Through the reconstruction of Leibniz's theory of the degrees of knowledge, this e-book investigates and explores the intrinsic relationship of imagination with space and time. The inquiry into this relationship defines the logic of imagination that characterizes both human and non-human animals, albeit differently, making them two different species of imaginative animals. -/- Lucia Oliveri explains how the emergence of language in human animals goes hand in hand with the emergence of thought and a different form of rationality constituted by (...) logical inferences based on identity and contradiction, principles that are out of reach of the imagination. The e-book concludes that the presence of innate principles in human animals transforms the way in which they sense-perceive the world, thereby constantly increasing the distinction between human and non-human animals. -/- Keywords: human and non-human animals, Leibniz and Locke on ideas, Leibniz on bodies, Leibniz on conceivability, Leibniz on degrees of knowledge, Leibniz on degrees of perception, Leibniz on innate ideas, Leibniz on modality, Leibniz on similarity and congruence, Leibniz on space and time, Leibniz’s philosophy of language, theory of types. (shrink)

The philosophical nature of the two versions of paraphrasing the Gorgias’ treatise On Non-Being — the skeptical version by Sextus Empiricus and the peripatetic version by an anonymous author — are discussed. The paper gives a comparative analysis of the arguments upheld by the informants enunciating Gorgias’ thoughts, demonstrates the range of philosophical problems, which Gorgias considered, judging by the reports of his speech, and shows how both versions add to and clarify each other in terms of philosophical issues. The (...) work provides insights as to how Gorgias modernizes and transforms the initial attitudes of Parmenides, shifting the reasoning plan: from how thought can be directed to an object and the qualities of this object to how thought can be directed to the non-existent. Accordingly, the problems of intentionality in the Gorgias’ teaching are considered as well as the privileged status of any of mental states, the nature of word or speech as an autonomous way to develop knowledge about external objects, the issue of meaning as a reference, and inter-subjectivity in cognition. A conclusion is reached that giving preference to one of the paraphrasing versions impoverishes our understanding of the Gorgias’ teaching considerably, while the joint analysis of both versions demonstrates the engagement of the sophistic issues raised by Gorgias, in the philosophical and, particularly, the epistemological paradigm of the ancient as well as modern philosophy. (shrink)

Brentano’s account of intentionality has often been traced back to its scholastic sources. This is justified by his claim that objects of thought have a specific mode of being—namely, “intentional inexistence” —and that mental acts have an “intentional relation” to these objects. These technical terms in Brentano do indeed recall the medieval notions of esse intentionale, which is a mode of being, and of intentio, which is a “tending towards” of mental acts. However, within the lexical family of intentio there (...) is another distinction that plays an important role in medieval philosophy—namely, the distinction between first and second intentions, which are, roughly speaking, concepts of things and concepts of concepts respectively. What is less well-known is that Brentano explicitly borrowed this distinction as well, and used it in his account of intentionality. This paper explores this little-known chapter in the scholastic-Austrian history of intentionality by evaluating both the historical accuracy and the philosophical significance of Brentano’s borrowing of the scholastic distinction between first and second intentions. (shrink)

The paper argues in favour of a direct realist reading of Aquinas’s theory of intelligible species, in opposition to the recent representationalist challenges. In order to secure the direct realist reading, the paper follows three steps: a short description of Aquinas’s process of cognition, a survey of the direct realist arguments and the analysis of the representationalist interpretation. The final step consists of investigating the representationalist reading as it is suggested by two scholars, Claude Panaccio in Aquinas on Intellectual Representation (...) and Robert Pasnau in Theories of Cognition in the Latter Middle Ages. Thus, the paper can be construed as a reply to these two authors, due to the thorough attention paid to their argumentative trails. With regard to Panaccio’s reading the paper focuses on the identity between the intelligible species and the essence of the extra-mental object and argues that Panaccio understands identity in a very narrow sense. Concerning Pasnau’s line of reasoning the focus is on the primum cognitum status of the intelligible species, and the main argument is that intelligible species is understood by Aquinas as the quo and not the quod of cognition. As the paper shows, neither one, nor the other interpretation poses a threat to the direct realist reading of Aquinas’s intelligible species. (shrink)

Ockham developed two theories to explain the intentionality of memory: one theory that takes previously perceived things to be the objects of memory, and another that takes one’s own earlier acts of perceiving to be the objects of memory. This paper examines both theories, paying particular attention to the reasons that motivated Ockham to give up the first theory in favor of the second. It argues that the second theory is to be understood as a theory of double intentionality. At (...) the core of this theory is the thesis that one directly remembers one’s own acts, and indirectly also the objects of these acts. The paper analyzes the cognitive mechanism that makes this double intentionality possible and examines the causal account that Ockham gave for explaining the emergence of acts of remembering. It emphasizes that he accepted nothing more than a causal chain of acts and habits, thereby offering an ontologically parsimonious theory of memory. (shrink)

