Argumentation logicians have recognized a specter of relativism to haunt their philosophy of argument. However, their attempts to dispel pernicious relativism by invoking notions of a universal audience or a community of model interlocutors have not been entirely successful. In fact, their various discussions of a universal audience invoke the context-eschewing formalism of Kant’s categorical imperative. Moreover, they embrace the Kantian method for resolving the antinomies that continually vacillates between opposing extremes – here between a transcendent universal audience and a (...) context-embedded particular audience. This tack ironically restores the very external mediation they thought to obviate in their aim to ‘dethrone’ the absolutism and totalitarianism of formal logic with a democratic turn to audience adherence, the acceptability of premises and inferential links, and a contextual, or participant-relative, notion of cogency. (shrink)

Is there—or rather, ought there to be—a presumption of atheism, as Antony Flew so famously argued nearly half a century ago? It is time to revisit this issue. After clarifying the concept of a presumption of atheism, I take up the evaluative question of whether there ought to be a presumption of atheism, focusing on Flew’s arguments for an affirmative answer. I conclude that Flew’s arguments, one of which rests on an analogy with the presumption of innocence, fail.

There is an increasing need for norms to be embedded in technology as the widespread deployment of applications such as autonomous driving, warfare and big data analysis for crime fighting and counter-terrorism becomes ever closer. Current approaches to norms in multi-agent systems tend either to simply make prohibited actions unavailable, or to provide a set of rules which the agent is obliged to follow, either as part of its design or to avoid sanctions and punishments. In this paper we argue (...) for the position that agents should be equipped with the ability to reason about a system’s norms, by reasoning about the social and moral values that norms are designed to serve; that is, perform the sort of moral reasoning we expect of humans. In particular we highlight the need for such reasoning when circumstances are such that the rules should arguably be broken, so that the reasoning can guide agents in deciding whether to comply with the norms and, if violation is desirable, how best to violate them. One approach to enabling this is to make use of an argumentation scheme based on values and designed for practical reasoning: arguments for and against actions are generated using this scheme and agents choose between actions based on their preferences over these values. Moral reasoning then requires that agents have an acceptable set of values and an acceptable ordering on their values. We first discuss how this approach can be used to think about and justify norms in general, and then discuss how this reasoning can be used to think about when norms should be violated, and the form this violation should take. We illustrate how value based reasoning can be used to decide when and how to violate a norm using a road traffic example. We also briefly consider what makes an ordering on values acceptable, and how such an ordering might be determined. (shrink)

The article focuses on the new rhetoric category of quasi-logical arguments, defined as arguments similar to logical or mathematical demonstrations, and therefore having an effect on the audience. Connecting the similarity of arguments to formal demonstrations with the claim of effect on audience is conceived in this article as the thesis of effectiveness of quasi-logical arguments. The components of the thesis are reconstructed and analyzed, and their precise definitions are proposed. The analysis shows that the category of quasi-logical arguments is (...) ambiguously defined and currently includes three different concepts based on a different understanding of similarity. Subsequently, it is showed that based on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s works, the explanation of quasi-logical arguments’ effect on an audience can be offered in terms of socially shared standards of community or in terms of individual processing of arguments. It is shown that these explanations can be in conflict each other regarding the assumption of the addressee’s acquaintance with formal principles. (shrink)

Conscience rests within the heart of equity, yet it is a manifestly nebulous and contradictory concept. In particular, equity has never been clear about exactly whose conscience we are concerned with: the Chancellor or judge, or the court, or the defendant? Furthermore, in some lights conscience appears to compel obedience to the authority of law, whilst in others it gives expression to ethical drives that escape the formal strictures of legal rules. Contextualised within the broader history of ideas of Western (...) modernity, this article sets out to understand the rhetorical significance of conscience in equity, making the argument that its disparate and contradictory modes of expression do not undermine its significance, and instead are essential to its construction of juridical obligations. By invoking conscience as a contradictory expression of both vertical state authority and personal ethical autonomy, equity asserts not only a unique normative structure, but also a distinct mode of power. (shrink)

