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  1. Un enfoque davidsoniano de los delirios: el caso del delirio de Capgras.Emilia Vilatta - 2017 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 29 (1):183-212.
    Recientemente, algunos críticos del enfoque davidsoniano de la atribución intencional han señalado que el mismo no puede ser aplicado para el caso de los delirios psiquiátricos, dado que las creencias delirantes no satisfacen los requisitos de racionalidad que este impone. En este trabajo: i) reconstruyo, a partir del análisis del caso del delirio de Capgras, la crítica a la idea de que solo podemos interpretar a un agente con creencias irracionales si mantiene aún un trasfondo de racionalidad; ii) objeto la (...)
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  • Levels and Kinds of Explanation: Lessons From Neuropsychiatry.Sam Wilkinson - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • Delusions, Dreams, and the Nature of Identification.Sam Wilkinson - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):203-226.
    Delusional misidentification is commonly understood as the product of an inference on the basis of evidence present in the subject's experience. For example, in the Capgras delusion, the patient sees someone who looks like a loved one, but who feels unfamiliar, so they infer that they must not be the loved one. I question this by presenting a distinction between “recognition” and “identification.” Identification does not always require recognition for its epistemic justification, nor does it need recognition for its psychological (...)
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  • A Mental Files Approach to Delusional Misidentification.Sam Wilkinson - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):389-404.
    I suggest that we can think of delusional misidentification in terms of systematic errors in the management of mental files. I begin by sketching the orthodox “bottom-up” aetiology of delusional misidentification. I suggest that the orthodox aetiology can be given a descriptivist or a singularist interpretation. I present three cases that a descriptivist interpretation needs to account for. I then introduce a singularist approach, one that is based on mental files, and show how it opens the way for different and (...)
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