The article suggests that the four-factor model of corporate citizenship (CC: economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary responsibilities) does not fairly represent all pertinent dimensions of employees' CC perceptions. Based on an empirical study with a sample of 316 employees, we show that, at least in some contexts, individuals distinguish seven CC dimensions: (1) economic responsibilities toward customers; (2) economic responsibilities toward owners; (3) legal responsibilities; (4) ethical responsibilities; (5) discretionary responsibilities toward employees; (6) discretionary responsibilities toward the community; and (7) (...) discretionary responsibilities toward the natural environment. We do not suggest that this seven-factor model represents all of the (more) relevant CC dimensions in the employees' minds. We aim to share evidence showing that the four-factor model proposed by Maignan et al. (Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 27(4):455-69, 1999) may be refined, at least when the employees are the stakeholders in question. (shrink)

A review of the stakeholder literature reveals that the concept of "normative core" can be applied in three main ways: philosophical justification of stakeholder theory, theoretical governing principles of a firm, and managerial beliefs/values influencing the underlying narrative of business. When considering the case of Wall Street, we argue that the managerial application of normative core reveals the imbedded nature of the fact/value dichotomy. Problems arise when the work of the fact/value dichotomy contributes to a closed-core institution. We make the (...) distinction between open- and closed-core institutions to show how in the case of the closed-core, ethical decision-making is viewed by the institution as a separate domain from the core business of the institution. The resulting blind spot stifles meaningful exchanges with stakeholders attempting to address the need for reform. We suggest in conclusion that ethical considerations are less about casting a value judgment and more about creating a process for meaningful conversation throughout an institution and its stakeholders. (shrink)

In this article, we propose an adaption to stakeholder theory whereby stakeholders are conceptualized on the basis of their social identity. We begin by offering a critical review of both traditional and more recent developments in stakeholder theory, focusing in particular on the way in which stakeholder categories are identified. By identifying critical weaknesses in the existing approach, as well as important points of strength, we outline an alternative approach that refines our understanding of stakeholders in important ways. To do (...) so, we draw on notions of social identity as the fundamental basis for group cohesion, mobilization, and action. A new form of cross-mapping as a basis for stakeholder identification is advanced and key research questions are set out. (shrink)

Theories of business ethics or corporate responsibility tend to focus on justifying obligations that go above and beyond what is required by law. This article examines the curious fact that most business ethics scholars use concepts, principles, and normative methods for identifying and justifying these beyond-compliance obligations that are very different from the ones that are used to set the levels of regulations themselves. Its modest proposal—a plea for a research agenda, really—is that we could reduce this normative asymmetry by (...) borrowing from the normative framework of “regulation” to identify and justify an important range of beyond-compliance obligations. In short, we might think of “self-regulation” as a language and a normative framework with some distinct advantages over other frameworks like stakeholder theory, corporate social responsibility, corporate citizenship, and the like. These other frameworks have been under attack in the business ethics literature of late, primarily for their vagueness and their disappointing inability to distinguish clearly between genuine beyond-compliance moral obligations, on the one hand, and charitable acts that are laudable but not morally obligatory, on the other. (shrink)

Henry Hansmann has claimed we have reached the “end of history” in corporate law, organized around the “widespread normative consensus that corporate managers should act exclusively in the economic interests of shareholders.” In this paper, I examine Hansmann’s own argument in support of this view, in order to draw out its implications for some of the traditional concerns of business ethicists about corporate social responsibility. The centerpiece of Hansmann’s argument is the claim that ownership of the firm is most naturally (...) exercised by the group able to achieve the lowest agency costs, and that homogeneity of interest within the ownership group is the most important factor in achieving lower costs. He defends this claim through a study of cooperatives, attempting to show that homogeneity is the source of the competitive advantage most often enjoyed by shareholders over other constituency groups, such as workers, suppliers and customers, when it comes to exercising control over the firm. Some business ethicists, impressed by this argument, have taken it to be a vindication of Milton Friedman’s claim that profit-maximization is the only “social responsibility” of management. I would like to suggest that this conclusion does not follow, and that the “Hansmann argument” lends itself to a less minimalist view, what I refer to as a “market failures” approach to business ethics. (shrink)

The article suggests that the four-factor model of corporate citizenship (CC: economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary responsibilities) does not fairly represent all pertinent dimensions of employees’ CC perceptions. Based on an empirical study with a sample of 316 employees, we show that, at least in some contexts, individuals distinguish seven CC dimensions: (1) economic responsibilities toward customers; (2) economic responsibilities toward owners; (3) legal responsibilities; (4) ethical responsibilities; (5) discretionary responsibilities toward employees; (6) discretionary responsibilities toward the community; and (7) (...) discretionary responsibilities toward the natural environment. We do not suggest that this seven-factor model represents all of the (more) relevant CC dimensions in the employees’ minds. We aim to share evidence showing that the four-factor model proposed by Maignan et al. (Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 27(4):455–469, 1999 ) may be refined, at least when the employees are the stakeholders in question. (shrink)

The dominance of agency theory can reduce our collective scope to analyse private equity in all its diversity and depth. We contribute to theorisation of private equity by developing a contrasting perspective that draws on a rich tradition of virtue ethics. In doing so, we juxtapose 'private equity' with 'public good' to develop points of rhetorical and analytical contrast. We develop a typology differentiating various forms of private equity, and focus on the 'take private' form. These takeovers are where private (...) equity funds are used to buy all a firm's publicly listed shares. Take private deals reduce reporting requirements and lessen the amount of public scrutiny a firm comes under. They allow greater control of a firm's assets and resources but also have effects in terms of the wider social fabric. The 'public good' and virtue ethics offer an alternative basis for theorisation of these deals. This provides a needed contrast to accounts of private equity based on agency theory. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to discuss popular conceptions of business ethics and their relationship to the problem of racial injustice by way of reviewing Spike Lee’s (1989) _Do the Right Thing_. Taking place on one day in late 80’s Bedford-Stuyvesant, and set against a tense decade of racial conflict in New York City, Spike Lee’s masterpiece has deeply influenced American discourse on race, capturing many of the complex interpersonal dynamics that are both constitutive and consequence of American racial (...) hierarchies. Instead of focusing on shareholders and stakeholders, I argue that _Do The Right Thing_ suggests a more political understanding of business’s ethical obligations: a business’s ethical obligations don’t emanate from internal relations but from its social and political position. I conclude by discussing a more recent film, Steve McQueen’s (2020) _Mangrove_. Like _Do the Right Thing_, _Mangrove_ also focuses on a business that is at the center of an urban racial conflict, but which stands in a very different relationship to this tension, providing an alternative illustration of business ethics informed by political and social positioning. (shrink)

This conceptual paper contributes to the critique of a body of literature that will be named ‘deliberative corporate governance’ by defending non-deliberative acts performed by stakeholders. It first argues that this literature introduces to the corporation a decision-making process where it does not belong, given the corporation's economic role. This leads to an ‘efficiency constraint’ on any attempt to justify deliberation – deliberative governance theorists must show that it is the most efficient and cost-effective way to address the issues that (...) concern them. A real case example where deliberation would have been counter-productive in that regard will show that this is not the case. Building on this example, the paper uses the theory of democratic agonism to argue that non-deliberative acts should be part of governance. A sketch of managerial duties vis-à-vis such acts is attempted as well. The paper does not seek to reject deliberative corporate governance entirely, but rather to defend the importance of non-deliberative practices in addressing its theoretical concern. It makes a conceptual contribution to corporate governance theory, from which it draws practical implications for stakeholders-oriented management. (shrink)

