manuscript delves into the philosophical debate surrounding the Special Composition Question (SCQ), focusing on the causal relationships between objects and their constituent parts. By distinguishing between Weak and Strong Causal Composition, the article explores how causal mechanisms underpin the composition of objects. Theories from notable philosophers, including van Inwagen and Leibniz, are evaluated. This study seeks to bridge the gap between common sense perspectives and principled ontological theories by introducing the concepts of Weak and Strong Causal Composition. The analysis reveals (...) how a causal approach can offer insightful resolutions to longstanding debates in mereology and ontology, emphasizing the role of causality in understanding the essence of material composition. The proposed causal perspective encourages further philosophical inquiry into the foundational principles governing the composition of objects. (shrink)

Resumo Lida sem atenção, a avaliação do Poema de Parmênides por Nietzsche corre o risco de frustrar, mais do que estimular, os leitores não-iniciados em Filosofia. Pois, nela o filósofo não só ignora a pesquisa sua contemporânea sobre o Eleata, como insere o seu pensamento numa polêmica antiracionalista, recheada de equívocos e intuições infundadas. É nosso objetivo aqui tentar restituir credibilidade a esta avaliação, apontando as linhas que orientam o diálogo do crítico com o seu objeto tanto para o senso-comum, (...) como para o seu próprio pensamento.Carelessly read, Nietzsche’s evaluation of Parmenides frustrates rather than stimulates non-initiate readers in Philosophy. For the German philosopher ignores any current research on the Eleatic thinker, inserting his arguments in an anti-rationalist polemic, mostly based on unfounded intuitions. We aim at establishing the credibility of Nietzsche’s criticism on the grounds of common sense and of his own heraclitean influenced philosophy. (shrink)

Transformation has been the fundamental basis upon which education has always stood, as without transformation in mind, education would seem purposeless and undirected. This would imply that the objective of providing information in education is not just to gain knowledge but to achieve the desired transformation in character or behaviour by applying the knowledge learnt within ourselves. Based on how information is interpreted and managed, the philosophy of information influences our states of being and becoming which have an impact on (...) our understanding of the information world. This paper discusses the philosophical aspects of being and becoming in relation to transformation, and threshold concepts are explored as a means of achieving transformative learning. (shrink)

Whitehead’s metaphysics involves an event ontology. Fundamental—that is, in Whitehead’s language: “actual”—entities are events, described as acts of experience. It also involves presentism since past events have perished and future events do not yet exist according to Whitehead. Hence the question alluded to in the title of the present paper: “How are you going to move forward into the future?… If you conceive it under the guise of a temporal transition into the non-existent, you can’t get going.” I will argue (...) that, to a large extent, Whitehead’s metaphysics is designed to answer that question. (shrink)

In this paper, we connected Zeno’s paradoxes and motions with the viscous friction force \. For the progressive version of the dichotomy paradox, if the body speed is constant, the sequences of positions and instants are infinite, but the series of distances and time variations converge to finite values. However, when the body moves with force \, the series of time variations becomes infinite. In this case, the body crosses infinite points, approximating to a final position forever, as the progressive (...) version of the dichotomy paradox describes. The same procedures with constant speed and motion with force \ result in different spatial sequences and the same series for the regressive version of the dichotomy paradox. Nonetheless, the regressive version of the dichotomy paradox does not describe a body that approximates a final position forever. Finally, for the Achilles paradox, we find the positional and temporal sequences of the man and the tortoise at constant speeds. Analogously to the progressive version of the dichotomy paradox, the positional and temporal sequences are infinite, but the spatial and temporal series converge to finite values. If Achilles and the tortoise are identical points that move with force \, and the turtle’s position in function of time presents a temporal advantage, the man and the animal will cross successive infinite places forever, and the quick hero will never overtake the slow reptile, as the paradox described. We conclude that the progressive version of the dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes can describe motions when the force is \. (shrink)

This paper examines three cases of the clash between science and philosophy: Zeno’s paradoxes, the Frame Problem, and a recent attempt to experimentally refute skepticism. In all three cases, the relevant science claims to have resolved the purported problem. The sciences, construing the term broadly, are mathematics, artificial intelligence, and psychology. The goal of this paper is to show that none of the three scientific solutions work. The three philosophical problems remain as vibrant as ever in the face of robust (...) scientific attempts to dispel them. The paper concludes by examining some consequences of this persistence. (shrink)

