Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Representationalism and Sensory Modalities: An Argument for Intermodal Representationalism.David Bourget - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):251-268.
    Intermodal representationalists hold that the phenomenal characters of experiences are fully determined by their contents. In contrast, intramodal representationalists hold that the phenomenal characters of experiences are determined by their contents together with their intentional modes or manners of representation, which are nonrepresentational features corresponding roughly to the sensory modalities. This paper discusses a kind of experience that provides evidence for an intermodal representationalist view: intermodal experiences, experiences that unify experiences in different modalities. I argue that such experiences are much (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Intentionalism.Tim Crane - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 474-93.
    The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object of a thought is what the thought concerns, or what it is about. Since there cannot be thoughts which are not about anything, or which do not concern anything, there cannot be thoughts without objects. Mental states or events or processes which have objects in this sense are traditionally called ‘intentional,’ and ‘intentionality’ is for this reason the general term for this defining characteristic of thought. Under (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • Representing Shape in Sight and Touch.E. J. Green - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Visual Awareness of Properties.Matthew J. Kennedy - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):298–325.
    I defend a view of the structure of visual property-awareness by considering the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. I argue that visual property-awareness is a three-place relation between a subject, a property, and a manner of presentation. Manners of presentation mediate our visual awareness of properties without being objects of visual awareness themselves. I provide criteria of identity for manners ofpresentation, and I argue that our ignorance of their intrinsic nature does not compromise the viability of a theory that employs them. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Multisensory Consciousness and Synesthesia.Berit Brogaard & Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. Oxford: Routledge.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Perception and Multimodality.Casey O'Callaghan - 2012 - In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers and cognitive scientists of perception by custom have investigated individual sense modalities in relative isolation from each other. However, perceiving is, in a number of respects, multimodal. The traditional sense modalities should not be treated as explanatorily independent. Attention to the multimodal aspects of perception challenges common assumptions about the content and phenomenology of perception, and about the individuation and psychological nature of sense modalities. Multimodal perception thus presents a valuable opportunity for a case study in mature interdisciplinary cognitive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • "Finding the Feel" : The Matching Content Challenge to Cognitive Phenomenology.Bayne Tim & McClelland Tom - forthcoming - .
    From the first-person point of view, seeing a red square is very different from thinking about a red square, hearing an alarm sound is very different from thinking that an alarm is sounding, and smelling freshly-roasted coffee is very different from thinking that there is freshly-roasted coffee in one’s vicinity. How might the familiar contrast between representing a fact in thought and representing it in perception be captured? One influential idea is that perceptual states are phenomenally conscious whereas thoughts are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark