Questions with a quantificational subject have readings that seemingly involve quantification into questions (called ‘QiQ’ for short). In particular, in single-wh questions with a universal quantifier, QiQ-readings call for pair-list answers, similar to pair-list readings of multiple-wh questions. This paper unifies the derivation of QiQ-readings and distinguishes QiQ-readings from pair-list readings of multiple-wh questions. I propose that pair-list multiple-wh questions and QiQ-questions both involve a wh-dependency, namely, that the wh-/quantificational subject stands in a functional dependency with the trace of the (...) wh-object. In particular, in a pair-list multiple-wh question, the wh-subject binds into the trace of the wh-object across an identity operator; in a QiQ-question, the quantificational subject binds into the trace of the wh-object across a predication operator. These operations give rise to distinct definedness requirements, which vary with the quantificational force of the wh-/quantificational subject. The proposed analysis explains a contrast in domain exhaustivity between the pair-list readings of multiple-wh questions and questions with a universal quantifier, while also doing justice to the intuitive similarities between these two types of questions. I further propose that the observed QiQ-effect in a QiQ-question is derived by extracting one of the minimal proposition sets that satisfy the aforementioned quantificational predication condition. The values of these sets determine whether the QiQ-reading is available and whether a QiQ-question admits pair-list answers and/or has a choice flavor. (shrink)

The paper gives a historically informed reconstruction of Frege's view of statements of number. The reconstruction supports Frege's claim that a statement can be 'about a concept' although it does not contain a singular term referring to the concept. Hence, Frege's philosophy of number is not subject to the problems Frege sees for singular reference to concepts.

This paper argues that parts of the lexical content of an A-bar moved phrase must be interpreted in the base position of movement. The argument is based on a study of deletion of a phrase that contains the base position of movement. I show that deletion licensing is sensitive to the content of the moved phrase. In this way, I corroborate and extend conclusions based on Condition C reconstruction by N. Chomsky and D. Fox. My result provides semantic evidence for (...) the existence of traces and gives semantic content to the A/A-bar distinction. (shrink)

In this paper we reexamine the question of whether questions areinherently intensional entities. We do so by proposing a novelextensional theory of questions, based on a re-interpretation of thedomain of t as a bilattice rather than the usual booleaninterpretation. We discuss the adequacy of our theory with respect tothe adequacy criteria imposed on the semantics of questionsby (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1997). We show that the theory is able to account in astraightforward manner for some complex issues in the semantics ofquestions (...) including coordinated questions, combined indicative andinterrogative sentences, questions with quantifiers, and theimpossibility of negating questions. (shrink)

Quantified NPs in questions may lead to an interpretation in which the NP quantifies into the question. Which dish did every guest bring? can be understood as: 'For every guest x: which dish did x bring?'. After a review of previous approaches that tried to capture this quantification formally or to explain it away, it is argued that such readings involve quantification into speech acts. As the algebra of speech acts is more limited than a Boolean algebra – it only (...) contains conjunction, not disjunction or negation – it is predicted that only universal quantifiers can scope out of questions or other speech acts. The approach is extended to indirect questions, which either are embedded speech acts or coerced to denote the true answers, depending on the embedding verb; in the latter case a Boolean structure results, and we find wide-scope readings of non-universal quantifiers. (shrink)

We discuss a phenomenon that appears when ‘even’ occurs in questions. Specifically, an inference of what we call “extreme ignorance” is projected onto the speaker. We argue that this effect arises when the known unlikelihood ‘even’ focuses an entire question, resulting in the focused question being the least likely to be asked. Specific implicatures then conspire to bring about the inference that the speaker does not know the answer to the question that is most expected to be known. The environments (...) explored are Wh-questions and Y/N questions, and the languages looked at primarily English, Greek, German and Russian. (shrink)