Results for 'James Pryor'

1000+ found
Order:
See also
James Pryor
New York University
  1. Phenomenal Conservatism and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.Luca Moretti - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):267-280.
    This paper criticizes phenomenal conservatism––the influential view according to which a subject S’s seeming that P provides S with defeasible justification for believing P. I argue that phenomenal conservatism, if true at all, has a significant limitation: seeming-based justification is elusive because S can easily lose it by just reflecting on her seemings and speculating about their causes––I call this the problem of reflective awareness. Because of this limitation, phenomenal conservatism doesn’t have all the epistemic merits attributed to it by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. Epistemic Responsibilism and Moorean Dogmatism.Martin Grajner - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3):291-307.
    In this paper, I defend Moorean Dogmatism against a novel objection raised by Adam Leite. Leite locates the defectiveness of the Moorean reasoning explicitly not in the failure of the Moorean argument to transmit warrant from its premises to its conclusion but rather in the failure of an epistemic agent to satisfy certain epistemic responsibilities that arise in the course of conscious and deliberate reasoning. I will first show that there exist cases of Moorean reasoning that are not put into (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  1
    Epistemic Responsibilism and Moorean Dogmatism.Martin Grajner - 2015 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 3 (VI):291-307.
    In this paper, I defend Moorean Dogmatism against a novel objection raised by Adam Leite. Leite locates the defectiveness of the Moorean reasoning explicitly not in the failure of the Moorean argument to transmit warrant from its premises to its conclusion but rather in the failure of an epistemic agent to satisfy certain epistemic responsibilities that arise in the course of conscious and deliberate reasoning. I will first show that there exist cases of Moorean reasoning that are not put into (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. 'William James on Percepts, Concepts, and the Function of Cognition'.James O'Shea - 2019 - In Alexander Klein (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of William James.
    ABSTRACT: Central to both James’s earlier psychology and his later philosophical views was a recurring distinction between percepts and concepts. The distinction evolved and remained fundamental to his thinking throughout his career as he sought to come to grips with its fundamental nature and significance. In this chapter, I focus initially on James’s early attempt to articulate the distinction in his 1885 article “The Function of Cognition.” This will highlight a key problem to which James continued to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. William James on Pragmatism and Religion.Guy Axtell - 2018 - In Jacob Goodson (ed.), William James, Moral Philosophy, and the Ethical Life: The Cries of the Wounded. London: Lexington Books. pp. 317-336.
    Critics and defenders of William James both acknowledge serious tensions in his thought, tensions perhaps nowhere more vexing to readers than in regard to his claim about an individual’s intellectual right to their “faith ventures.” Focusing especially on “Pragmatism and Religion,” the final lecture in Pragmatism, this chapter will explore certain problems James’ pragmatic pluralism. Some of these problems are theoretical, but others concern the real-world upshot of adopting James permissive ethics of belief. Although Jamesian permissivism is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  6. James and Dewey on Abstraction. Winther - 2014 - The Pluralist 9 (2):1.
    Reification is to abstraction as disease is to health. Whereas abstraction is singling out, symbolizing, and systematizing, reification is neglecting abstractive context, especially functional, historical, and analytical-level context. William James and John Dewey provide similar and nuanced arguments regarding the perils and promises of abstraction. They share an abstraction-reification account. The stages of abstraction and the concepts of “vicious abstractionism,” “/the/ psychologist’s fallacy,” and “the philosophic fallacy” in the works of these pragmatists are here analyzed in detail. For instance, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  7. Appearance and Illusion.James Genone - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):339-376.
    Recent debates between representational and relational theories of perceptual experience sometimes fail to clarify in what respect the two views differ. In this essay, I explain that the relational view rejects two related claims endorsed by most representationalists: the claim that perceptual experiences can be erroneous, and the claim that having the same representational content is what explains the indiscriminability of veridical perceptions and phenomenally matching illusions or hallucinations. I then show how the relational view can claim that errors associated (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  8. Was James Psychologistic?Alexander Klein - 2016 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (5).
    As Thomas Uebel has recently argued, some early logical positivists saw American pragmatism as a kindred form of scientific philosophy. They associated pragmatism with William James, whom they rightly saw as allied with Ernst Mach. But what apparently blocked sympathetic positivists from pursuing commonalities with American pragmatism was the concern that James advocated some form of psychologism, a view they thought could not do justice to the a priori. This paper argues that positivists were wrong to read (...) as offering a psychologistic account of the a priori. They had encountered James by reading Pragmatism as translated by the unabashedly psychologistic Wilhelm Jerusalem. But in more technical works, James had actually developed a form of conventionalism that anticipated the so-called “relativized” a priori positivists themselves would independently develop. While positivists arrived at conventionalism largely through reflection on the exact sciences, though, James’s account of the a priori grew from his reflections on the biological evolution of cognition, particularly in the context of his Darwin-inspired critique of Herbert Spencer. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  9. Scientific Realism in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Seven Sciences and History and Philosophy of Science.James R. Beebe & Finnur Dellsén - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (2):336-364.
    We report the results of a study that investigated the views of researchers working in seven scientific disciplines and in history and philosophy of science in regard to four hypothesized dimensions of scientific realism. Among other things, we found that natural scientists tended to express more strongly realist views than social scientists, that history and philosophy of science scholars tended to express more antirealist views than natural scientists, that van Fraassen’s characterization of scientific realism failed to cluster with more standard (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  10. Qualitative Tools and Experimental Philosophy.James Andow - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1128-1141.
    Experimental philosophy brings empirical methods to philosophy. These methods are used to probe how people think about philosophically interesting things such as knowledge, morality, and freedom. This paper explores the contribution that qualitative methods have to make in this enterprise. I argue that qualitative methods have the potential to make a much greater contribution than they have so far. Along the way, I acknowledge a few types of resistance that proponents of qualitative methods in experimental philosophy might encounter, and provide (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  11. The Default Theory of Aesthetic Value.James Shelley - 2019 - British Journal of Aesthetics 59 (1):1-12.
    The default theory of aesthetic value combines hedonism about aesthetic value with strict perceptual formalism about aesthetic value, holding the aesthetic value of an object to be the value it has in virtue of the pleasure it gives strictly in virtue of its perceptual properties. A standard theory of aesthetic value is any theory of aesthetic value that takes the default theory as its theoretical point of departure. This paper argues that standard theories fail because they theorize from the default (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  12. Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment.James Fritz - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):643-661.
    Subject-sensitive invariantism posits surprising connections between a person’s knowledge and features of her environment that are not paradigmatically epistemic features. But which features of a person’s environment have this distinctive connection to knowledge? Traditional defenses of subject-sensitive invariantism emphasize features that matter to the subject of the knowledge-attribution. Call this pragmatic encroachment. A more radical thesis usually goes ignored: knowledge is sensitive to moral facts, whether or not those moral facts matter to the subject. Call this moral encroachment. This paper (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  13. Why Compatibilist Intuitions Are Not Mistaken: A Reply to Feltz and Millan.James Andow & Florian Cova - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):550-566.
    In the past decade, a number of empirical researchers have suggested that laypeople have compatibilist intuitions. In a recent paper, Feltz and Millan have challenged this conclusion by claiming that most laypeople are only compatibilists in appearance and are in fact willing to attribute free will to people no matter what. As evidence for this claim, they have shown that an important proportion of laypeople still attribute free will to agents in fatalistic universes. In this paper, we first argue that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  14.  18
    “L'ètica de la creença” (W. K. Clifford) & “La voluntat de creure” (William James).Alberto Oya, William James & W. K. Clifford - 2016 - Quaderns de Filosofia 3 (2):123-172.
    Catalan translation, introductory study and notes on W. K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”. Published in Clifford, W.K. “L’ètica de la creença”. Quaderns de Filosofia, vol. III, n. 2 (2016), pp. 129–150. // Catalan translation, introductory study and notes on William James’s “The Will to Believe”. Published in James, William. “La voluntat de creure”. Quaderns de Filosofia, vol. III, n. 2 (2016), pp. 151–172. [Introductory study published in Oya, Alberto. “Introducció. El debat entre W. K. Clifford i William (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Moral Encroachment and Reasons of the Wrong Kind.James Fritz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3051-3070.
