic inflation, anthropic principle, closed timelike loops, Abhay Ashtekar, Hans-Joachim Blome, Martin Bojowald, George F. R. Ellis, Maurizio Gasperini, John Richard Gott III, Alan Guth, Jim Hartle, Stephen Hawking, Mark Israelit, Claus Kiefer, Li-Xin Li, Andrei Linde, Wolfgang Priester, Eckhard Rebhan, Paul Steinhardt, Neil Turok, Gabriele Veneziano, Alexander Vilenkin, H. Dieter Zeh. ›. (shrink)

In this paper we present a new framework of idealization in biology. We characterize idealizations as a network of counterfactual conditionals that can exhibit different degrees of contingency. We use the idea of possible worlds to say that, in departing more or less from the actual world, idealizations can serve numerous epistemic, methodological or heuristic purposes within scientific research. We defend that, in part, it is this structure what helps explain why idealizations, despite being deformations of reality, are so successful (...) in scientific practice. (shrink)

The line of argument pursued in this paper is to proceed from Einstein’s fundamental problem situation to a consideration of scientific representation with respect to the Special theory of relativity (STR). Einstein’s fundamental problem situation, which is Kantian in spirit, is how the conceptual freedom of the scientist is compatible with the need for an objective representation of an independently given material world. To solve this philosophical issue Einstein employs a number of constraints, which are central to the STR. The (...) issue of scientific representation leads to a consideration of the notion of reality and to the realistic commitments implied in the STR. From this point of view, the paper concludes that Einstein was committed to a kind of ‘structural’ realism. (shrink)

A thought experiment demonstrates that physicalism about consciousness entails a para- doxical duplication of physical information. Moreover, objective existence acquires the status of a physical property. To avoid this paradox, one requires a concept of objectivity in which individuation is finite and incomplete. Finite individuation requires objective uncertainty and is thus corroborated by the contemporary sciences. Finite individuation and objective uncer- tainty prevent existence from becoming a physical property, thus defeating physicalism about consciousness and resolving the paradox.

In this paper it will be argued that any realist interpretation of quantum mechanics intending to preserve the objectivity of the set of the definite-valued observables should require such a set to be invariant under the symmetry group of the theory. In particular, it will be shown that the natural way to reach this goal is to appeal to the Casimir operators of the Galilean group. Additionally, this idea will be generalized in two ways: by selecting the definite-valued observables of (...) a system in quantum field theory as those represented by the Casimir operators of the Poincaré group, and by extending the strategy to gauge symmetries. (shrink)

Pre-publication certification through peer review stands in need of philosophical examination. In this paper, philosopher-psychologist Steven James Bartlett recalls the arguments marshalled four hundred years ago by English poet John Milton against restraint of publication by the "gatekeepers of publication," AKA today's peer reviewers.

This essay revisits the topic of how we should measure the things that matter, at a time when we continue to mismeasure our lives, as we hold fast to outworn myths of usefulness, popularity, and the desire to influence others. /// Three central, unquestioned presumptions have come to govern much of contemporary society, education, and the professions. They are: the high value placed on usefulness, on the passion to achieve popularity, and on the desire to influence others. In this essay, (...) the psychologist-philosopher author makes the case against these presumptions, presumptions which lead to exclusionary commitments that stand in the way of human cultural development. (shrink)

My Ph.D. thesis œImpossibilità nel diritto€ [Impossibility in the Legal Domain] is devoted to the systematic analyses of what are called, at least prima facie, €œlegal impossibilities. My dissertation defines and isolates an area of studies - impossibility in the law - that has never been put organically together. In my work I present some case studies of normative impossibilities and discuss them from a philosophical point of view: impossible laws, impossible norms in a prescriptive theory of norms (ch. 2), (...) conflicting norms and legal gaps (metanormative impossibility - ch. 3), impossible obligations (ch. 4), impossible crimes (ch. 5), impossible legal proofs (ch. 6). I organize my research along the distinction -€“ introduced in ch. 1 -€“ between impossibility of norms (i.e. impossible norms and impossible normative acts) and impossibility from norms (i.e. impossibility due to a norm or a set of norms); the distinction between the impossibility of a norm conceived as a single entity and the impossibility of a norm conceived as part of a legal system; and the distinction of two uses of impossibilities in general, as impossibility can be both the object of a modal qualification and a modality itself. I propose four new contributions to the study of impossibility in the legal domain (ch. 7). Firstly, I reconstruct two different functions of the impossibility in the legal domain (exculpatory and invalidating); secondly, I put forward a triadic model for describing impossibility in the legal domain (in which, roughly, a set of sources of impossibilities is qualified by a function for the assumption of impossibility in the actual and concrete legal system); thirdly, I define and investigate the relationship of creation, assumption and presupposition between impossibility and a legal system; fourthly, I critically list and review all the different kinds of things that are called €˜impossibilities€™ inside a legal system, showing how sometimes the use of the concept of impossibility is not carefully justified. As an appendix (ch. 8), I outline a logic for impossibilities in the legal domain that allows to investigate the phenomena discussed in the work by breaking down the equivalence between being impossible (in the legal domain) and being logically contradictory. (shrink)