To contribute to the continuing challenge of explaining how managers identify stakeholders and assess their salience, in this article, we chronicle the history, assess the impact, and evaluate the possibilities opened by Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (MAW-1997). We do so through two types of qualitative analysis, and also through utilizing a quantitative network analysis tool. The first qualitative analysis categorizes the major contributions of the most influential papers succeeding MAW-1997; the second identifies and compares the relevant issues with MAW-1997 at (...) the time of initial publication and today. We apply main path analysis, a quantitative tool, to map how this scholarly domain has evolved. These three analyses robustly depict the impact of MAW-1997 and the ensuing scholarly conversation, and they enable us to illustrate the current state and trajectory of stakeholder identification and salience scholarship. We close by discussing pressing topics related to the broader body of stakeholder theory literature. (shrink)

In the business ethics literature, many argue that managerial decision making ought to be improved by more robust ethical concerns. Some see the virtue of “practical wisdom” as the key for improved managerial decision making. However, because of the epistemic limitations confronting decision makers in the face of irreducible market complexity, there is a risk that practical wisdom, employed in the context of day‐to‐day managerial decision making, becomes an impractical concept. Nevertheless, if the attempt to incorporate virtue ethics (and its (...) related concepts) into business practices is laudable, if indeed a virtuous life is worth pursuing and practical wisdom plays an essential role toward that end, it is important to attempt to salvage practical wisdom and uncover its appropriate usage. Thus, this article pursues two major ends. First, upon surveying some of the prominent and standard usages of the term, it articulates concerns, rooted in epistemic limitations, about the way that practical wisdom appears in business ethics literature. Second, it offers a new way forward for understanding “practical wisdom.” By contextualizing day‐to‐day, rule‐based managerial decision making within the ethical value of the market order, practical wisdom reappears as the higher‐order capacity to pursue vocations, as morally worthwhile projects, in business. (shrink)

This article provides an overview of the field of business ethics.

We offer a precautionary account of why business managers should proactively rethink about what kinds of automation firms ought to implement, by exploring two challenges that automation will potentially pose. We engage the current debate concerning whether life without work opportunities will incur a meaning crisis, offering an argument in favor of the position that if technological unemployment occurs, the machine age may be a structurally limited condition for many without work opportunities to have or add meaning to their lives. (...) We term this the axiological challenge. This challenge, if it turns out to be persuasive, leads to a second challenge, to which managers should pay special attention: the teleological challenge, a topic especially relevant to the broad literature about corporate purpose and governance. We argue that both the shareholder profit-maximization model and its major alternative, stakeholder theory, are insufficient to address the meaning crisis. Unless rebutted, the two challenges compel business leaders to proactively rethink the purpose of business for future society. Otherwise, businesses will be contributors to a major ethical crisis and societal externality in the coming society. (shrink)

Stakeholder theory has been an incredibly powerful tool for understanding and improving organisations, and their relationship with other actors in society. That these critical ideas are now accepted within mainstream business is due in no small part to the influence of stakeholder theory. However, improvements to stakeholder engagement through stakeholder theory have tended to help stakeholders who are already somewhat powerful within organisational settings, while those who are less powerful continue to be marginalised and routinely ignored. In this paper, we (...) argue that one possible obstacle preventing less powerful stakeholders from speaking up and/or being heard by organisations is found at the ontological level, where we have identified an ‘essentialist self’ underpinning the stakeholder concept. By deconstructing the stakeholder concept through how it is defined, discussed and debated, and linking this back to the practical consequences of the theory for the least powerful stakeholders, we are able to make three contributions. One, through our deconstruction, it is clear that at an ontological level, stakeholder theory is underpinned by an implicit, and problematic, assumption of the ‘essentialist self’, where the organisation is treated as the ‘natural, universal self’, and anyone not closely resembling this narrow (and unrealistic) view of self is treated as ‘other’. Two, we build on the work of authors such as Wicks et al. (Bus Ethics Q 4(4):475–497, 1994), who highlight the need for consideration of the self within stakeholder theory. We thus take our findings from contribution one and begin to build a more holistic view of the self within the stakeholder concept, where each self is encouraged to recognise common selves outside and inside the corporation. Third, we link the theoretical discussion to the practical by discussing some imperfect ways in which a more holistic, enriched stakeholder concept might begin to help mitigate marginalisation for some stakeholders. (shrink)

