- X *—Does Hume’s Argument Against Induction Rest on a Quantifier-Shift Fallacy?Samir Okasha - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):237-255.details
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Physicalism from a Probabilistic Point of View.Elliott Sober - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):135-174.details
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Pushing brains: Can cognitive neuroscience provide experimental evidence for brain-mind causation?Martin Kurthen - 2010 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 16 (2):5-22.details
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Naturalism and Physicalism.D. Gene Witmer - 2012 - In Robert Barnard & Neil Manson (eds.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics. Continuum Publishing. pp. 90-120.details
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Intension and representation: Quine’s indeterminacy thesis revisited.Itay Shani - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):415 – 440.details
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(1 other version)Suffering without subjectivity.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (2):99-125.details
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Dretske's innate modesty.Karen Neander - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):258-74.details
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The Knowledge Argument.Luca Malatesti - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Stirlingdetails
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Natural Mind.Brian L. Keeley - 2015 - In Kelly James Clark (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 196–208.details
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Meaning-Preserving Translations of Non-classical Logics into Classical Logic: Between Pluralism and Monism.Gerhard Schurz - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (1):27-55.details
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How Beliefs are like Colors.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Pennsylvaniadetails
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Jack Ritchie,Understanding Naturalism(Acumen, 2008).David Spurrett - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (3):439-445.details
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Reply to Robert Kirk's and Andrew Melnyk's comments on my "Thinking about Consciousness".David Papineau - unknowndetails
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Qualia and the argument from illusion: A defence of figment. [REVIEW]Andrew Bailey - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (2):85-103.details
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Naturalizing the content of desire.Peter Https://Orcidorg288X Schulte - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):161-174.details
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(1 other version)Physicalism and mental causes: contra Papineau.P. K. Moser - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):263-267.details
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Towards a Fictionalist Philosophy of Mathematics.Robert Knowles - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Manchesterdetails
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Analysis in Mind.Andrew Botterell - 1998 - Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technologydetails
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The No-Miracles Argument, reliabilism, and a methodological version of the generality problem.Mark Newman - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):111 - 138.details
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Dupre's anti-essentialist objection to reductionism.D. Gene Witmer - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):181-200.details
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(1 other version)Should Intentionality Be Naturalized?Thomas Bontly - 2001 - In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press. pp. 43-60.details
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Constructing Foucault's ethics: A poststructuralist moral theory for the twenty-first century.Mark Olssen - 2021 - Manchester University Press.details
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Complete Issue.Nicolas Lindner - 2017 - Abstracta 10.details
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(1 other version)What does It Mean to be a Mechanism? Stephen Morse, Non-reductivism, and Mental Causation.Katrina L. Sifferd - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):143-159.details
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Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) Versus Explaining for the Best Inference.Tania Lombrozo & Daniel Wilkenfeld - 2015 - Science & Education 24 (9-10):1059-1077.details
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Exclusion.Daniel Lim - 2015 - In God and Mental Causation. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.details
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(1 other version)What does It Mean to be a Mechanism? Stephen Morse, Non-reductivism, and Mental Causation.Katrina L. Sifferd - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-17.details
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A mechanistic framework for Darwinism or why Fodor’s objection fails.Fermín Fulda - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):163-183.details
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Social Objects, Causality and Contingent Realism.Malcolm Williams - 2009 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 39 (1):1-18.details
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The normativity of naturalistic epistemology.Markus Lammenranta - 1998 - Philosophia 26 (3-4):337-358.details
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How to be a scientific realist (if at all): a study of partial realism.Dean Peters - 2012 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
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(1 other version)Borderline Experiences One Cannot Undergo.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2015 - Critica 47 (140):31-42.details
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