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[In French]Both Patočka and Merleau-Ponty conceive the world not just as an Object, but rather as a field of an irreducible phenomenal and ontological depth. Patočka’s concept of movement and Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh are two concrete figures of this depth, and as such they are understood by the respective authors as that what stands at the origin of every singular being so far as it detaches itself on the ground of the world as an open totality. Nevertheless, the position (...) |
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The volume Applied Ethics. Perspectives from Romania is the first contribution that aims at showing to the Japanese reader a sample of contemporary philosophy in Romania. At the same time a volume of contemporary Japanese philosophy is translated into Romanian and will be published by the University of Bucharest Press. -/- Applied Ethics. Perspectives from Romania includes several original articles in applied ethics and theoretical moral philosophy. It is representative of the variety of research and the growing interest in applied (...) |
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El artículo analiza desde una perspectiva fenomenológica y hermenéutica el modo originario de donación del mundo y el origen del mundo en el pensamiento de Jan Patočka posterior a 1965. Primero muestra en qué sentido tanto la donación del mundo como horizonte, cuanto los movimientos de la existencia humana, implican un vínculo esencial entre el modo originario de darse del mundo y la noción de infinito, concebido como lo indefinido e inagotable. Finalmente explicita por qué el vínculo del mundo con (...) |
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Un primer aspecto concierne a la praxis no-intencional y primaria del cuerpo propio. A ello se añade su condición de sostén para los valores sensibles de la comodidad y la salud, y de trampolín para valores espirituales cuyo nivel superior se encuentra en los valores éticos de la persona. Estos puntos de vista husserlianos encuentran nuevos desarrollos en la fenomenología: M. Henry pone el acento en un "yo puedo" pre-intencional, y Ricoeur describe el cuerpo propio como "fuente" de valores propios (...) |
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The history of philosophy would not have needed to wait for Heidegger if Hegel had taught us that the transformation from hypokeimenon to subiectum introduced by Descartes is due to the transformation from truth to certainty, which he introduces too. So, taking for subject this certainty, which makes the certainty of subject, we aim to understand that before the truth of man was distorted, the truth itself? the ontological and antepredicative truth, i.e. aletheia? was with him. |
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In ‘Wondering the world directly’, Erin Manning criticizes phenomenology by drawing upon Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on the problems of his own project and the criticisms of José Gil. Manning claims that phenomenology goes ‘wrong’ in its privileging of the subject and processes of intentionality: the ‘consciousness–object distinction’. While phenomenology on this understanding alone is inadequate to account for movement and the body, process philosophy has the ‘ability to create a field for experience that does not begin and end with a human (...) |
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The purpose of this paper is to lay out the similarities between the philosophical projects of Patočka and Merleau-Ponty, with respect to the question of the “limits of phenomenology”. We suggest that both these authors propose two complementary strategies in their attempt of overcoming the Husserlian phenomenology. The first one consists in extending the field of phenomenology so as for it to be able to encompass phenomena either insufficiently explored or misinterpreted by the conceptuality that Husserl put forth; the second (...) |
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Este texto presenta en un primer momento el movimiento propio de la fenomenología a-subjetiva de Patočka a partir de su crítica de la versión subjetivista del aparecer, para así posteriormente mostrar una dinámica fenomenológica que comprende la manifestación como la obra misma del mundo. En este sentido, el destino de la fenomenología se trasciende en la elaboración del a priori universal de la correlación que estipula la universalidad de una manifestación anónima. Es así que finalmente la fenomenología se modifica en (...) |
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This paper aims to articulate the way in which Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jan Patočka revisit the figure of Socrates as a way of overcoming what they view as the “crisis of philosophy”, discussing both their points of convergence and divergence. To this end, the paper unfolds in three sections. The first section will address the general sense of historical crisis in which the said crisis of philosophy arises. The second section turns around Merleau-Ponty’s proposal of a return to Socrates as (...) |
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The main goal of my inquiry is to lay out the proximity between Patočka’s and Ricœur’s readings of Husserl’s Krisis and to stress the role played by the concept of the life-world in the unfolding of their original philosophical undertakings. In the first part, I show the importance both Patočka and Ricœur assignedto the Husserlian project of an “ontology of the life-world”. In the second part, I expose the criticism these two authors addressed to Husserl’s understanding of the life-world and, (...) |
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_Phénoménologie de la perception _es, sin duda, una de las obras más potentes del pensamiento francés del siglo XX. Allí se plantea una pregunta antigua y novedosa al mismo tiempo, en el cruce de la filosofía fenomenológico-existencial con diversas disciplinas que se ocupan del viviente humano: ¿quién es el sujeto de percepción? Merleau-Ponty responderá en esta obra ya clásica: el cuerpo vivido. Éste será, a su vez, caracterizado como un tipo particular de movimiento, que, en el camino de la fenomenología (...) |
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In this paper we will highlight the Hegelian heritage in Patočka and Ricœur’s thoughts. This heritage is particularly clear in their ideas of gift of self and of community bonding. The critical resumption of Hegel leads the two philosophers to discover some forms of recognition that overtake the struggle to the death, i.e. the two figures of the gift of self: the ceremonial gift and the authentic sacrifice. Patočka and Ricœur compare to Hegel also on the political thought. On one (...) |
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My paper aims to elucidate the emergence of subjectivity from the interplay between living beings and their environment. This attempt to give account of becoming-subject within the life itself leads to a confrontation between the phenomenology of life pursued since at least two decades by Renaud Barbaras with Canguilhem´s philosophy of biology. It starts with a criticism of Merleau-Ponty’s and Patočka´s respective failures to overcome the contrast between the level of bare life and the level of human existence. In order (...) |
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The phenomenon of birth is here to be presented as a crucial one, discreet though, into Merleau-Ponty and Patočka’s philosophy. So it deserves a confrontation of their respective thoughts. Both of them have radicalised Husserl’s phenomenology into a philosophy of birth. This phenomenological achievement includes an ontology of birth, which feeds an anthropology in a brand new way, presented in the following pages. |
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The question I intend to answer is whether one can speak of a tacit metaphysics, not expressed conceptually, but nevertheless common. If the answer is positive and providing that it is specific to day-to-day life, such metaphysics may be called everyday metaphysics. To this end, I review the meaning of everyday life and its ambivalent character. Next, I present several milestones in the debate on the subject, from authors who have focused on a kind of usual, common or ‘natural’ metaphysics. (...) |
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