Acceptable analyticities, i.e. contradictions or tautologies, constitute problematic evidence for the idea that language includes a deductive system. In recent discussion, two accounts have been presented in the literature to explain the available evidence. According to one of the accounts, grammatical analyticities are accessible to the system but a pragmatic strengthening repair mechanism can apply and prevent the structures from being actually interpreted as contradictions or tautologies. The proposed data, however, leaves it open whether other versions of the meaning modulation (...) operation are required. Novel evidence we present argues that a loosening version of the repair mechanism must be available. Our observation concerns acceptable lexical contradictions that cannot be rescued if only a strengthening version of the pragmatic strategy is available. (shrink)

Grammatical theories of Scalar Implicatures make use of an exhaustivity operator exh, which asserts the conjunction of the prejacent with the negation of excludable alternatives. We present a new Grammatical theory of Scalar Implicatures according to which exh is replaced with pex, an operator that contributes its prejacent as asserted content, but the negation of scalar alternatives at a non-at-issue level of meaning. We show that by treating this non-at-issue level as a presupposition, this theory resolves a number of empirical (...) challenges faced by the old formulation of exh (as well as by standard neo-Gricean theories). The empirical challenges include projection of scalar implicatures from certain embedded environments (‘some under some’ sentences, some under negative factives), their restricted distribution under negation, and the existence of common ground-mismatching and oddness-inducing implicatures. We argue that these puzzles have a uniform solution given a pex-based Grammatical theory of implicatures and some independently motivated principles concerning presupposition projection, cancellation and accommodation. (shrink)

This paper addresses a little puzzle with a surprisingly long pedigree and a surprisingly large wake: the puzzle of Free Choice Permission. I begin by presenting a popular sketch of a pragmatic solution to the puzzle, due to Kratzer and Shimoyama, which has received a good deal of discussion, endorsement and elaboration in recent work :535–590, 2006; Fox, in: Sauerland and Stateva Presupposition and implicature in compositional semantics, 2007; Geurts, Mind Lang 24:51–79, 2009; von Fintel, Central APA session on (...) Deontic Modals, 2012). I then explain why the general form of the Kratzer and Shimoyama explanation is not extensionally adequate. This leaves us with two possibilities with regard to the original solution-sketch; either the suggested pragmatic route fails, or it succeeds in a particularly strange way: Free Choice permission is rendered a kind pragmatic illusion on the part of both speakers and hearers. Finally, I discuss some ramifications. (shrink)

I observe that the “concept-generator” theory of Percus and Sauerland (2003), Anand (2006), and Charlow and Sharvit (2014) does not predict an intuitive true interpretation of the sentence “Plato did not believe that Hesperus was Phosphorus”. In response, I present a simple theory of attitude reports which employs a fine-grained semantics for names, according to which names which intuitively name the same thing may have distinct compositional semantic values. This simple theory solves the problem with the concept-generator theory, but, (...) as I go on to show, it has problems of its own. I present three examples which the concept-generator theory can accommodate, but the simple fine-grained theory cannot. These examples motivate the full theory of the paper, which combines the basic ideas behind the concept-generator theory with a fine-grained semantics for names. The examples themselves are of interest independently of my theory: two of them constrain the original concept-generator theory more tightly than previously discussed examples had. (shrink)

This paper investigates how regular pronominal typology interfaces with de se and de re interpretations, and highlights a correlation between strong pronouns and de re interpretations, and weak pronouns and de se interpretations. In order to illustrate this correlation, I contrast different pronominal forms within a single language, null versus overt pronouns in Kutchi Gujarati, and clitic versus full pronouns in Austrian Bavarian. I argue that the data presented here provide cross-linguistic comparative support for the idea of a dedicated de (...) se LF as argued for by Percus and Sauerland. (shrink)

Cuprins INTRODUCERE EXCURSIVĂ 5 CAPITOLUL I SECRETUL CA TEMA A UNEI ANALIZE DE FILOSOF1E APLICATA ...9 Preliminarii 9 /. Schiţa ideii de „aplicare" a fiiosofiei şi a unei „filosofii aplicate" 10 //. Tematica secretului 27 Excurs: Despre temati-are 28 CAPITOL Uli^T) _ ANALIZA CATEGORIALA Şl SECRETUL 40 /. Filosofía aplicată şi analiza categorială 40 //. Secretul şi structura lui categorială 6,5, Excurs: Secret - Privat - Public 70 CAPITOLUL III SECRETUL ŞI SOCIALISMUL 76 Excurs: Fonduri secrete sau fonduri interzise? 90 (...) CAPITOLUL IV FENOMENOLOGIA EXISTENŢIALĂ A SECRETULUI - TENTATIVE DE DIALOG CU MARTIN HEIDEGGER 113 Excurs: Nimicul, Secretul şi Misterul 158 CAPITOLUL V „FOSTELE" SECRETE - „FOSTITATE" ŞI TRECUT 179 Excurs: Despre NICICÂND şi NICIODATĂ 1) Expunerea temporalităţii ..fenomenului culpei" la Heidegger 198 2) Analiza lui „nicicând" şi „niciodată" (nici-când-nici) 201 CAPITOLUL VI IPOSTAZELE SECRETULUI. COMPLOTUL. JURĂMÂNT ŞI SECRET ..229" Excurs: Despre jurământ 233 Excurs: Despre mască 248 APPENDLX: FILOSOFÍA APLICATA ŞI ÎNTREBAREA DESPRE EXISTENŢA Şl POSIBILITATEA FILOSOFULOR NAŢIONALE 258 RESUME 272. (shrink)