A novel non-classical mereological concept built up by blending the Metaphysics of Xavier Zubiri and the Quantum Theory of Atoms in Molecules of R. F. W. Bader is proposed. It is argued that this philosophical concept is necessary to properly account for what happens in a chemical reaction. From the topology of the gradient of the laplacian of the electronic charge density, \\) within the QTAIM framework, different “atomic graphs” are found for each atom depending on the molecular context, reflecting (...) how the whole molecule affects each atom. In this way, the whole molecular system imposes certain geometry onto each atom, and every atom exhibits different ontological modality. On the Metaphysical side, for X. Zubiri real things are system of different notes. The physical essence is the subsystem of essential notes with a coherence unity. Every note is grounded on the essence. The unity of the system is present somehow in every note-of beforehand, and every essential note-of turns towards the other. The essence determines the position of each note within the system, and hence is the grounding for modality of the notes. By conflating both “theories” and taking the atoms as essential notes, we propose the concept of “Molecule in atoms-of” or “atoms-of in Molecules”. Within the course of a chemical reaction the atoms-of modified their “of” as required by the new molecular unity being formed, and eventually change their modality. The validity to the Zubiri’s statements, is attained by evaluating necessity and possibility in a set-up of finite accessible “possible worlds”. (shrink)

Kripke-Putnam argument for natural kind essentialism can be said to depend on placeholder essentialist intuitions. But some argue that such philosophical intuitions are merely preschooler cognitive biases which are not supported by scientific knowledge of natural kinds. Chemical substances, for instance, whether elements or compounds do not have such privileged set of underlying properties (‘same substance’ relation) which are present in all members of the kind and which provide necessary and sufficient condition for kind membership. In this paper, I argue (...) that placeholder essentialism works for at least some of the scientific natural kinds especially for the basic chemical natural kind, i.e., element. I argue that the dual sense of the element (the basic substance and the simple substance) along with microstructuralism helps explain the essence of an element not only at the abstract level but also at the more concrete level. Based on this essentialist account of element, I conclude that placeholder essentialism is not completely without merit, and it fits nicely with at least some of our scientific natural kinds. (shrink)

The article begins with a response to a recent contribution by Jensen, in which he has criticized several aspects of the use of triads of elements, including Döbereiner’s original introduction of the concept and the modern use of atomic number triads by some authors including myself. Such triads are groups of three elements, one of which has approximately the average atomic weight of the other two elements, as well as having intermediate chemical reactivity. I also examine Jensen’s attempted reconstruction Mendeleev’s (...) use of triads in predicting the atomic weights of three hitherto unknown elements, that were subsequently named gallium, germanium and scandium. The present article then considers the use of atomic number triads, in conjunction with the phenomenon of first member anomaly, in order to offer support for Janet’s left-step periodic table, in which helium is relocated into group 2 of the table. Such a table features triads in which the 2nd and third elements of each group, without fail, fall into periods of equal length, a feature that is absent in the conventional 18-column or the conventional 32-column table. The dual sense of the term element, which is the source of much discussion in the philosophy of chemistry, is alluded to in further support of such a relocation of helium that may at first appear to contradict chemical intuition. (shrink)

Recent work on Natural Kind Essentialism has taken a deflationary turn. The assumptions about the grounds of essentialist truths concerning natural kinds familiar from the Kripke-Putnam framework are now considered questionable. The source of the problem, however, has not been sufficiently explicated. The paper focuses on the Twin Earth scenario, and it will be demonstrated that the essentialist principle at its core (which I call IDENT)—that necessarily, a sample of a chemical substance, A, is of the same kind as another (...) sample, B, if and only if A and B have the same microstructure—must be re-evaluated. The Twin Earth scenario also assumes the falsity of another essentialist principle (which I call INST): necessarily, there is a 1:1 correlation between (all of ) the chemical properties of a chemical substance and the microstructure of that substance. This assumption will be questioned, and it will be argued that, in fact, the best strategy for defending IDENT is to establish INST. The prospects for Natural Kind Essentialism and microstructural essentialism regarding chemical substances will be assessed with reference to recent work in the philosophy of chemistry. Finally, a weakened form of INST will be presented. (shrink)

Science depends on judgments of the bearing of evidence on theory. Scientists must judge whether an observation or the result of an experiment supports, disconfirms, or is simply irrelevant to a given hypothesis. Similarly, scientists may judge that, given all the available evidence, a hypothesis ought to be accepted as correct or nearly so, rejected as false, or neither. Occasionally, these evidential judgments can be made on deductive grounds. If an experimental result strictly contradicts a hypothesis, then the truth of (...) the data deductively entails the falsity of the hypothesis. In the great majority of cases, however, the connection between evidence and hypothesis is non-demonstrative, or inductive. In particular, this is so whenever a general hypothesis is inferred to be correct on the basis of the available data, since the truth of the data will not deductively entail the truth of the hypothesis. It always remains possible that the hypothesis is false even though the data are correct. (shrink)

In this article I assess the problems and prospects of a microstructural approach to chemical substances. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam famously claimed that to be gold is to have atomic number 79 and to be water is to be H2O. I relate the first claim to the concept of element in the history of chemistry, arguing that the reference of element names is determined by atomic number. Compounds are more difficult: water is so complex and heterogeneous at the molecular (...) level that `water is H2O' seems false under some interpretations. I sketch a response to this problem. (shrink)

Contribution to a symposium on Alan Chalmer's The Scientist’s Atom and the Philosopher’s Stone: How Science Succeeded and Philosophy Failed to Gain Knowledge of Atoms (Springer, Dordrecht, 2009).

