My aim in this paper is twofold: to establish that Kierkegaard's so‐called theory of the leap strongly anticipates a line of argument that is central to Wittgenstein's so‐called rule‐following considerations; and to begin to show how Kierkegaard's work has fruitful contributions of its own to make to on‐going discussions about rules and rule‐following. The paper focuses throughout on the question of how, if at all, human rule‐following can be distinguished from behaviour that is merely mechanical or instinctual. I identify a (...) central line of argument in Wittgenstein that problematizes this question by establishing the basis our ability to follow rules in our spontaneous responses. I argue that Kierkegaard not only strongly anticipates this line of argument but also offers a distinctive story about what, at bottom, makes the difference between human rule‐following and behaviour that is merely mechanical or instinctual. In a word, on Kierkegaard's story, what makes the difference is: anxiety. (shrink)

While there have been numerous claims of a resemblance between the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Zen Buddhism, few studies of the philosophy of Wittgenstein in detailed comparison with specific Zen thinkers have emerged. This paper attempts to fill this gap by considering Wittgenstein’s philosophy in relation to that of Eihei Dōgen, founder of the Sōtō school of Zen. Points of particular confluence are found in both thinkers’ approaches to language, experience, and practice. Through an elucidation of these points, this (...) paper argues that both Dōgen and Wittgenstein can be understood as putting forth a philosophy of transcendent ethics. (shrink)

Today, the notion of identity is usually linked with ethical-political discussions like multiculturalism, gender or sexual diversity, recognition of plurality, etc. Nevertheless, the flourishing of this vision that interprets “identity” mainly in its plural form (as “identities”) contrasts sharply with the sense that “identity” has had during most of the history of philosophy (in which identity was understood in connection with “unity” or “selfsameness”, not with “diversity” or “otherness”). In order to explain the passage from one notion of identity to (...) the other (a passage mainly made in the last third of the 20th century), we will focus on the reflections made by Ludwig Wittgenstein towards the middle of that century. Our contention is that these reflections open the way to a more plural understanding of human identity, against the many interpreters of Wittgenstein that defend the opposite: that he offered a strong notion of common human identity in his writings, a notion based on the idea of “human nature”. In order to sustain our thesis, we will have to give an interpretation of some key terms of Wittgenstein’s philosophy (like “forms of life” or “natural history”) from a pluralistic point of view; this is the only way of understanding to what extent he is a predecessor of contemporary discussions about plural identities. (shrink)

Interpretations of Wittgenstein’s work notoriously fuel debate and controversy. This holds true not only with respect to its main messages, but also to questions concerning its unity and purpose. Tradition has it that his intellectual career can be best understood if carved in twain; that we can get a purchase on his thinking by focusing on and contrasting his, “two diametrically opposed philosophical masterpieces, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and the Philosophical Investigations (1953)” (Hacker 2001, 1). This is allegedly justified by (...) the supposition that these provide us with two, distinctive, “powerful complete world-pictures” (Hacker 2001, p. viii). Others object; holding that this simple division fails to take account of all the major breaks. They claim that, minimally, we ought to recognise at least three major moments in the progression of Wittgenstein's thought, taking stock of a final period in which On Certainty dominates. Still others reject the idea that the best interpretative results will come from regarding the development of his thinking in the stark terms of involving 'complete' changes of mind at all. On the contrary, they argue that we will better understand his works if we emphasise their methodological continuity. For anyone interested in these matters, The Voices of Wittgenstein is an absolutely fascinating collection. It presents us with dictations by Wittgenstein and a series of other writings with his solid imprint; all of these were compiled and arranged (if not partly composed) by Waismann. Although Baker is clear that they did not come with any explicit account of their origin or purpose, it is possible to draw some reasonable inferences about these by consideration of the salient historical facts. (shrink)

Scepticism is sometimes expressed about whether there is any interesting problem of other minds. In this paper I set out a version of the conceptual problem of other minds which turns on the way in which mental occurrences are presented to the subject and situate it in relation to debates about our knowledge of other people's mental lives. The result is a distinctive problem in the philosophy of mind concerning our relation to other people.