    According to the view that there is moral encroachment in epistemology, whether a person has knowledge of p sometimes depends on moral considerations, including moral considerations that do not bear on the truth or likelihood of p. Defenders of moral encroachment face a central challenge: they must explain why the moral considerations they cite, unlike moral bribes for belief, are reasons of the right kind for belief (or withheld belief). This paper distinguishes between a moderate and a radical version of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  16. Recent Work on Naive Realism.James Genone - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1).
    Naïve realism, often overlooked among philosophical theories of perception, has in recent years attracted a surge of interest. Broadly speaking, the central commitment of naïve realism is that mind-independent objects are essential to the fundamental analysis of perceptual experience. Since the claims of naïve realism concern the essential metaphysical structure of conscious perception, its truth or falsity is of central importance to a wide range of topics, including the explanation of semantic reference and representational content, the nature of phenomenal consciousness, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  17. The Empirical Case for Folk Indexical Moral Relativism.James R. Beebe - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy 4.
    Recent empirical work on folk moral objectivism has attempted to examine the extent to which folk morality presumes that moral judgments are objectively true or false. Some researchers report findings that they take to indicate folk commitment to objectivism (Goodwin & Darley, 2008, 2010, 2012; Nichols & Folds-Bennett, 2003; Wainryb et al., 2004), while others report findings that may reveal a more variable commitment to objectivism (Beebe, 2014; Beebe et al., 2015; Beebe & Sackris, 2016; Sarkissian, et al., 2011; Wright, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  18. Reliable but Not Home Free? What Framing Effects Mean for Moral Intuitions.James Andow - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):904-911.
    Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have an unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  19. How “Intuition” Exploded.James Andow - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (2):189-212.
    Recent decades have seen a surge in interest in metaphilosophy. In particular there has been an interest in philosophical methodology. Various questions have been asked about philosophical methods. Are our methods any good? Can we improve upon them? Prior to such evaluative and ameliorative concerns, however, is the matter of what methods philosophers actually use. Worryingly, our understanding of philosophical methodology is impoverished in various respects. This article considers one particular respect in which we seem to be missing an important (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  20. The Causal Mechanical Model of Explanation.James Woodward - 1989 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13:359-83.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  21. Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief.David James Barnett - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):184-212.
    This paper critically examines currently influential transparency accounts of our knowledge of our own beliefs that say that self-ascriptions of belief typically are arrived at by “looking outward” onto the world. For example, one version of the transparency account says that one self-ascribes beliefs via an inference from a premise to the conclusion that one believes that premise. This rule of inference reliably yields accurate self-ascriptions because you cannot infer a conclusion from a premise without believing the premise, and so (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  22. How Different Kinds of Disagreement Impact Folk Metaethical Judgments.James R. Beebe - 2014 - In Jennifer Cole Wright & Hagop Sarkissian (eds.), Advances in Experimental Moral Psychology. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 167-187.
    Th e present article reports a series of experiments designed to extend the empirical investigation of folk metaethical intuitions by examining how different kinds of ethical disagreement can impact attributions of objectivity to ethical claims.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  23. Thin, Fine and with Sensitivity: A Metamethodology of Intuitions.James Andow - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-21.
    Do philosophers use intuitions? Should philosophers use intuitions? Can philosophical methods (where intuitions are concerned) be improved upon? In order to answer these questions we need to have some idea of how we should go about answering them. I defend a way of going about methodology of intuitions: a metamethodology. I claim the following: (i) we should approach methodological questions about intuitions with a thin conception of intuitions in mind; (ii) we should carve intuitions finely; and, (iii) we should carve (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  24. Expecting Moral Philosophers to Be Reliable.James Andow - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (2):205-220.
    Are philosophers’ intuitions more reliable than philosophical novices’? Are we entitled to assume the superiority of philosophers’ intuitions just as we assume that experts in other domains have more reliable intuitions than novices? Ryberg raises some doubts and his arguments promise to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy once and for all. In this paper, I raise a number of objections to these arguments. I argue that philosophers receive sufficient feedback about the quality of their intuitions and that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  25. Do Non-Philosophers Think Epistemic Consequentialism is Counterintuitive?James Andow - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2631-2643.