Friedrich Paneth’s conception of “chemical element” has functioned as the official definition adopted by the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry since 1923. Paneth maintains a distinction between empirical and “transcendental” concepts of element; furthermore, chemical science requires fluctuation between the two. The origin of the empirical-transcendental split is found in Immanuel Kant’s classic Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787). The present paper examines Paneth’s foundational concept of element in light of Kant’s attempt, late in life, to revoke key distinctions (...) made in his Critique, including that of regulative and constitutive functions of reason. In a section of his Opus postumum devoted to the “Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics,” Kant bends his philosophical system to address the newly emerging sciences of matter of his time. Specifically, he tried, without success, to develop the transcendental ground for microscale motions of bodies encountered in physical, electrical and chemical processes. Paneth’s discussion of chemical element does not take the Opus postumum into account, which is why it begins with a rejection of Kant’s rejection (in his earlier writings) of chemistry’s status as science. I make the case that Paneth’s definition of element effectively maintains something very like Kant’s critical separation of regulative and constitutive principles, while a advancing the concept of chemical science. (shrink)

What are the criteria determining the individuation of chemical kinds? Recent philosophical discussion, which puts too much emphasis on microstructure, seems to presuppose a reductionist conception not motivated by the scientific facts. The present article traces the development of the traditional notion of a substance with the rise of modern chemistry from the end of the 18th century with a view to correcting this speculative distortion.

Since its inception in 1869, the periodic system — icon of modern chemistry — has suffered from the problematic accommodation of the rare-earth elements. The substance of this paper intends to retrace Mendeleev’s shifting attitudes with regard to the rare-earth crisis during the period 1869–1871. Based on a detailed examination of Mendeleev's research papers from that period, it will be argued that the rare-earth crisis played a key role in inducing a number of important changes in Mendeleev’s philosophical viewpoints with (...) regard to the epistemological concept of a chemical element and the nature of elementary groups. Many of Mendeleev's most cherished beliefs got endangered by the nature of these elements. Their mystifying properties forced him to revise his ideas about primary and secondary groups, the elements as basic and simple substances, and the use of short and long form tables. They made him question the validity and universality of the periodic law, and led him into hypothesizing about the internal structure of matter and constitution of atoms. (shrink)

Chemistry is the study of the structure and transformation of matter. When Aristotle founded the field in the 4th century BCE, his conceptual grasp of the nature of matter was tailored to accommodate a relatively simple range of observable phenomena. In the 21st century, chemistry has become the largest scientific discipline, producing over half a million publications a year ranging from direct empirical investigations to substantial theoretical work. However, the specialized interest in the conceptual issues arising in chemistry, hereafter Philosophy (...) of Chemistry, is a relatively recent addition to philosophy of science. Philosophy of chemistry has two major parts. In the first, conceptual issues arising within chemistry are carefully articulated and analyzed. Such questions which are internal to chemistry include the nature of substance, atomism, the chemical bond, and synthesis. In the second, traditional topics in philosophy of science such as realism, reduction, explanation, confirmation, and modeling are taken up within the context of chemistry. (shrink)

Around fifteen years before the chemical substance alumina could be decomposed in the laboratory, it was identified as a compound and predicted to contain a new element called ‘aluminium’. Using this episode from early nineteenth-century chemistry as a case study for the use of analogical reasoning in science, this paper examines how chemists relied on chemical classifications for the prediction of aluminium. I argue that chemists supplemented direct evidence of chemical decomposition with analogical inferences in order to evaluate the composition (...) of substances. Since they were established on the basis of relevant similarities in chemical properties, classifications were taken to reflect so-called ‘chemical analogies’ between substances. In combination with the knowledge that analogous properties indicated similarities in composition, this enabled chemists to infer the composition of experimentally indecomposable substances by analogy. The trust in such analogical inferences, even if they could not be confirmed through experiment, was justified by pragmatic considerations. Whereas the possibility of decomposing a substance depended on the available laboratory techniques, chemical analogies were thought to last independently of internal composition. It was therefore more practical to keep well-established classes of substances together rather than separate them on the basis of experimental results that might evolve as new techniques were developed. Besides highlighting the links between analogical reasoning and classification, this paper also illustrates the importance of analogy in the evaluation of elementary nature in the early nineteenth century. (shrink)

The Aristotelian distinction between actual and potential presence of a substance in a mixture forms part of a conception of mixture which stands in contrast to atomist and Stoic theories as propounded by the ancients. But the central ideas on which these theories are built need not be combined and opposed to one another in precisely the ways envisaged by these ancient theories. This is well illustrated by Duhem, who maintained the Aristotelian idea that the original ingredients are only potentially, (...) and not actually, present in a mixture, but who sided with the Stoics and against Aristotle on the possibility of co-occupancy. I have argued that the Stoic theory cannot dispense with some such notion as the Aristotelian conception of potentiality in allowing the elements to be actually present in a mixture. Here I suggest that some such Aristotelian notion must be at work in a more modern atomic conception of matter if this is to allow elemental substances to be actually present in compounds, which I think is how compounds are usually understood. Analogous issues arise regarding the status of solutions and their components. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant has built up a dualistic epistemology that seems to fit to the peculiarities of chemistry quite well. Friedrich Paneth used Kant’s concept and characterised simple and basic substances which refer to the empirical and to the transcendental world, respectively. This paper takes account of the Kantian influences in Paneth’s philosophy of chemistry, and discusses pertinent topics, like observables, atomism and realism.

Humeans and non-Humeans reasonably agree that there may be necessary connections between entities that are identical or merely partly distinct—between, e.g., sets and their individual members, fusions and their individual parts, instances of determinates and determinables, members of certain natural kinds and certain of their intrinsic properties, and (especially among physicalists) certain physical and mental states. Humeans maintain, however, that as per “Hume’s Dictum”, there are no necessary connections between entities that are wholly distinct;1 and in particular, no necessary causal (...) connections between such entities (even when the background conditions requisite for causation are in place). The Humean’s differential treatment appears principled, in reflecting that commonly accepted necessary connections involve constitutional relations, whereas wholly distinct entities (notably, causes and effects) do not constitute each other. I’ll argue, however, that the appearance of principle is not genuine, as per the following conditional: Constitutional→Causal: If one accepts certain constitutional necessities, one should accept certain causal necessities. This result provides needed leverage in assessing the two main frameworks in the metaphysics of science, treating natural kinds, causes, laws of nature, and the like. These frameworks differ primarily on whether Hume’s Dictum is taken as a working constraint on theorizing; and it has proved difficult for either side to criticize the other without presupposing their preferred stance on the dictum, hence talking past one another. The arguments for Constitutional→Causal are based, however, in general and independent considerations about what facts in the world might plausibly warrant our beliefs in certain constitutional necessities involving broadly scientific entities. The Humean can respond to these arguments, which reveal a deep tension in their view, at attendant costs of implausibilty and adhocery. The non-Humean framework doesn’t face any such tension between constitutional and causal necessities, however, and so in this respect comes out ahead. (shrink)

I present a response to Vollmer's review of the book Of Minds and Molecules, and especially her comments on my own article therein. This provides an opportunity to discuss two central ideas in the philosophy of chemistry. These are the distinction between elements as simple substances (element-1) and elements as basic substances (element-2) and Paneth's proposed intermediate position for philosophy of chemistry. The response also discusses the question of isotopes in relationship to the nature of the elements and their classification (...) as well as the philosophical status of atomic orbitals. (shrink)

Two articles on the reduction of chemistry are examined. The first, by McLaughlin (1992), claims that chemistry is reduced to physics and that there is no evidence for emergence or for downward causation between the chemical and the physical level. In a more recent article, Le Poidevin (2005) maintains that his combinatorial approach provides grounding for the ontological reduction of chemistry, which also circumvents some limitations in the physicalist program. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Chemistry and (...) Biochemistry, UCLA, 607 Charles E. Young Drive East, Box 951569, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1569; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

In this article we critically evaluate Robin Le Poidevin's recent attempt to set out an argument for the ontological reduction of chemistry independently of intertheoretic reduction. We argue, firstly, that the argument he envisages applies only to a small part of chemistry, and that there is no obvious way to extend it. We argue, secondly, that the argument cannot establish the reduction of chemistry, properly so called.

The paper deals with the philosophy of science and technology from a new perspective. The analysis connects closely to the novel approach to scientific research called practical realism of the late Estonian philosopher of science and chemistry Rein Vihalemm. From his perspective, science is not only theoretical but even more clearly a practical activity. This kind of practice-based approach puts chemistry rather than physics into the position of the most typical science as chemistry has a dual character resting on both (...) constructive-hypothetico-deductive and classifying-historico-descriptive types of cognition. Chemists deal with finding out the laws of nature just like the physicists do. However, in addition to this chemistry deals with substances or stuff that is rather an activity typical to natural history. The analysis of the dual character of chemistry brings forward the need to analyse philosophically also the reasons why physics has held the position of the model science so far. The problem unfolds in the context of practical realism. However, some earlier observations concerning the dual character of chemistry influenced us as well, i.e. by Friedrich Paneth, Michael Polanyi and Edward Caldin. More recently, Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent and Jonathan Simon have given their own explanation of why and how chemistry has a dual character. From their perspective, chemistry is a perfect technical science as it aims at applications, literally at producing something new. Bensaude-Vincent and Simon call their approach operational realism. The latter, however, does not differ from practical realism. (shrink)