In a recent article published in this journal, Hugh Desmond attempts to show that status differences can rationally justify the conspiracy theorist’s repeated refusal to defer to the authority of scientific experts. We will show that the ‘stubborn distrust’ described by Desmond is irrational. Nevertheless, it raises important questions regarding the authority of scientists to set the bounds of reasonable belief and whether there are circumstances in which the layperson can rationally reject scientific authority. To explore such rational resistance, we (...) consider Love Canal, among the United States’ worst human-caused environmental disasters wherein a working-class community was built atop a chemical waste dump. We examine scientists’ repeated assurances to the residents that their homes were safe and residents’ struggle to convince decision-makers otherwise. We find that resident distrust was warranted and driven either by the irrationality of scientists or by differences in values. This case illustrates how the influence of values in science can lead to a persistent rational distrust of scientific expertise amongst the public and clarifies the bounds of scientific authority. Finally, the rationality of the rejection of scientific expertise at Love Canal helps put in relief what is epistemically problematic when conspiracy theories are irrationally held. (shrink)

In a certain sense, uncertainty andignorance have been recognized in science andphilosophy from the time of the Greeks.However, the mathematical sciences have beendominated by the pursuit of certainty.Therefore, experiments under simplified andidealized conditions have been regarded as themost reliable source of knowledge. Normally,uncertainty could be ignored or controlled byapplying probability theory and statistics.Today, however, the situation is different.Uncertainty and ignorance have moved intofocus. In particular, the global character ofsome environmental problems has shown that theproblems cannot be disregarded. Therefore,scientists and technologists (...) have in many wayscome into a new situation. The Chernobylaccident is a dramatic example, however,problems such as a possible greenhouse effect,a possible reduction of the ozone layer, and soon are all of the same type. These encompasstotally different problems than scientists andtechnologists are traditionally trained to dealwith. In these cases, the standard use ofstatistics has to change, the burden of proofshould be reversed, one should draw ondifferent kinds of expertise, and, in general,science should be ``democratized.''. (shrink)

Many professional bodies now include activist committees devoted to better serving the broad public interest. Some of the different ways that these groups operate are explored and analyzed. In particular, professional activist groups are divided into two general categories: those dealing mainly with standards of professional practice, and those dealing with political and social issues relevant to the larger social milieu. By participating in such groups, professionals can give the public an alternative view of their profession, and set the stage (...) for public demand for more responsive, socially controlled, professional practices. (shrink)