Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Hyper-Reliability and Apriority.James Pryor - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):327–344.
    I argue that beliefs that are true whenever held-like I exist, I am thinking about myself, and (in an object-dependent framework) Jack = Jack-needn't on that account be a priori. It does however seem possible to remove the existential commitment from the last example, to get a belief that is knowable a priori. I discuss some difficulties concerning how to do that.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Donnellan on Neptune.Robin Jeshion - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):111-135.
    Donnellan famously argued that while one can fix the reference of a name with a definite description, one cannot thereby have a de re belief about the named object. All that is generated is meta-linguistic knowledge that the sentence “If there is a unique F, then N is F” is true. Donnellan’s argument and the sceptical position are extremely influential. This article aims to show that Donnellan’s argument is unsound, and that the Millian who embraces Donnellan’s scepticism that the reference-fixer (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations