Until recently, many theorists defined domination such that it requires unequal power, and most others held that even if domination were not defined as requiring unequal power, a requirement of unequal power would nevertheless follow from the definition of what domination is. On these views, unless there is an imbalance of power between the two parties, there can be no relation of domination. However, two prominent theorists have recently broken from this consensus, on the grounds that people can depend on (...) one another's arbitrary or uncontrolled wills even in contexts where there is no inequality of power. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: domination theorists have a powerful reason to hold that domination cannot take place without a power imbalance. Consequently, we should only accept definitions of the concept on which domination requires unequal power. (shrink)

Authors like Iris Young and Philip Pettit have come up with proposals for theorizing ‘structural injustice’ and social relations marred by ‘domination’. These authors provide conceptual tools for f...