Results for 'Umrao Sethi'

4 found
Order:
See also
Umrao Sethi
Brandeis University
  1. Mind-Dependence in Berkeley and the Problem of Perception.Umrao Sethi - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
    On the traditional picture, accidents must inhere in substances in order to exist. Berkeley famously argues that a particular class of accidents—the sensible qualities—are mere ideas; entities that depend for their existence on minds. To defend this view, Berkeley provides us with an elegant alternative to the traditional framework: sensible qualities depend on a mind, not in virtue of inhering in it, but in virtue of being perceived by it. This metaphysical insight, once correctly understood, gives us the resources to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  49
    The Varieties of Instantiation.Umrao Sethi - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    Working with the assumption that properties depend for their instantiation on substances, I argue against a unitary analysis of instantiation. On the standard view, a property is instantiated just in case there is a substance that serves as the bearer of the property. But this view cannot make sense of how properties that are mind-dependent depend for their instantiation on minds. I consider two classes of properties that philosophers often take to be mind-dependent: sensible qualities like color, and bodily sensations (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. ‘For Me, In My Present State’: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity.Janum Sethi - 2020 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 2 (9):20.
    Few of Kant’s distinctions have generated as much puzzlement and criticism as the one he draws in the Prolegomena between judgments of experience, which he describes as objectively and universally valid, and judgments of perception, which he says are merely subjectively valid. Yet the distinction between objective and subjective validity is central to Kant’s account of experience and plays a key role in his Transcendental Deduction of the categories. In this paper, I reject a standard interpretation of the distinction, according (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Two Feelings in the Beautiful: Kant on the Structure of Judgments of Beauty.Janum Sethi - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19 (34):1-17.
    In this paper, I propose a solution to a notorious puzzle that lies at the heart of Kant’s Critique of Judgment. The puzzle arises because Kant asserts two apparently conflicting claims: (1) F→J: A judgment of beauty is aesthetic, i.e., grounded in feeling. (2) J→F: A judgment of beauty could not be based on and must ground the feeling of pleasure in the beautiful. I argue that (1) and (2) are consistent. Kant’s text indicates that he distinguishes two feelings: the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark