- On the dangers of oversimulation.Gergely Csibra & György Gergely - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):127-128.details
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Los animales entre la mente y el mundo: La filosofía de McDowell y el reencantamiento de la naturaleza por parte de la etología cognitiva.Andrés Crelier - 2018 - Análisis Filosófico 38 (1):57-82.details
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An ambiguity.Jennifer Church - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):126-127.details
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Language and its role in understanding intentional relations: Research tool or mechanism of development?Nancy Budwig & Michael Bamberg - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):125-126.details
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Understanding self and other.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):142-154.details
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Intentional relations and social understanding.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):107-122.details
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Can children with autism integrate first and third person representations?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):123-124.details
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Comparative cognitive studies, not folk phylogeny, please.Colin Allen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):122-123.details
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Rhesus monkeys are radical behaviorists.Gordon G. Gallup - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129-129.details
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The Counterfactual Theory of Free Will: A Genuinely Deterministic Form of Soft Determinism.Rick Repetti - 2010 - Saarbrücken, Germany: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing.details
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Development of social emotions and constructive agents.Aaron Ben Ze'ev & Keith Oatley - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):124-125.details
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Are blind babies delayed in achieving social understanding?Carol Slater - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):141-142.details
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Omitting the second person in social understanding.Vasudevi Reddy - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):140-141.details
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Intentional schema will not do the work of a theory of mind.David Premack & Ann James Premack - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):138-140.details
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Ontogeny, evolution, and folk psychology.Daniel J. Povinelli, Mia C. Zebouni & Christopher G. Prince - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):137-138.details
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Social relations and understanding the intentional self.Annerieke Oosterwegel - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):136-136.details
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Understanding that looking causes knowing.David R. Olson & Bruce Homer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):135-135.details
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Four-year-old humans are different: Why?Katherine Nelson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):134-135.details
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But what is the intentional schema?Adam Morton - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):133-134.details
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Self-knowledge, knowledge of other minds, and kinesthetic-visual matching.Robert W. Mitchell - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):133-133.details
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A framework for the ethical assessment of chimeric animal research involving human neural tissue.Sebastian Porsdam Mann, Rosa Sun & Göran Hermerén - 2019 - BMC Medical Ethics 20 (1):10.details
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The Evolution of the Human Self: Tracing the Natural History of Self‐Awareness.Mark R. Leary & Nicole R. Buttermore - 2003 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 33 (4):365-404.details
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A longitudinal study of the emerging self from 9 months to the age of 4 years.Susanne Kristen-Antonow, Beate Sodian, Hannah Perst & Maria Licata - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.details
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Understanding minds and selves.R. Peter Hobson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):132-132.details
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Imagination and imitation: Input, acid test, or alchemy?C. M. Heyes - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):131-132.details
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First person representations need a methodology based on simulation or theory.Robert M. Gordon - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):130-131.details
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Second person intentional relations and the evolution of social understanding.Juan Carlos Gomez - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129-130.details
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Moral competence is cognitive but (perhaps) nonmodular.Susan Dwyer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):128-129.details
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Pre-reflective self-as-subject from experiential and empirical perspectives.Dorothée Legrand - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):583-599.details
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Automata, receptacles, and selves.Paola Cavalieri & Harlan B. Miller - 1999 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 5.details
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