Arguers sometimes cite a decision made in an earlier situation as a reason for making the equivalent decision in a later situation. I argue that there are two kinds of “case-to-case arguments”. First, there are arguments by precedent, which cite the mere existence of the past decision as a reason to decide in the same way again now, independent of the past decision’s merits. Second, there are case-to-case arguments from parralel reasoning which presuppose that the past decision was justified and (...) are used to show that an equivalent present decision would also be justified. Both arguments are a type of argument by analogy. They differ in their structures and conditions of cogency, even though they often look the same in presentation. Their similar appearance poses a risk of miss-evaluation and fallacious use. Therefore a clearly theorized distinction is important. (shrink)

This paper approaches legal argumentation from a rhetorical perspective. It discusses the nature of the audiences that are targeted by judges in the legal process. Judicial opinions reach diverse groups of people with very different attitudes and expectations: other judges, lawyers, litigants, concerned citizens, etc. One important way in which these groups differ is that some of them are more likely to be persuaded by legalistic, precedent or statute-based arguments, while others expect judges to decide on grounds of justice or (...) equity. So, judges face the challenge of determining whether they should select particular groups for special attention, or whether they have alternative rhetorical means to approach the problem of audience diversity. One strategy that is likely to be recommended by rhetorical scholars is that judges should not try to accommodate the various preferences of their actual readership, but that they should rather invoke an idealized audience or some version of Chaïm Perelman’s universal audience. However, the paper tries to show that the universal audience is of limited value for a discussion about how judges ought to proceed in the face of audience diversity. In particular, the idea of a universal audience does not help judges to make the choice between a legalistic or an equity-based approach to legal decision-making. By showing that this is so, the paper also raises doubts about the common thought that to invoke the universal audience in law is to appeal to natural law. (shrink)

The theory of rhetoric is recognised and widely used in a number of disciplines, particularly in the social sciences. It is therefore slightly surprising that it has not gained an important footing in jurisprudence. It is often argued that rhetoric and argumentative justification are clearly different issues. However, the present paper argues that they are in fact two aspects of argumentation and that the theory of rhetoric may be used also in the context of legal reasoning.

. One of the most powerful accounts of the necessary connection between law and morality grounded on the openness of communication is provided by Robert Alexy, who builds a discourse theory of law on the basis of Habermas’ theory of general practical discourse. In this article I argue that the thesis based on the openness of legal discourse is problematic in that it does not provide a convincing account of the differentiation of legal discourse from other practical discourses. I offer (...) an understanding of the institutionalisation of legal discourse as the tacit commitment of the participants to their shared normative experience and in particular in: 1) the possibility of containing normative force in space, 2) the possibility of transforming word into deed, 3) the possibility of grasping and controlling time and 4) the possibility of transforming deed into word. That commitment of participants in legal discourse is revealed as a set of fundamental assumptions embedded in all legal utterances, which provide the necessary bedrock that makes communication possible. It also provides a basis for the institution of legal discourse, to the effect that their problematisation signifies a departure from the latter. (shrink)

This paper offers a novel situational approach to study organizational justice in which the proposed unit of analysis is managerial behavior manifested in argumentation rather than employee justice perceptions. The currently dominant theoretical framework in justice research, which is built on justice perceptions, neglects the unique features of organizational order and vulnerability of procedural justice perceptions. As the procedural justice concept belongs chiefly to a spontaneous market order under which the rule of law is made possible, it is inappropriate to (...) transfer this concept to an organization in which the rule of authority is dominant. Therefore, except the limited legal domain in which managerial freedom is restrained by laws, procedural justice in organizations represents a mirage that can give rise to hypocritical managerial actions that can legitimate morally controversial outcomes via eristic tactics. In contrast, interactional justice is of great importance to organizations in that employees and organizations can ensure their rational economic exchanges without deception. However, current formulations of interactional justice often regard interactions as a palliative recipe designed to alleviate reactions to outcomes and not as a constituent of distributive justice. Perelman’s argumentation theory can offer a new conceptualization of interactional justice that addresses this gap. (shrink)

