Converging data from different disciplines are showing the role of classical conditioning processes in the elaboration of human and animal behavior to be larger than previously supposed. Restricted views of classically conditioned responses as merely secretory, reflexive, or emotional are giving way to a broader conception that includes problem-solving, and other rule-governed behavior thought to be the exclusive province of either operant conditiońing or cognitive psychology. These new views have been accompanied by changes in the way conditioning is conducted and (...) evaluated. Data from a number of seemingly unrelated phenomena such as relapse to drug abuse by postaddicts, the placebo effect, and the immune response appear to involve classical conditioning processes. Classical conditioning, moreover, has been found to occur in simpler and simpler organisms and recently even demonstrated in brain slices and in utero. This target article will integrate the several research areas that have used the classical conditioning process as an explanatory model; it will challenge teleological interpretations of the classically conditioned CR and offer some basic principles for testing conditioning in diverse areas. (shrink)

People cannot contemplate a proposition without believing that proposition. A model of belief fixation is sketched and used to explain hitherto disparate, recalcitrant, and somewhat mysterious psychological phenomena and philosophical paradoxes. Toward this end I also contend that our intuitive understanding of the workings of introspection is mistaken. In particular, I argue that propositional attitudes are beyond the grasp of our introspective capacities. We learn about our beliefs from observing our behavior, not from introspecting our stock beliefs. -/- The model (...) of belief fixation offered in the dissertation poses a novel dilemma for theories of rationality. One might have thought that the ability to contemplate ideas while withholding assent is a necessary condition on rationality. In short, it seems that rational creatures shouldn‘t just form their beliefs based on whatever they happen to think. However, it seems that we are creatures that automatically and reflexively form our beliefs based on whatever propositions we happen to consider. Thus, either the rational requirement that states that we must have evidence for our beliefs must be jettisoned or we must accept the conclusion that we are necessarily irrational. (shrink)

ArgumentIn the 1940s–50s, one of the most central questions in psychological research related to the nature of neurosis. In the final years of the Second World War and the following decade, neurosis became one of the most prominent psychiatric disorders, afflicting a high proportion of military casualties and veterans. The condition became central to the concerns of several psychological fields, from psychoanalysis to Pavlovian psychology. This paper reconstructs the efforts of Chicago psychiatrist Jules Masserman to study neurosis in the laboratory (...) during the 1940s and 1950s. Masserman used Pavlovian techniques in a bid to subject this central psychoanalytic subject to disciplined scientific experimentation. More generally, his project was an effort to bolster the legitimacy of psychoanalysis as a human science by articulating a convergence of psychoanalytic categories across multiple species. Masserman sought to orchestrate a convergence of psychological knowledge between fields that were often taken to be irreconcilable. A central focus of this paper is the role of moving images in this project, not only as a means of recording experimental data but also as a rhetorical device. The paper argues that for Masserman film played an important role in enabling scientific observers to see agency and emotion in the animals they observed. (shrink)

The ArgumentIn different contexts, beginning with different concerns, Pavlov, James, and Freud tried to achieve a neurophysiological explanation of mind, and suffered defeat. James and Freud acknowledged the defeat and attempted, in radically different ways, to construct an interim psychology, hoping that neural explanation would be achieved in the future. Pavlov came to the effort in his fifties, after decades of research that took for granted a sharp separation between neurophysiology and psychology. He changed his mind as he noticed the (...) descent of his discipline from study of whole-body and organ functions to concentration on the neuron and the molecule. Pavlov thought to save the discipline from chaos by providing laws of “higher nervous activity” to serve as an organizing framework. Hence his stubborn refusal to acknowledge the obvious errors in his supposed neural explanation of conditioned reflexes. The Russian context of ideological division and extreme social conflict reinforced the unwitting retreat of Pavlov and his school into a scientistic counterculture, while claiming to be developing the ultimate neural explanation of the mind. In countries of less extreme conflicts, classical conditioning continued to be a focal point of discord between psychologists who accept the inevitability of mentalist concepts and neuroscientists who insist that they must be avoided. In any context, neural explanation of mental phenomena has been a project that is impossible to avoid and impossible to accomplish. (shrink)