Stakeholder theory is widely accepted but elementary aspects remain indeterminate as the term ‘stakeholder’ is an essentially contested concept, being variously describable, internally complex and open in character. Such contestability is highly problematic for theory development and empirical testing. The extent of essential contestability, previously unknown, is demonstrated in this paper through a bounded systematic review of 593 different stakeholder theory definitions. As an essentially contested concept, the solution does not lie in a universal stakeholder definition, but in debating the (...) boundaries of stakeholder identification. To this end, this paper presents the first major attempt at sorting, filtering and ordering stakeholder theory and stakeholder definitions to produce a comprehensive, multi-dimensional classification of stakeholder theory. The constructs of the classification model juxtapose existing stakeholder theories and contributions from across the multi-contextual applications of stakeholder theory, thereby providing an invaluable overview of what we know about stakeholder theory in one model. The classification model is then tested with positive results. The paper concludes with a comprehensive discussion of the implications of classification stakeholder theory definitions, which has for future research. (shrink)

The most recent restatements of stakeholder theory formulate that approach in terms of the distribution of value: “A stakeholder approach to business is about creating as much value as possible for stakeholders, without resorting to tradeoffs” (Freeman et al. 2010: 28). This formulation marks a shift from earlier work, which included a procedural dimension—a requirement that stakeholders participate in organization decision making. The present paper pushes back against this shift: it argues that orienting the stakeholder approach around the participation requirement (...) provides for a different moral logic, one not available to (now) conventional stakeholder theorizing (without that requirement), and one that may be more compelling to many. This argument requires critical re-examination of the moral arguments offered in the most recent restatements of the stakeholder approach. (shrink)

Some leading economists maintain that corporate managers have no social responsibilities other than to maximize profits and obey the law. To support that thesis, they rely, in part, on the agency theory of the firm. The theory provides that managers are agents of shareholders and must do what shareholders want, which is generally to make as much money as possible. For purposes of this article, I accept that managers are agents of shareholders, but I reject the conclusion that the relationship (...) dilutes their moral obligations. Managers, as agents, cannot justify immoral decisions on the grounds that their shareholders direct their actions. Similarly, shareholders, as principals, lack moral bases to authorize managers to take actions the shareholders could not justify taking themselves. I apply this thesis to the ethical challenges managers of government contracting businesses face when they consider whether to make independent political expenditures. I argue that where it is in the interests of government contractors to publicly disclose, limit, or forego making independent political expenditures, they can legally do so, and that in the absence of financial advantage or legal obligation, agency theory highlights the ethical obligations of shareholders and their managers agents. It does not grant them an ethical free pass. (shrink)

Some leading economists maintain that corporate managers have no social responsibilities other than to maximize profits and obey the law. To support that thesis, they rely, in part, on the agency theory of the firm. The theory provides that managers are agents of shareholders and must do what shareholders want, which is generally to make as much money as possible. For purposes of this article, I accept that managers are agents of shareholders, but I reject the conclusion that the relationship (...) dilutes their moral obligations. Managers, as agents, cannot justify immoral decisions on the grounds that their shareholders direct their actions. Similarly, shareholders, as principals, lack moral bases to authorize managers to take actions the shareholders could not justify taking themselves. I apply this thesis to the ethical challenges managers of government contracting businesses face when they consider whether to make independent political expenditures. I argue that where it is in the interests of government contractors to publicly disclose, limit, or forego making independent political expenditures, they can legally do so, and that in the absence of financial advantage or legal obligation, agency theory highlights the ethical obligations of shareholders and their managers agents. It does not grant them an ethical free pass. (shrink)

