This dissertation attempts to preserve the central tenets of a global moral theory called “the capabilities approach” as defended by Martha Nussbaum, but to do so in a way that better realizes its own goals of identifying gender injustices and gaining cross-cultural support by providing an alternative defense of it. Capabilities assess an individual’s well-being based on what she is able to do (actions) and who she is able to be (states of existence). Nussbaum grounds her theory in the intuitive (...) idea that each and every person is worthy of equal respect and dignity. The problem with grounding a theory in a version of intuitionism is that it runs the risk of authoritarian moral reasoning. I argue Nussbaum, in fact, is the final arbiter who decides which intuitions are mistaken, which are not, and how to interpret what people say to fit into her own framework. This method of justifying capabilities is most problematic in cases of social inequality whereby dominant group members do not feel they need to check their intuitions against non-dominant group members, and even if they did, they are not forced to take the non-dominant group’s intuitions seriously. I find capabilities as a global moral theory to be very promising, and I agree with Nussbaum that a list of capabilities is beneficial for identifying people who are not able to live a truly dignified human life. However, I am also sympathetic to the criticism of defending capabilities using a version of intuitionism. So, I offer an alternative method of justifying the capabilities rooted in the discourse ethics tradition. This method seeks all persons that are affected by the outcome to freely and equally share their opinion. This avoids the charge of authoritarian moral reasoning, because (1) it seeks perspectives other than simply one’s own, but unlike traditional ethics, it (2) pays special attention to the ways in which power relations shape dialogue. Ultimately, I hope to have preserved the central tenets of the capabilities approach while better realizing Nussbaum’s commitment to defending a theory that is gender sensitive and has gained cross-cultural support. (shrink)

Recent feminist critiques of development have questioned some fundamental assumptions of feminist political theory; such critiques have also been successful in subverting long-held assumptions of conventional economic development. Viewed in the context of women’s subordination in third world countries, a redefinition of development must not only be about economic growth, but ensure a redistribution of resources, challenge the gender-based division of labour and also seek to provide for an egalitarian basis in social arrangements. Further, as this article argues, any starting (...) point for feminist critiques of development must also seek to link the end of gender oppression to multiple theories of justice – a justice not juridical but one that recognises the cultural membership of women in the community. (shrink)

In France between 1780 and 1815, doctors opened a broad correspondence with medical faculties and public officials about foetal anomalies . Institutional and legal reforms forced doctors to encounter monstrous births with greater frequency, and they responded by developing new ideas about heredity and embryology to explain malformations to public officials. Though doctors achieved consensus on pathogenesis, they struggled to apply these ideas in forensic cases, especially with doubtful sex. Medical networks simultaneously allowed doctors to explore obstetrical techniques, as licensing (...) regulations forced practitioners into emotional encounters with child anomalies. Doctors thus developed a new ethics for treating monstrosities, viewing them as pathological specimens, forensic objects, and obstetrical tragedies. (shrink)

Dans l’essai qu’elle consacre au roman de Dickens David Copperfield (« Le bras de Steerforth : l’amour et le point de vue moral »), Martha Nussbaum affirme que si ce roman montre qu’une union de l’amour et de la moralité est possible, le narrateur y parvient à travers l’écriture du roman et grâce à l’amour « romantique et érotique » qu’il éprouve pour le personage de Steerforth. Je montre au contraire que la forme de moralité que l’amour permet d’atteindre caractérise (...) aussi, dans ce roman, d’autres types d’amour, non-érotiques, notamment l’amour parental, l’amour filial et l’amour chrétien. Je montre également qu’Agnès Wickfield n’est pas dans ce roman le personnage kantien ou le spectateur impartial qu’y voit Nussbaum, de sorte qu’Agnès exprimerait « une position éthique qui diffère de celle qui anime la narration dans son ensemble ». Je montre au contraire qu’à travers l’amour sans jugement qu’elle porte à son père, Agnès illustre précisément, tout comme d’autres personnages qui s’y trouvent, la position éthique générale de ce roman. (shrink)

This article argues that the early Christian ?order of widows? provides a fruitful model for Christian ethicists struggling to address the medical and social problems of elderly women today. After outlining the precarious state of the ?almanah? - or widow - in biblical times, it describes the emergence of the order of widows in the early Church. Turning to the contemporary situation, it argues that demographics both in the United States and around the globe suggest that meeting the needs of (...) elderly women will become an enormous challenge in the years to come. The order of widows illustrates a three-fold conception of solidarity that has immediate implications today. That conception of solidarity encourages us: 1) to identify the unique medical needs of elderly women (e.g., osteoporosis); 2) to find ways of overcoming their societal isolation, which can increase their risk of medical and psychological problems; and 3) to develop strategies for enabling them to remain contributing members of the community for as long as possible. This essay is a slightly revised version of a keynote address given by the author at a conference on ?Women?s Health and Human Rights? held in Rome, Italy in February 1998 and sponsored by the Vatican, Georgetown University, and the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore. The proceedings of that conference were published in Italy by the Società Editrice Universo-Roma in a volume entitled Women?s Health Issues, edited by Spagnolo and Gambino (2003). (shrink)

John Rawls argued in A Theory of Justice that ‘justice as fairness … is likely to have greater stability than the traditional alternatives since it is more in line with the principles of moral psychology'. In support, he presented a psychology of moral development that was informed by a comprehensive liberalism. In Political Liberalism, Rawls confessed that the argument was 'unrealistic and must be recast'. Rawls, however, never provided a psychology of moral development informed by a specifically political liberalism, leaving (...) it at a disadvantage with respect to comprehensive liberalism itself. I argue that no coherent account is available. But, because Rawls’s Liberal Principle of Legitimacy, along with its implied stricture against 'indoctrination in the pejorative sense', is a creature of ideal rather than non-ideal theory, the deficiency is far less significant than many would assume. (shrink)

The paper intends to initiate a discussion on the politico-liberal concept of judgment. It is argued that whilst political liberalism (PL) – presented as an account of political objectivity – already appeals to judgment, this conception is an unsatisfactory one. This critical assessment is supported by the juxtaposition of PL with an Arendtian understanding of political objectivity which offers a more robust account of judgment. In the conclusion, the possibility of applying the Arendtian solution to PL is outlined.

The article launches a conceptual argument against the suggestion that Christian fundamentalist women, having for religious reasons voluntarily chosen their subjugation, are not oppressed. The article also rebuts the related argument that Christian fundamentalism provides women with adequate means for subversive power. Instead, the article proposes that women within Christian fundamentalism are oppressed, because within Christian fundamentalism the very identity of ‘woman’ is construed as subjected, thus obliterating the possibility of choosing a non-subjected identity.