    Direct epistemic consequentialism is the idea that X is epistemically permissible iff X maximizes epistemic value. It has received lots of attention in recent years and is widely accepted by philosophers to have counterintuitive implications. There are various reasons one might suspect that the relevant intuitions will not be widely shared among non-philosophers. This paper presents an initial empirical study of ordinary intuitions. The results of two experiments demonstrate that the counterintuitiveness of epistemic consequentialism is more than a philosophers' worry---the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  26. Toward the Ethical Robot.James Gips - 1994 - In Kenneth M. Ford, C. Glymour & Patrick Hayes (eds.), Android Epistemology. MIT Press. pp. 243--252.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  27. What is the Point of Helping?James Fanciullo - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1487-1500.
    In some cases, a group of people can bring about a morally bad outcome despite each person’s individual act making no difference with respect to bringing that outcome about. Since each person’s act makes no difference, it seems the effects of the act cannot provide a reason not to perform it. This is problematic, because if each person acts in accordance with their reasons, each will presumably perform the act—and thus, the bad outcome will be brought about. Recently, Julia Nefsky (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  28. Corrupting the Youth: A History of Philosophy in Australia.James Franklin - 2003 - Sydney, Australia: Macleay Press.
    A polemical account of Australian philosophy up to 2003, emphasising its unique aspects (such as commitment to realism) and the connections between philosophers' views and their lives. Topics include early idealism, the dominance of John Anderson in Sydney, the Orr case, Catholic scholasticism, Melbourne Wittgensteinianism, philosophy of science, the Sydney disturbances of the 1970s, Francofeminism, environmental philosophy, the philosophy of law and Mabo, ethics and Peter Singer. Realist theories especially praised are David Armstrong's on universals, David Stove's on logical probability (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  29. Divergent Perspectives on Expert Disagreement: Preliminary Evidence From Climate Science, Climate Policy, Astrophysics, and Public Opinion.James R. Beebe, Maria Baghramian, Luke Drury & Finnur Dellsén - 2019 - Environmental Communication 13:35-50.
    We report the results of an exploratory study that examines the judgments of climate scientists, climate policy experts, astrophysicists, and non-experts (N = 3367) about the factors that contribute to the creation and persistence of disagreement within climate science and astrophysics and about how one should respond to expert disagreement. We found that, as compared to non-experts, climate experts believe that within climate science (i) there is less disagreement about climate change, (ii) methodological factors play less of a role in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30. A Puzzle About Seeing for Representationalism.James Openshaw & Assaf Weksler - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2625-2646.
    When characterizing the content of a subject’s perceptual experience, does their seeing an object entail that their visual experience represents it as being a certain way? If it does, are they thereby in a position to have perceptually-based thoughts about it? On one hand, representationalists are under pressure to answer these questions in the affirmative. On the other hand, it seems they cannot. This paper presents a puzzle to illustrate this tension within orthodox representationalism. We identify several interesting morals which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. Moral Steadfastness and Meta-Ethics.James Fritz & Tristram McPherson - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):43-56.
    Call the following claim Asymmetry: rationality often requires a more steadfast response to pure moral disagreement than it does to otherwise analogous non-moral disagreement. This paper briefly motivates Asymmetry and explores its implications for meta-ethics. Some philosophers have thought that anti-realists are better-placed than realists to explain Asymmetry because, if anti-realism is true, disagreement cannot provide evidence against the reliability of one's thinking about objective moral facts. This paper argues that this simple diagnosis fails to support otherwise plausible anti-realisms. It (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  32. Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Susceptible to Framing Effects?James Andow - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):115-141.
    Various studies have reported that moral intuitions about the permissibility of acts are subject to framing effects. This paper reports the results of a series of experiments which further examine the susceptibility of moral intuitions to framing effects. The main aim was to test recent speculation that intuitions about the moral relevance of certain properties of cases might be relatively resistent to framing effects. If correct, this would provide a certain type of moral intuitionist with the resources to resist challenges (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  33. If Time Travel to Our Location is Possible, We Do Not Live in a Branching Universe.James Norton - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):260-266.