This paper examines three cases of the clash between science and philosophy: Zeno’s paradoxes, the Frame Problem, and a recent attempt to experimentally refute skepticism. In all three cases, the relevant science claims to have resolved the purported problem. The sciences, construing the term broadly, are mathematics, artificial intelligence, and psychology. The goal of this paper is to show that none of the three scientific solutions work. The three philosophical problems remain as vibrant as ever in the face of robust (...) scientific attempts to dispel them. The paper concludes by examining some consequences of this persistence. (shrink)

每本书都能有自己的一个名字，这实在是一件有趣且意味深长的事情。 这本书的名字，《存在或上帝 —— 对西方意识形态的建设性批判》，虽然长了点，但同样不失其有趣与意味深长。 书名中所谓的“西方意识形态”，指的是起源于西方世界，贯穿于西方历史，激发并引导了神学、哲学、数学、逻辑、艺术、科学、心理、经济、社会、环境、政治和军事等不同方面的理论和实践活动在西方的出现和发展，并造 就了西方人生活现状的那些最根本的理想或信念。 “对西方意识形态的批判”意味着，在本书作者看来，那些最根本的理想或信念并不完美，并不自洽，而且，不仅有必要也同样有可能变得更完美。 “对西方意识形态的建设性批判”则意味着，本书的重点并不是“批判”而是“建设”。这种建设性批判，主要涉及到两个极为重要的理想或信念的不自洽和不完美，其中一个是“存在”，另一个便是“上帝”。 至于书名中的“存在或上帝”，说的不仅是“存在”和“上帝” 的不自洽、不完美，说的不仅是使这两个概念更完美的必要性与可能性，说的不仅是使它们同一或统一的可能性与必要性，同时亦向读者提示了贯彻本书始终的那个基本方法或那条基本思路：在一切之间，有一切之存在。 无论是远在过去还是时至今日，对于许多西方人来说，“存在”与“上帝”这两个概念，既是一切问题之问题，又是一切答案之答案，不仅涉及到他们的过去，更涉及到了他们的未来。换句话说，“存在”与“上帝”所涉及到的 绝非仅仅只是人们所面对的那个世界，同样涉及到那个世界所面对的人本身，绝非仅仅只涉及到那个世界所承负着的“非我”，同样涉及到人们所承负着的那个“自我”，涉及到，我们每个人用“非我”为自己的“自我”所做的 每一件事情，涉及到了“自我”与“非我”的关系，特别是自由与必然之间的关系。 由此可见，这问题和答案绝非仅仅只是向西方人提出，亦绝非只应由西方人给出。对每个和所有人来说，这都同样有可能成为一个问题，我们又都以某种方式在给出一份自己的答案。甚至可以说，任何一种人生，人生中的任何一 件大事或小事，所留下的，无一不是这个问题，亦无一不是对这个问题的回答。 作为对这个问题的提出和对那个答案的探索，本书的第一章讨论了“存在”，最后一篇附录的文章讨论了“上帝”，而在它们之间的八个章节和所有附录的文章中，通过对宇宙、生命、生物、心灵、自我、人和社会的本体论理解 ，讨论的则是“自由” ，特别是“自由”与“平等”之间的相互依存，因为只有通过自由与平等的相互依存，“存在”与“上帝”方才能得以完美自洽，方才能回归于彼此。 通过这些讨论，本书顺便还介绍了两种尚且不为大多数西方人所知所行的自由，源于平等的自由和超越平等的自由。 因为存在或上帝既成就又超越了我们已有的一切知识，无论这知识是语言、哲学、逻辑、数学还是科学，所以，本书在内容和方法上同样既尊重它们又不为之所限。这种对现存全部知识既尊重又不为之所限的态度和做法，固然是 对形而上传统的继承，固然在自由主义中有其思想根源，亦可以说是本书作者对爱因斯坦所说“想象比知识更重要”那句话的理解、证明、实践和发扬光大。 既尊重又要超越一切知识，对任何人来说都不是一件容易做到的事情，但也同样不是一件不可能的事情。本书将一步一步地向读者解释并证明这一道理，证明这不仅符合存在或上帝的本性，也正是存在或上帝一直以来的所作所为 。 也许，无论是过去还是未来，无论是在西方还是在东方，只有当理解这本性和那所作所为之后，一个人才有可能最终走出自己，才有可能成就自己的真实与自由，人类才有可能最终走出柏拉图所说的那个洞穴，才有可能既生活在 存在的真实无妄之中，也生活在上帝的自由自在之中。 .

