Representationalism and Sensory Modalities: An Argument for Intermodal Representationalism

American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):251-268 (2017)
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Abstract

Intermodal representationalists hold that the phenomenal characters of experiences are fully determined by their contents. In contrast, intramodal representationalists hold that the phenomenal characters of experiences are determined by their contents together with their intentional modes or manners of representation, which are nonrepresentational features corresponding roughly to the sensory modalities. This paper discusses a kind of experience that provides evidence for an intermodal representationalist view: intermodal experiences, experiences that unify experiences in different modalities. I argue that such experiences are much easier to explain on the intermodal view.

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David Bourget
University of Western Ontario

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