The last thirty years of scholarship in western medieval philosophical historiography have seen a number of reflections on the methodological paradigms, schools, trends, and dominant approaches in the field. As a contribution to this ongoing assessment of the existing methods of studies in medieval philosophy and theology and a supplement to classifications offered by M. Colish, J. Inglis, C. König-Pralong, J. Marenbon, A. de Libera, and others, the article offers another explanatory tool. Here is a description of an imaginary system (...) of methodological coordinates that systematizes the current tendencies by placing them in a three-dimensional system of axes. Every axis corresponds to a certain aspect of the historical and systematic research in medieval thought and symbolizes a possible movement between two extremes representing opposite methodological values and directions. The methods and approaches practiced in recent studies in medieval philosophy and theology might be schematically located inside this general system of argumentational, focal (or objectival), and (con)textual axes with their intersection identified with what some scholars call the “integral” model of study. This explanatory tool allows one to see how current approaches and methods form a panoply of axes that belong together in one complex grid and helps to visualize the tapestry of existing approaches in medieval philosophical historiography. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas is known for having endorsed the view that in our universe everything strives for a certain purpose. According to him not only rational agents act for the sake of specific ends, but every active substance does. It is this claim I reconstruct and discuss in this paper. I argue that it is based on Aquinas’ understanding of causality which is best – or so I suggest – conceived as a dispositional theory of causation. However, Aquinas does not only (...) provide a natural philosophical account of natural teleology. Rather, he substantiates this account by embedding the phenomenon of natural teleology into a monotheistic framework. As I will point out, this move leads to a severe tension in Aquinas’ theory of natural teleology and ultimately threatens to deprive him of his ability to account for the natural substances’ intrinsic teleology. Thomas von Aquin vertrat die Ansicht, dass in unserem Universum alles einen bestimmten Zweck anstrebt. Nicht nur rationale Akteure seien um eines gewissen Ziels tätig, sondern jede aktive Substanz. Hier rekonstruiere und diskutiere ich diese Ansicht. Ich führe aus, dass sie auf Thomas’ Kausalitätsverständnis beruht, das man am besten im Rahmen einer dispositionalen Kausalitätstheorie deuten sollte. Mit Rückgriff auf seinen Monotheismus liefert Thomas neben einer naturphilosophischen Erklärung auch eine theologische Erklärung der Naturteleologie. Wie ich argumentiere, führt diese theologische Einbettung der Naturteleologie zu einer Spannung, welche schließlich die Annahme intrinsischer Teleologie problematisch macht. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas and Hervaeus Natalis share a correlational theory of intentionality. When I cognize a thing, I am in a real relation with the thing cognized and at the same time the thing is in a relation of reason with me. Hervaeus coins the term “intentionality” to designate precisely this relation of reason. First and second intentionality express two stages of this relation. First intentionality refers to the relation that a thing has to the mind, while second intentionality indicates the (...) relation that a thing qua cognized has to the mind. Thus, first intentionality involves direct cognition, while second intentionality reflexive cognition. This theory of intentionality has two purposes: first, to de-psychologize the cognitive process and second, to allow the application of Aristotle’s table of categories to the sphere of the mental. Through his detailed analysis of the relation of intentionality, Hervaeus clarifies some of Thomas’s obscurer points, but at the same time he has to solve a delicate problem of circularity entailed by the notion of intentionality as a relation of reason. (shrink)

O objetivo principal deste artigo é analisar os objetos intencionais da teoria da intencionalidade em Franz Brentano em sua primeira fase, ou seja, no período de 1874 a 1904, por meio de sua análise mereológica da consciência. Nesse contexto, irei abordar os diferentes modos de consciência, os correlatos intencionais, a distinção entre seres real e existente assim como a distinção entre objeto e conteúdo na teoria brentaniana. No final, irei defender que o estatuto ontológico dos objetos que existem nos correlatos (...) intencionais e dos objetos representados ou conteúdos intencionais podem ser interpretados como sendo “neutros”, visto que eles são partes apenas conceituais ou abstratas de sua teoria mereológica. (shrink)

RESUMO Ainda que Tomás de Aquino não usasse o termo intencionalidade frequentemente, ele tem uma teoria que explica como nós, enquanto sujeitos, nos referimos intencionalmente aos objetos. Nossa referência funciona quando há uma "identidade formal" entre a forma no ato de percepção ou conhecimento do sujeito e a forma do objeto. Na literatura secundária, "identidade formal" é muitas vezes o nome usado para chamar essa teoria. Nosso artigo visa o fato de que, em Tomás, a tese da identidade formal não (...) é só epistemológica, mas ela exige uma base metafísico-ontológica. O resultado da nossa investigação é que, segundo a tese da identidade formal, a referência epistêmica aos objetos funciona de maneira direta, mas por meio disso ela não produz uma variedade de objetos imanentes ou intencionais na ontologia. ABSTRACT Even if Thomas Aquinas did not use the term intentionality often, He has a theory that explains how we, as subjects, intentionally refer to objects. Our reference works when there is a "formal identity" between the form in the act of perception or subject knowledge and the form of the object. In secondary literature, "formal identity" is the name used to refer to that theory. Our article aims at the fact that, in Thomas's writings, the formal identity thesis is not only epistemological, but requires a metaphysical-ontological basis. The result of our investigation is that, according to the formal identity thesis, the epistemic reference to objects works on a direct way, but by means of that it does not produce a variety of immanent or intentional objects within ontology. (shrink)