    This paper argues for the following disjunction: either we do not live in a world with a branching temporal structure, or backwards time travel is nomologically impossible, given the initial state of the universe, or backwards time travel to our space-time location is impossible given large-scale facts about space and time. A fortiori, if backwards time travel to our location is possible, we do not live in a branching universe.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  34. Intuitions About Cases as Evidence (for How We Should Think).James Andow - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Much recent work on philosophical methodology has focused on whether we should accept evidence: the claim that philosophers use intuitive judgments about cases as evidence for/against philosophical theories. This paper outlines a new way of thinking about the philosophical method of appealing to cases such that evidence is true but not as it is typically understood. The idea proposed is that, when philosophers appeal to cases, they are engaged in a project of conceptual engineering and that, within that project, intuitions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35. What Science Knows: And How It Knows It.James Franklin - 2009 - Encounter Books.
    In What Science Knows, the Australian philosopher and mathematician James Franklin explains in captivating and straightforward prose how science works its magic. It offers a semipopular introduction to an objective Bayesian/logical probabilist account of scientific reasoning, arguing that inductive reasoning is logically justified (though actually existing science sometimes falls short). Its account of mathematics is Aristotelian realist.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  36. The Lord of Noncontradiction: An Argument for God From Logic.James N. Anderson & Greg Welty - 2011 - Philosophia Christi 13 (2):321 - 338.
    In this paper we offer a new argument for the existence of God. We contend that the laws of logic are metaphysically dependent on the existence of God, understood as a necessarily existent, personal, spiritual being; thus anyone who grants that there are laws of logic should also accept that there is a God. We argue that if our most natural intuitions about them are correct, and if they are to play the role in our intellectual activities that we take (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  37.  67
    The Discretionary Normativity of Requests.James H. P. Lewis - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18:1-16.
    Being able to ask others to do things, and thereby giving them reasons to do those things, is a prominent feature of our interpersonal lives. In this paper, I discuss the distinctive normative status of requests – what makes them different from commands and demands. I argue for a theory of this normative phenomenon which explains the sense in which the reasons presented in requests are a matter of discretion. This discretionary quality, I argue, is something that other theories cannot (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  38. The Truth About Kant On Lies.James Edwin Mahon - 2009 - In Clancy Martin (ed.), The Philosophy of Deception. Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter I argue that there are three different senses of 'lie' in Kant's moral philosophy: the lie in the ethical sense (the broadest sense, which includes lies to oneself), the lie in the 'juristic' sense (the narrowest sense, which only includes lies that specifically harm particular others), and the lie in the sense of right (or justice), which is narrower than the ethical sense, but broader than the juristic sense, since it includes all lies told to others, including (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  39. The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability Before Pascal.James Franklin - 2001 - Baltimore, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press.
    How were reliable predictions made before Pascal and Fermat's discovery of the mathematics of probability in 1654? What methods in law, science, commerce, philosophy, and logic helped us to get at the truth in cases where certainty was not attainable? The book examines how judges, witch inquisitors, and juries evaluated evidence; how scientists weighed reasons for and against scientific theories; and how merchants counted shipwrecks to determine insurance rates. Also included are the problem of induction before Hume, design arguments for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  40. Carnap, Explication, and Social History.James Pearson - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (4):741-774.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  41. Immoralism and the Valence Constraint.James Harold - 2008 - British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (1):45-64.
    Immoralists hold that in at least some cases, moral fl aws in artworks can increase their aesthetic value. They deny what I call the valence constraint: the view that any effect that an artwork’s moral value has on its aesthetic merit must have the same valence. The immoralist offers three arguments against the valence constraint. In this paper I argue that these arguments fail, and that this failure reveals something deep and interesting about the relationship between cognitive and moral value. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  42. Semantic Pathology and the Open Pair. [REVIEW]James A. Woodbridge & Bradley Armour-Garb - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):695–703.