In our time, innovation is considered an important way to address societal problems. That we expect so much from innovation to solve the challenges of our time, makes the question what could count as ‘responsible innovation’ more pressing. And that is what this thesis is about. The aim of this thesis is to offer philosophical reflections on responsible innovation in the business context. Since that is still a quite broad topic, the main title suggests its further focus: deliberation and food. (...) The first focus originates from the idea in the academic literature on responsible innovation, that innovators should not just assess by themselves what ‘responsible’ is, but should invite others to think along with them about the social and ethical aspects of innovation. Chapter 2 to 4 zoom in on this aspect of responsible innovation. The second focus has to do with the specific context of application, namely food and the food industry. Chapter 4 and 5 relate the topic of responsible innovation to this context. The question I raise in chapter 2 is whether the ideal of inclusive deliberation is suitable for innovation processes in businesses. I argue that this is not so easy, and provide different reasons why companies might not be willing to involve societal stakeholders into their innovation processes. First, the requirement of deliberation can be tension with the ability of companies to exploit their innovations commercially within a competitive market. Second, deliberation requires a certain degree of transparency about the innovation strategy of a company. Companies might not be willing to provide this transparency, because they fear knowledge leakage to other companies. Third, companies are controlled most often by people with a financial stake. Therefore, we can expect that financial considerations are decisive in the investment decisions of companies. This could conflict with the ideal of responsible innovation to ‘democratize’ innovation processes. Hence, I suggest that scholars should modify the ideal of deliberation in order to make it suitable to the business context, or they should suggest changes in the governance and regulation of markets so as to make deliberation more workable. Chapter 3 discusses the place of conflict and self-interest in deliberation. It starts with a discussion of the literature on stakeholder dialogue. In this literature, the ideal dialogue is presumed to aim at consensus. This also implies that participants avoid conflict and set self-interested considerations aside. I argue that this ideal of dialogue is problematic, especially for a dialogue between companies and NGOs. I show that companies can never completely set aside their profit-orientation, and hence that this ‘self-interest’ always influences their input in a dialogue. Furthermore, conflict and criticism can be necessary to make clear that societal problems require more attention, whether from the general public or from companies. Since the market is an imperfect institution, we need critical citizens and stakeholders such as NGOs to assess the behavior of companies. A certain degree of conflict between companies and NGOs may therefore be more desirable than a focus on consensus. For these reasons, I develop an alternative approach to dialogue in which conflict and self-interest have a legitimate place, and can even play a productive role. In chapter 4, a case-study is conducted to better understand how participants in a dialogue deal with conflicts. In this case-study, I analyzed different dialogues organized by the foundation ‘Ik Kies Bewust’, which issued a front-of-pack health label. In my analysis, I investigate the conflict between, on the one hand, the value of public health and healthy food, and, on the other hand, the commercial interests of companies. In the responses of companies to this conflict, three patterns became visible. First, companies frame their critics as not constructive, because, in their view, they only criticize but do not help to improve the label. Second, they stressed that they are really and genuinely motivated to make food healthier or to make a healthy food choice easier. Thereby, they seemingly tried to counter the image that they are just motivated to make profit. Third, they called on the government to take more control over the label, because this would make the label more reliable and more broadly adopted. I qualify these responses as defensive, which means that the conflict between commercial considerations and public interests is suppressed or ignored. An active response would require to recognize and confront the conflicts and dilemmas that companies face. The case-study makes clear how difficult it can be to engage in dialogue with critical stakeholders. In chapter 5, I reflect on how food innovation can be responsible. In trying to answer this question, I take a certain detour, by starting a discussion about the place of food in a life well-lived. For this purpose, I use the philosophy of Albert Borgmann. On the basis of my analysis of his philosophy, I argue that there are good reasons for engaging with food in active way, for example by growing your own vegetables and home-cooking, instead of consuming food merely passively. I also draw some implications for food innovation. In my view, people responsible for food innovation should critically assess whether new products or services enhance engagement or disengagement. Is it desirable, for example, to develop even more and better pre-packaged meals, or should we stimulate consumers to cook by themselves? I argue that it would be problematic if our overall pattern of dealing with food is characterized by disengagement and convenience, and hence that food innovation should not only go in this direction. (shrink)