On Foucault’s own telling, his distinctive approach to critique is to be characterized as a ‘limit attitude’. Definitive of this limit attitude is a problematizing, transgressive style of thinking oriented toward challenging existing ways of being and doing, with a view to liberating new possibilities for advancing ‘the undefined work of freedom’. From the outset, however, the efficacy of this problematizing approach to critique has been beset by doubts about the adequacy of its normative resources. In the present article, it (...) is argued that progress can be made toward a productive resolution of this contested issue if adequate account is taken of both the Nietzschean and the Kantian dimensions of Foucault’s thought. Specifically, it is argued that the balance between these potentially conflictual elements must be appropriately (re)negotiated, if the normative efficacy of Foucauldian critique is to be ensured, while its distinctive problematizing thrust is preserved. In defending this view, the Foucauldian concept of autonomy is seen to have a pivotal role to play both in advancing the task of problematization and, in its relation to intersubjectivity, in securing its normative efficacy. In thus vindicating the integrity of Foucault’s distinctive approach to critique, new light is shed on the structure, dynamics and logic of a contemporary mode of inquiry committed to the problematizing exercise of critical reason. (shrink)

This paper examines the consequences for agency that Foucault’s historiographical approach constructs. The analysis begins by explaining the difference between ‘legislative history’ and ‘exemplary history,’ drawing parallels to similar theoretical distinctions offered in the works of Max Weber, J.L. Austin, and Zygmunt Bauman. The analysis continues by reading Habermas’s critique of Foucault through the tropological lenses suggested by White [Metahistory. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973]; it argues that Habermas’s critique misrecognizes the tropes of Foucaultian genealogy. The paper draws (...) implications for education by articulating possibilities for praxis and agency in terms of pedagogy specifically related to the distinction between didactics and modeling. The paper concludes by suggesting that genealogy does not ‘play by Hegel’s rules,’ but rather exemplifies agency in ways that are not recognizable from a modernist perspective. (shrink)

This article compares the ways in which Michel Foucault’s and Quentin Skinner’s historical analyses seek to unsettle the limits on present forms of freedom. We do so by comparing their ways of analysing discourse, rationality and agency. The two authors differ significantly in the ways they deal with these three phenomena. The most significant difference lies in their ways of addressing agency and its relationship to power. Notwithstanding these differences, the historical analyses of both authors seek to problematize the ways (...) in which past thoughts and practices limit contemporary forms of freedom. While Foucault seems to go furthest in this endeavour, a comparison may enrich both lines of historical analyses. (shrink)

This article seeks to provide a set of pointers for methodological reflections on Foucauldian-inspired analyses of the exercise of power. Michel Foucault deliberately eschewed methodological schemata, which may be why so little has been written on the methodological implications of his analyses. While this article shares the premise that we should refrain from a standardized methodology, it argues that providing broad pointers for analyses informed by the critical ambition and conceptual framework offered by Foucault is both desirable and possible. The (...) article then offers some reflections and general guidelines on how to strengthen the methodological quality of Foucauldian analyses. We argue that the quality of Foucauldian-inspired analysis of modern power may gain from methodological reflections around four pointers: curiosity, nominalism, conceptual grounding and exemplarity. (shrink)

In a provocative recent study, Bent Flyvbjerg makes a sustained case for the need for a revitalized conception of social inquiry with direct input into the policy-making and planning process, contending that it is only in this way that social science can be made to matter again. Flyvbjerg further contends that to do justice to the reality of contemporary policy forums, we need to embrace a thoroughgoing dialogical conception of the policy-making process itself. To vindicate this contention and theoretically ground (...) the envisaged dialogical ideal, Flyvbjerg draws extensively on the work of both Habermas and Foucault. In so doing, he makes a valuable contribution to delineating the requirements that contemporary policy forums must meet if participants can judiciously claim to be engaging in decision-making in the best interests of the community at large. However, the overall tenability of Flyvbjerg’s proposal is diminished because, motivated by his convictions about the importance of power relations in determining real-world policy outcomes, he engages in a one-sided defence of the merits of Foucault’s contribution to the neglect of Habermas’s input in informing us about the ground rules needed to structure policy debate to ensure an equitable outcome. The aim of the present article is to redress this imbalance. To this end, I argue that given certain weaknesses in Foucault’s formulation of his position, we must draw on Habermas as a corrective if we are to succeed in advancing the dialogical ideal envisaged by Flyvbjerg. Beyond defending the need for a complementary reading of these theorists, I undertake to facilitate the implementation of the envisaged dialogical ideal by further elucidating the discursive conditions needed to underpin it. (shrink)

Though Foucault was intrigued by the possibilities of radical social transformation, he resolutely resisted the idea that such transformation could escape the effects of power and expressed caution when it came to the question of revolution. In this article we argue that in one particularly influential line of development of Foucault’s work his exemplary caution has been exaggerated in a way that weakens the political aspirations of post-Foucaldian scholarship. The site of this reduction is a complex debate over the role (...) of normativity in Foucaldian research, where it has been claimed that Foucault’s genealogical approach is unable to answer the question ‘ Why fight?’ The terms of this debate (on the neo-Foucaldian side) are limited by a dominant though selective interpretation of Foucault’s analytics of power, where power is understood primarily in terms of government, rather than struggle. In response we suggest that if we reconfigure power-as-government to power-as-war, this adjusts the central concern. ‘ Why fight?’ becomes replaced by the more immediate question, ‘ How fight?’ Without denying the obvious benefits of cautious scholarly work, we argue that a reconfiguration of Foucault’s analytics of power might help Foucaldian research to transcend the self-imposed ethic of political quietism that currently dominates the field. (shrink)