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Descartes and Berkeley on mind: The fourth distinction

Walter Ott

British Journal for the History of Philosophy 14 (3):437 – 450 (2006)

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Mind-Dependence in Berkeley and the Problem of Perception.Umrao Sethi - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):648-668.details ABSTRACT On the traditional picture, accidents must inhere in substances in order to exist. Berkeley famously argues that a particular class of accidents—the sensible qualities—are mere ideas—entities that depend for their existence on minds. To defend this view, Berkeley provides us with an elegant alternative to the traditional framework: sensible qualities depend on a mind, not in virtue of inhering in it, but in virtue of being perceived by it. This metaphysical insight, once correctly understood, gives us the resources to (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 6 citations
The Varieties of Instantiation.Umrao Sethi - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (3):417-437.details Working with the assumption that properties depend for their instantiation on substances, I argue against a unitary analysis of instantiation. On the standard view, a property is instantiated just in case there is a substance that serves as the bearer of the property. But this view cannot make sense of how properties that are mind-dependent depend for their instantiation on minds. I consider two classes of properties that philosophers often take to be mind-dependent: sensible qualities like color and bodily sensations (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Malebranche and the Riddle of Sensation.Walter Ott - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):689-712.details Like their contemporary counterparts, early modern philosophers find themselves in a predicament. On one hand, there are strong reasons to deny that sensations are representations. For there seems to be nothing in the world for them to represent. On the other hand, some sensory representations seem to be required for us to experience bodies. How else could one perceive the boundaries of a body, except by means of different shadings of color? I argue that Nicolas Malebranche offers an extreme -- (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Berkeley’s Theory of Mind: Some New Models1. [REVIEW]Talia Mae Bettcher - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (10):689-698.details Berkeley didn’t write very much about his ‘philosophy of mind’ and what he did write is rather perplexing and perhaps inconsistent. The most basic problem is that it just isn’t clear what a mind (or, more accurately, a spirit) is for Berkeley. Unsurprisingly, many interpretations tend to understand Berkeleian spirit in models provided by other philosophers – interpretations in which Berkeleian spirit turns out to be a close cousin of the Cartesian ego, Lockean spiritual substratum, Lockean self, and Humean bundle (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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