By synthesizing the argumentation theory of new rhetoric with research on heuristics and motivated reasoning, we develop a conceptual view of argumentation based on reasoning motivations that sheds new light on the morality of decision-making. Accordingly, we propose that reasoning in eristic argumentation is motivated by psychological (e.g., anxiety reduction) or material (e.g., vested interests) gains that do not depend on resolving the problem in question truthfully. Contrary to heuristic argumentation, in which disputants genuinely argue to reach a practically rational (...) solution, eristic argumentation aims to defeat the counterparty rather than seeking a reasonable solution. Eristic argumentation is susceptible to arbitrariness and power abuses; therefore, it is inappropriate for making moral judgments with the exception of judgments concerning moral taboos, which are closed to argumentation by their nature. Eristic argumentation is also problematic for strategic and entrepreneurial decision-making because it impedes the search for the right heuristic under uncertainty as an ecologically rational choice. However, our theoretical view emphasizes that under extreme uncertainty, where heuristic solutions are as fallible as any guesses, pretense reasoning by eristic argumentation may be instrumental for its adaptive benefits. Expanding the concept of eristic argumentation based on reasoning motivations opens a new path for studying the psychology of reasoning in connection to morality and decision-making under uncertainty. We discuss the implications of our theoretical view to relevant research streams, including ethical, strategic and entrepreneurial decision-making. (shrink)

Based on the argumentation theory of new rhetoric, this paper offers an analytical framework to facilitate empirical investigations on how managers in organizations handle unfairness claims. The proposed framework advocates a rhetorical approach that seeks to understand whether managers absolve themselves of unfairness accusations by pseudo-legitimations. Pseudo-legitimation is defined as an attempt to legitimate an action without any genuine reasoning. While the precision of formal deductive reasoning tends not to apply to moral disputes, rhetoric enables rational argumentation and the use (...) of practical reasoning to achieve resolution. Therefore, if managerial judgments are genuine products of reasoning, managers' use of rhetoric to legitimate their actions should be respected in acknowledging value plurality within their boundaries of authority. By contrast, managerial legitimations that are based on irrational grounds should be disrespected, as they can lead to arbitrariness and abuse of power. Institutional dynamics may either permit or inhibit such uses of irrationality. Thus, the proposed framework should be considered alongside the perspective of rhetorical institutionalism. (shrink)

Humanist concerns to empower human beings and to promote justice inspired the modern argumentation movement. Turning to audience adherence and acceptability of inferential links raised a spectre of pernicious relativism that undermines concerns for justice. Invoking Perelman’s universal audi-ence as a remedy only begs the question with ‘whose universal audience?’ and frustrates fulfilling the jus-tice commitment. Turning discourse toward the common good better addresses concerns of justice and social justice.

Infusing logic with new rhetoric, dialogical pragmatics, and emphasizing argument context revolutionized the practice of logic. Critiquing oppressive practices and promoting justice, argumentationists empower participants to mediate their own argumentative situations. Against relativism to rescue the normative utility of good argument, argumentationists invoke the universal audience. Still, context-concerns eclipse its independence or resurrect rationalist absolutism. This vacillation imposes an external mediation that subverts establishing theoretical ground for promoting an empowering culture of justice.

This paper examines whether philosophers of argument, in spite of their disavowing ‘timeless principles’, nevertheless embrace a set of principles, or axioms, to underlie argumentation theory. First, it reviews the thinking of some prominent philosophers of argument; second, it extracts some principles common to their philosophies; and third, it draws out possible consequences for argumentation theory and asks whether such theory has an underlying political posture.