Zeno’s Arrow and Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way Chapter 2 contain paradoxical, dialectic arguments thought to indicate that there is no valid explanation of motion, hence there is no physical or generic motion. There are, however, diverse interpretations of the latter text, and I argue they apply to Zeno’s Arrow as well. I also find that many of the interpretations are dependent on a mathematical analysis of material motion through space and time. However, with modern philosophy and physics (...) we find that the link from no explanation to no phenomena is invalid and that there is a valid explanation and understanding of physical motion. Hence, those arguments are both invalid and false, which banishes the MMK/2 and The Arrow under this and derivative interpretations to merely the history of philosophy. However, a view that maintains their relevance is that each is used as a koan or sequence of koans designed to assist students in spiritual meditation practice. This view is partly justified by the realization that both Nāgārjuna and Zeno were likely meditation masters in addition to being logicians. The works are, therefore, not works that should be assessed as having valid arguments and true conclusions by the standards of modern analytic philosophy—contrary to some of the literature—but rather are therapeutic and perhaps more appropriately considered as part of an experientially focused philosophy such as existentialism, phenomenology or religion. (shrink)

This paper draws on the author's work in social epistemology and on comparative studies of sciences of human behavior to draw attention to the importance of interaction. Drawing further on recent and contemporary research in biology, she argues that interaction ought to be considered a distinct ontological category, not reducible to properties of its participants.

The primary interpretative challenge for understanding Parmenides’ poem revolves around explaining both the meaning of, and the relationship between, its two primary sections: a) the positively endorsed metaphysical arguments which describe some unified, unchanging, motionless, and eternal “reality”, and b) the ensuing cosmology, which incorporates the very principles explicitly denied in Aletheia. I will refer to this problem as the “A-D Paradox.” I advocate resolving this paradoxical relationship by reading Parmenides’ poem as a ring-composition, and incorporating a modified version of (...) Palmer’s modal interpretation of Aletheia. On my interpretation, Parmenides’ thesis in Aletheia is not a counter-intuitive description of how all the world must truly be, but rather a radical rethinking of divine nature. Understanding Aletheia in this way, the ensuing “cosmology” can be straightforwardly rejected as an exposition of how traditional, mythopoetic accounts have misled mortals in their understanding of divinity. Not only does this interpretative view provide a resolution to the A-D Paradox, it offers a more holistic account of the poem by making the opening lines of introduction integral to understanding Parmenides’ message. By setting forth its own unacceptable fiction, paralleling the elements of the Doxa in a ring-composition, the Proem simultaneously establishes the scope of the ensuing inquiry, and its target. Maintaining Parmenides’ historical position as the “father of metaphysics,” the narrative that he advanced a strictly secular account of all reality is challenged. Instead, Parmenides is best understood as further advancing Xenophanes’ criticisms of traditional religion, an intellectual relationship which the ancient testimonia strongly supports. (shrink)

Evidence for a Parmenidean influence on Plato’s Republic typically focuses on content from Bks. V-VI, and the development of Plato’s Theory of Forms. This essay aims to suggest that Plato’s censorship of poetic content in Bks. II-III—particularly the rules for portraying divine nature (376e-383c)—also draw heavily upon the Eleatic tradition, particularly Parmenides’s. Identifying this further Eleatic influence will be enhanced by my own reading of Parmenides. This reading advocates understanding Parmenides in a more Xenophanean-vein—i.e. by taking What-Is to be an (...) explication of the essential qualities of divine nature, and the overall poem as rejecting traditional, mythopoetic accounts of divinity. Recognizing this Eleatic influence on the censorship of poetic content, a tension arises. For Plato infamously censors poetic styles next, concluding that mimetic dialogue may only be rarely employed, and only then in imitation of virtuous persons and actions (392c-398b). This would entail banning all poetic works relying exclusively on mimetic dialogue. Yet, not only do Plato’s own dialogues entirely consist of mimetic dialogue, so does Parmenides’s proto-dialogue. Furthermore, by so closely imitating Parmenides’s thought and language in Republic, has not Plato himself engaged in a type of intellectual and compositional mίμησις? Just as it would be strange to ban the very dialogue (Republic) which outlines and justifies Kallipolis in the first place, it would also be troubling to ban a philosophical work (i.e. Parmenides’s poem) which Republic is so heavily indebted to. Such a ban would also seem strongly at odds with Plato’s general reverence for Parmenides. In an attempt to address these tensions, I suggest that in Republic II-III, Plato’s lack of concern for banning philosophical works along with mimetic poetry should further suggest that he intends the ban to be far narrower than it first appears: as a rejection of performative, rather than compositional, mίμησις. (shrink)