- Responsibility, Reflection, and Rational Ability.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2020 - The Monist 103 (3):294-311.details
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Free Will and Epistemology: a Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Robert Lockie - 2018 - London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Merit, fit, and basic desert.Daniel Haas - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):226-239.details
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Luck’s Mischief and the Prescriptive Burden.Kelly McCormick - 2017 - Criminal Justice Ethics 36 (3):297-313.details
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Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018):1-81.details
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Three Recent Frankfurt Cases.Robert Lockie - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):1005-1032.details
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The Three-Fold Significance of the Blaming Emotions.Zac Cogley - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford studies in agency and responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 205-224.details
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In defense of hard-line replies to the multiple-case manipulation argument.Daniel Haas - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):797-811.details
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What kind of determination is compatible with what kind of freedom? – A reply to Marcelo Fischborn.Gilberto Gomes - 2019 - Filosofia Unisinos 20 (2):113-127.details
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Panentheism, Panpsychism and Neuroscience : In Search of an Alternative Metaphysical Framework in Relation to Neuroscience, Consciousness, Free Will, and Theistic Beliefs.Oliver Li - unknowndetails
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Source incompatibilism and the foreknowledge dilemma.Tina Talsma - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):209-219.details
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I could have done otherwise: Availability of counterfactual comparisons informs the sense of agency.Eugenia Kulakova, Nima Khalighinejad & Patrick Haggard - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 49:237-244.details
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