Two normative principles of toleration are offered, one individual-regarding, the other group-regarding. The first is John Stuart Mill’s harm principle; the other is “Principle T,” meant to be the harm principle writ large. It is argued that the state should tolerate autonomous sacrifices of autonomy, including instances where an individual rationally chooses to be enslaved, lobotomized, or killed. Consistent with that, it is argued that the state should tolerate internal restrictions within minority groups even where these prevent autonomy promotion of (...) members of the group. Finally, it is argued that toleration excludes external protections of minority groups. (shrink)

The liberal perspective entrusts to civic education the roles of combating declining numbers in national public participation and of closing the civic empowerment gap between privileged and under-privileged groups. Citizens equipped with rationality, on this view, will be able to see that participating in the public arena is a benefit to themselves and to the country. This paper critically examines this position, and finds that liberal forms of education suffer from three failings. First, people’s rationality is more likely to persuade (...) them that public participation is too costly in comparison with the advantages found in private life. Second, cognitive states developed in learning-based education may not provide sufficient motivation for action. Third, the liberal take on education may have exaggerated people’s capacity for making rational choices. These three failings come together to suggest that liberal style civic education is unlikely to increase public participation or diminish the civic empowerment gap. (shrink)

Liberal writers share the intuition that the fundamental moral particle is the human individual, not the group. In this paper, I adopt the opposing intuition which many, including the indigenous Maori of New Zealand, say they feel: that it is the group that is fundamental, rather than the individual. I attempt to work out the doctrine which results from that intuition and call it?group foundationalism?. I then seek to explore the tenability of group foundationalism, not from the perspective of external (...) criticisms, but by reference to its own internal logic, and the experience of Maori. The problem raised is how far it is possible for a group which claims precedence over its members to be coherently self?defined, and to enjoy stable relations with other groups, including states, from which it may seek reparations for past wrongs, while sharing no common authority with them. (shrink)

I argue that religious elementary schools whose pedagogical methods satisfy the principle of rational authority have distinctive advantages over secular elementary schools for the purpose of laying the foundations for ethical autonomy in the children of religious parents. Insights from developmental psychology bolster the argument from conceptual analysis. Before children have the cognitive capacities to engage in authentically autonomous reflection, their long-run interest in developing autonomy is best served by developing their understanding of and provisional identity within their primary culture (...) and by encouraging a limited form of ethical reasoning within the framework provided by that secure cultural identity. (shrink)