    In Vagueness and Contradiction (2001), Roy Sorensen defends and extends his epistemic account of vagueness. In the process, he appeals to connections between vagueness and semantic paradox. These appeals come mainly in Chapter 11, where Sorensen offers a solution to what he calls the no-no paradox—a “neglected cousin” of the more famous liar—and attempts to use this solution as a precedent for an epistemic account of the sorites paradox. This strategy is problematic for Sorensen’s project, however, since, as we establish, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  43. William James and His Darwinian Defense of Freewill.Matthew Crippen - 2011 - In Mark Wheeler (ed.), 150 Years of Evolution: Darwin’s Impact on Contemporary Thought and Culture. pp. 68-89.
    Abstract If asked about the Darwinian influence on William James, some might mention his pragmatic position that ideas are “mental modes of adaptation,” and that our stock of ideas evolves to meet our changing needs. However, while this is not obviously wrong, it fails to capture what James deems most important about Darwinian theory: the notion that there are independent cycles of causation in nature. Versions of this idea undergird everything from his campaign against empiricist psychologies to his (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  44. William James on Belief: Turning Darwinism Against Empiricistic Skepticism.Matthew Crippen - 2010 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46 (3):477-502.
    Few address the extent to which William James regards the neo-Lamarckian account of “direct adaptation” as a biological extension of British empiricism. Consequently few recognize the instrumental role that the Darwinian idea of “indirect adaptation” plays in his lifelong efforts to undermine the empiricist view that sense experience molds the mind. This article examines how James uses Darwinian thinking, first, to argue that mental content can arise independently of sense experience; and, second, to show that empiricists advance a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  45. What Pessimism About Moral Deference Means for Disagreement.James Fritz - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):121-136.
    Many writers have recently argued that there is something distinctively problematic about sustaining moral beliefs on the basis of others’ moral views. Call this claim pessimism about moral deference. Pessimism about moral deference, if true, seems to provide an attractive way to argue for a bold conclusion about moral disagreement: moral disagreement generally does not require belief revision. Call this claim steadfastness about moral disagreement. Perhaps the most prominent recent discussion of the connection between moral deference and moral disagreement, due (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  46. Achievements and Fallacies in Hume's Account of Infinite Divisibility.James Franklin - 1994 - Hume Studies 20 (1):85-101.
    Throughout history, almost all mathematicians, physicists and philosophers have been of the opinion that space and time are infinitely divisible. That is, it is usually believed that space and time do not consist of atoms, but that any piece of space and time of non-zero size, however small, can itself be divided into still smaller parts. This assumption is included in geometry, as in Euclid, and also in the Euclidean and non- Euclidean geometries used in modern physics. Of the few (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  47. Infinite Utility.James Cain - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):401 – 404.
    Suppose we wish to decide which of a pair of actions has better consequences in a case in which both actions result in infinite utility. Peter Vallentyne and others have proposed that one action has better consequences than a second if there is a time after which the cumulative utility of the first action always outstrips the cumulative utility of the second. I argue against this principle, in particular I show how cases may arise in which up to any point (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  48. Visual Geometry.James Hopkins - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (1):3-34.
    We cannot imagine two straight lines intersecting at two points even though they may do so. In this case our abilities to imagine depend upon our abilities to visualise.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  49. The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Logic of Relative Identity.James Cain - 1989 - Religious Studies 25 (2):141 - 152.
    I EXPLORE ONE WAY IN WHICH THE THEORY OF RELATIVE IDENTITY (DEVELOPED ALONG LINES SUGGESTED BY GEACH’S WRITINGS) CAN BE USED TO UNDERSTAND THE WAY LANGUAGE FUNCTIONS IN TRINITARIAN DOCTRINE. THIS INCLUDES A DISCUSSION OF REDUPLICATIVE PROPOSITIONS.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  50.  34
    Thinking About Many.James Openshaw - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2863-2882.
    The notorious problem of the many makes it difficult to resist the conclusion that almost coincident with any ordinary object are a vast number of near-indiscernible objects. As Unger was aware in his presentation of the problem, this abundance raises a concern as to how—and even whether—we achieve singular thought about ordinary objects. This paper presents, clarifies, and defends a view which reconciles a plenitudinous conception of ordinary objects with our having singular thoughts about those objects. Indeed, this strategy has (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 1000