While blame is not a difficult practice to defend, in part because of its ineradicability in our moral lives, angry blame has been a tougher sell. Critics of angry blame cast it as an unnecessary, punitive, or unproductive practiceâone that should be either avoided or abandoned altogether. Against these views, I argue that anger has positive moral value and should remain on the table in our blaming practices. The argument proceeds by identifying a specific mode of angry blameâwhat I call (...) âauthority-focused resentmentââwhich is both apt and uniquely valuable in cases in which agentsâ standing as equals is under threat. Insofar as anger has value in these cases it should not be dismissed wholesale in favor of other blaming alternatives, as angerâs staunchest critics would recommend. For all the virtues of anger, it is not equally accessible to all. In final chapter of the project, I identify a distinct kind of harm that happens to oppressed agents when their anger fails to receive uptake. While feminist accounts of angerâs dismissal have tended to focus on its epistemic dimensions, I shift to consider the damage to oppressed subjectsâ moral agency. I argue that what is going on in the dismissal of marginalized agentsâ anger is not merely the loss of knowledge or the dismissal of testimony. Instead, we need a different paradigm to conceptualize the dismissal and its harms. If we understand angry blame as an invocation or an assertion of authority, then its dismissal is a refusal to comply and to recognize our authority as subjectsâan altogether different problem. (shrink)

In this chapter, I defend a novel account of contempt’s evaluative presentation by synthesizing relevant psychological work (Rozin et al. 1999; Fischer and Roseman 2007; Fischer 2011; Hutcherson and Gross 2011) with philosophical insights (Mason 2003; Bell 2005; Abramson 2009; Bell 2013). I then show how a concern about contempt’s status as an emotion involved in holding people accountable can be helpfully addressed. Finally, I gesture at an account of why, when we feel contemptuous toward people, our accountability responses involve (...) withdrawal and exclusion rather than approach and confrontation. (shrink)